Theoretical Approaches on Continuity and Change in IR

Liberalization theories (Baccaro/Howell 2011; Streeck 2009)

Comparative employment relations (Doiglass/Ilies/Phillipps 2011; Benassil et al. 2016; both institutional and power)

European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)

Newer approaches (Hall 2014; Hopkins/Lutter 2014; highlig..)

Institutional complementarities within/across different spheres of political economy (e.g., L.R., corporate finance)

Economic Interests transformed by institutional institutional

varieties of capitalism (Hall/Soskice 2001)

Common trajectories of neoliberal institutional change: form and functioning of institutions towards greater employer discretion.
Who will have a say in economic policy – business experts or social partners?

Over legitimacy of different principles of domination (symbolic struggles)

Economic interests of actors

Habitus

Social fields (Bourdieu/Wacquant 1992), such as collective bargaining fields as

Our approach: Transnational Field Perspective
Local supply chains by international suppliers

Value chains were restuctured since economic crises 2008: Large and medium sized companies substituted by smaller ones. Lack of innovation and management competences, weak investments,

Italian metal sector:

(EMU effective)

Strong export-orientation, relatively quick recovery from crisis 2008/9, export position has strengthened

German metal sector:

Bargaining field (national, transnational)

A dominant position in transnational markets likely to correspond with subordinate position of collective baragaining field, nationally and transnationally (EU)

A dominant position in transnational markets likely to correspond with favorable position of collective bargaining

Assumptions:

Case selection
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<th>Size</th>
<th>Italy</th>
<th>Germany</th>
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*According to firm size: % of employees*  
*Industry employment in metal industry (Eurostat 2018)*

*Share in EU28’s total turnover in metal industry*
not subject to EU sanctions as it is the case for excessive wage growth. The speed-up of wage growth to productivity growth were rarely made and wage restraint is an asymmetric way to evaluate CB systems within the Eurozone. To Germany, requests to it wage-setting system remain unheeded. European Commission regularly demands reforms not aligned to productivity. 

- Italian CBOs considered as culprit for macroeconomic imbalances as wage increases restrained

- Social partners contributed to quick economic recovery (short-time work, wage export position)

- Moderate wage increases below productivity developments promoted Germany’s export position

- German field of collective bargaining (CB) enjoys high esteem among European and international actors. Why?

Transnational field of power:

Positions of collective bargaining fields
associations

- Habitats: fundamental change in values part of employers: legitimacy of CB party
- Increase of atypical employment and contractual differentiation among workforces
- Procedure to gain control over derogation was established
- Derogations from coll. agreements increasing up to 2004 when
- Introduction of OT-associations where members are not bound
- % of employees 1991-2017
- Members 1990-2004 and CB coverage declined from 70% to 49
- Employers' association Gesamthandel lost almost half of its

GERMAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FIELD
In particular in service sector:
- Increasing conflict-orientation of trade unions and increasing strike activity since mid-2000s.
- Introducing more flexibility in wage-setting, e.g., Differenzierungsgeregeln.
- Legal initiatives, e.g., Tarifvertrag mittelständischer Branche (2014) to strengthen collective agreements.
- Workers in metalworking and chemical industry since 2011 minimum wage for agency work, since 2012 branch-level supplements for agency work.
- Campaign: Same Wage, Same Work (2007): Participation of agency workers in internal structures.
- New organizing approaches and conditional collective bargaining.
- IG Metall's membership stabilized since 2010.

CONFLICTS FOR STABILITY?
(2018)

- Agreements on the modernization of IR between trade unions and employers’ associations

  - Health and pension insurance

- 2016 collective agreement includes innovative elements (e.g., vocational training, additional union(s) to strengthen national level of CB in order to modernize production system

- Deep crisis of the metal sector and pressure from EU led employers’ association and trade

- Extended from company to national level (2016)
  - Support, e.g., incentives to conclude collective agreement were moved

- Role of government in CB: challenged legitimacy (2011) of CB or

- Conflictual relations between trade unions and fragmented labour

ITALIAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING FIELD
- Trade unions: maintaining central level of CB.

- Employees' modernisation of production system by collective agreement.

- Solution: 2009-2011 crisis of IR in metal sector brought social partners to mobilize resources to find a joint solution.

- FIAT: let employers' association to conclude company-agreement, lead to conflict with strongest trade union (FIMI-CGL).

- ECB secret letter 2011: further decentralization, derogation from coll. agreements and labour legislation.

STRIEGELS AGAINST DECENTRALISATION
CONCLUSIONS

- Power resources alone do not explain developments in collective bargaining fields; it’s rather positions and dispositions of bargaining actors, affected also by field-external forces (e.g. EU, market and political fields), that might explain developments in collective bargaining fields.

- Perceptions and values of legitimacy of CB differ according to the position of actors in trans/national fields

- **DE**: high levels of legitimacy, structural and associational power have not helped social partners to re-extend the field but rather to reproduce bargaining institutions in the core of the field.

- **IT**: external pressure on CB institutions and severe economic problems gave rise to experimentation and strengthened belief in collective solutions. Mobilisation of trade unions and employers‘ association to avoid complete decentralisation of the system. BUT: fragile compromise
GERECHTIGKEIT MÜSSE SEIN

DIE KRAFT VON MEHR ALS DREI MILLIONEN
Collective Bargaining Coverage, EU