

Title: The Ideological Foundations of Three Types of Solidarity in Austria

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Abstract:

Solidarity is a term and concept many appeal to, especially during crises. It also enjoys a long tradition within social sciences but nevertheless remains a rather ambiguous term with many open questions attached. Based on theoretical literature, this article introduces a multi-dimensional concept of solidarity by combining opinions regarding global, institutional, group-oriented and supportive dimensions of solidarity, or a lack thereof. This allows for differentiation between three types of solidarity: a universal, an exclusive, and a lack of

solidarity. These types are further seen as embedded in ideologies. This is empirically tested via survey data and multiple linear regression models. This approach allows for closing an existing gap between the theoretical and empirical literature and to more thoroughly examine the relation between solidarity and the perception of groupings, belongings, and deservingness. The latter is necessary to contrast the different types of solidarity, which tends to go unnoticed.

Introduction

On many occasions – not least during the Covid-19 pandemic – citizens have been called upon to show solidarity. In recent years, researchers have increasingly investigated solidary attitudes and actions. Yet, in spite of the long tradition of the concept of solidarity in social sciences, it has remained a rather ambiguous term that has left many questions unanswered.

While some conceptualise solidarity in a binary way, i.e. contrasting solidary with non-solidary orientations, others suggest arranging expressions of solidarity on a continuum (Stjerno, 2005). Differences also relate to how many and what dimensions capture solidarity best. Empirical research is also inconclusive regarding the causes of solidarity. What leads people to show solidarity with others in their attitudes or actions? Often, and particularly in quantitative research, the answers reside in socio-demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of different groups of people. Since this has not been particularly fruitful, we suggest in this contribution to additionally focus on ideologies. This allows for analysing the influence of authoritarian, racialising, nationalist, and success ideologies. This means seeing solidarity as

embedded in different views and assessments of the world, thereby advancing or inhibiting certain types of solidarities e.g. a universal solidarity vs. a solidarity excluding certain members. Starting from a multi-dimensional concept of solidarity and understanding it as a continuum, this paper addresses the influence of ideologies on solidary attitudes and actions. It introduces a concept of solidarity that unites different aspects of solidarity that were previously addressed separately. Solidarity is constructed here as a combination of opinions of global, institutional, group-oriented and supportive solidarity, or a lack thereof. This allowed for differentiation between three types of solidarity: universal or exclusive solidarity and a lack of solidarity. The influence of ideologies is analysed via survey-based data and by several multiple linear regression models with socioeconomic characteristics as control variables.

For the empirical analysis, Austria is taken as an example, allowing an interesting case study on the topic of solidarity and ideology: As the first country within the European Union with a far-right party in government (2000-2005), it showcased early on that racist and authoritarian ideologies are not only at the margins but mainstream and widespread. Since 2017, the conservative party has openly shifted to a right-wing anti-migrant stance while maintaining its anti-welfare position. In general, the Austrian welfare state is described as a conservative, male-breadwinner welfare regime under constant pressure to economise (Österle & Heitzmann, 2019), allowing insights into complex views on institutionalised solidarity. Hence, while Austria shares several traits with many other countries at least within the EU, it has often been at the forefront when it comes to (modern) debates of welfare and the advancement of right-wing politics.

In the following chapter, the notion of solidarity as a continuum is discussed from different points of view. Then, Stuart Hall's conceptualisation of ideologies is introduced before arguing

for the influence of ideologies on solidarity. An overview of the current state of research leads into the research question and the relevant data for the empirical analysis. The operationalisation of the three solidarity concepts is then outlined before the presentation of the survey outcome. The paper closes with a discussion of the merits of a multifaceted conceptualisation of solidarity and a conclusion stressing the importance of considering ideologies for explaining different types of solidarity.

Solidarity as Continuum or the Many Faces of Solidarity

Within most social theories and literature, solidarity is seen as a relevant social force. Usually, solidarity denotes one of many ways how humans are connected to form a group or community (Smith & Sorrell, 2014, p. 228). Often, the argument follows that it relies on an emotionally underpinned mutual connection subjectively seen as meaningful (Prisching, 2011, p. 158) and therefore generates expectations of support tied to legitimate aims of the solidary community. As a consequence, people are not only ready to support each other even at their own expense but also to legitimise exclusion by limiting solidarity to members of a certain group.

As far as more precise definitions are concerned, what is considered solidarity varies from study to study and approach to approach. This ranges from a general means of social ordering of contemporary societies to one or more concepts indicating that social coexistence can (or should) not be reduced to power and occasionally shared individual interests alone (e.g. Beckert et al., 2004). A wide variety of understandings can be found even at the level of the individual dimensions of the concept (Lessenich et al., 2020): between social and political solidarity; between institutionalised norms and individual behaviour; between particularism and universalism; or between unilateralism and reciprocity.

For the purpose of this contribution, we use a multi-dimensional concept of solidarity to do justice to the multidimensional nature of the term. Following Stjernø (2005), solidarity is conceptualised as a continuum, which goes beyond contrasting solidarity with its absence. Stjernø argues that solidarity is differentially enacted according to four aspects – the foundations (e.g. shared interests, altruism), the objective or function (e.g. strengthening of a certain community, reaching a common goal), who is included and excluded, and how strongly it is oriented towards collectivity or individualism.

This approach is also supported by the empirical literature, which stresses an open-ended notion of solidarity. In quantitative studies, solidarity gets operationalised into specific social contexts with the focus on various selected aspects of solidarity. In the anthology *Solidarity in Europe*, edited by Lahusen and Grasso (2018), it is addressed as social activism, from attending marches, donating money, food, and/or time, boycotting, and active and passive membership in organisations that support different vulnerable groups (refugees, unemployed, disabled). Denz (2003) also counts general attitudes e.g. towards the importance of sharing, redistribution, etc., and the readiness to support and include (or exclude) different members of society as aspects of solidarity. The broad literature on the acceptance of the welfare state can also be classified as addressing a specific form of institutionalised solidarity (Grausgruber, 2019; Kootstra, 2016; Svallfors, 1997). Welfare support is also addressed by Gerhards et. al. (2019) as one form of transnational solidarity at the European level. Furthermore, Arndt (2018) conceptualises solidarity via questions of income redistribution versus marked allocation.

The Significance of Ideologies for Understanding Solidarity

What are the foundations of solidarity? As Smith and Sorrell (2014) summarise, the foundation of solidarity is both objective and subjective. *Objective* in this sense implies that certain

sociodemographic and socioeconomic characteristics of actors may generate situations in which individuals align with group advantages and goals. These shared interests due to similar social positions (can) stimulate coordinated actions. What causes solidarity attitudes and actions is therefore often derived from these characteristics. This includes, among others, access to social resources like income or education tied to social status, but also dominant gender roles (see e.g. Lahusen & Grasso, 2018) and social class within capitalist societies (see e.g. Prisching, 2011). The *subjective* dimension, on the other hand, broaches the issue how these similarities are recognised in the first place. As a shared common interest alone does not guarantee consolidated action and support, it relies on a definition of the situation and its perception. Here ideologies come into play as this definition is not left to the subjects alone. *Subjective definitions* are strongly connected to concepts of *ideas* or *world views* as introduced by Max Weber and ideologies as elaborated by Stuart Hall. It is Hall's conceptualisation of ideologies that will be used to conceptualise the subjective foundations of solidarity.

Hall discusses ideologies in the sense of 'mental frameworks – the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thoughts, and the systems of representation – which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out and render intelligible the way society works' (Hall, 1986, p. 29). Social actors rely on ideological frameworks to act out the different and sometimes even contradictory social roles, e.g. workers, consumers, citizens, voters, etc. By doing so, it may 'naturalise' social relations and offer 'positions of identification and knowledge' to claim 'authentic truths' about society, the world, and everything (2016, p. 151f). Racism and sexism are dominant ideologies that work in this way: they mask the power structure at work and arrange the allocation of material and cultural resources accordingly (Hall, 2016, p. 174f).

Solidarity can be seen as being embedded in a multitude of competing ideologies or, to adapt a phrase by Hall, solidarity intentions are formulated ‘within ideologies’ (Hall, 2021, p. 100). Ideologies permeate the shape and form of solidarity, including what it entails or lacks, which justifies assigning certain specifications such as ‘inclusive,’ ‘universal,’ ‘exclusive,’ ‘fascist,’ etc. (Flecker et al., 2018; Stjernø, 2005). This view is shared by Börner (2018) when speaking of the ‘elasticity of solidarity’ constructed by patterns of inclusion and exclusion inscribed in practices and institutions and in a similar vein by Nowicka et al. (2019, p. 393) by connecting transnational solidarity to discourses oscillating ‘between cosmopolitan inclusiveness and religious and ethnic exclusiveness.’

State of Research

A significant number of studies focus on attitudes toward the welfare state as one form of institutionalised solidarity. Van Oorschot (2000) stresses the relevance of notions of ‘deservingness’ in a survey study on the willingness to grant public support. There, deservingness is strongly tied to ascribed origin, willingness to work, having contributed to society, and being in real need. Several studies also identified a connection between ‘racial attitudes’ and the rejection of welfare measures (see Gilens, 1995 for the U.S. and Harell et al., 2016; and Hjorth, 2016 for Europe), which is also tightly connected to the deservingness topic. Kluegel and Myano (1995) tested the influence of another kind of ideology on the support for the welfare state, namely ‘justice beliefs.’ Besides egalitarianism and a belief in the general fairness of the market, they also included ‘success ideology,’ i.e. the view that equal opportunity is already realised. All three justice beliefs are discussed as influential. Several authors draw similar conclusions, stating that the opinion towards the welfare state can be mainly explained by ideologies (see e.g. Corneo & Grüner, 2002; Grausgruber, 2019).

Beyond institutionalised solidarity in the form of the welfare state, the connection between solidarity and ideology has been less thoroughly examined thus far. Based on survey data from Austria, Denz (2003) shows a negative connection between authoritarianism and solidarity with foreigners but a slightly more positive one with support for neighbours and the elderly. A similar relation was observed by Maggini (2018, p. 154) for Italy, with authoritarian views negatively connected to support for refugees and religiosity positively connected to support for refugees, the unemployed, and disabled persons. In the same study, solidarity is also shown as being connected to certain conditions (e.g. access to social support just for migrants who pay taxes) and notions of deservingness. Nowicka et al. (2019) point toward ‘cosmopolitan’ versus ‘particularistic’ boundary setting through media discourses and everyday conversations underpinning transnational solidarity manifested in support for refugees.

There are, however, three major shortcomings within these studies. First, most focus on one type of ideology alone. Second, ideologies are often delegated to an ancillary role below social status when explaining solidary opinions. Due to this, the ideology variables are given rather little and unsystematic attention, if at all (e.g. Lahusen & Grasso, 2018). This is quite surprising, as sociodemographic and -economic variables themselves often hold little to no explanatory power within these studies compared to ideology (e.g. Denz, 2003; Grausgruber, 2019; Maggini, 2018). For example, political opinions show significantly more influence than the sociodemographic and economic variables within Grausgruber’s (2019, p. 470) analyses of attitudes toward support for the unemployed within the Austrian Social Survey. However, the text discussing the outcome of the survey spends little time on the role of attitudes and ideologies compared to socioeconomic standing.

The third shortcoming is that the relationship between ideologies and solidarity is not explicitly elaborated and reflected upon. Typically, ideology is seen as influencing solidary attitudes, but

it is not explicitly discussed or argued for; however, two implicit arguments can be found in the literature.

First, solidarity is conceptualised and operationalised in more concrete terms pointing towards action or more precise opinions towards social or political topics e.g. donation (time and money) or public support for the unemployed or refugees. Ideology, on the other hand, is formulated in more general terms e.g. left-right scale, items like ‘this country needs strong leaders’ on the authoritarianism scale. Ideology forms a more general state of the mental frameworks in which more concrete solidarity opinions and actions are embedded.

Second, the concept of deservingness underlying solidarity as addressed in several studies is tightly connected to the notion of ideology as discussed before. The categories (e.g. majority vs. minority, hard-working vs. lazy) used to distinguish between those deserving and undeserving of solidarity and support are not inscribed in the notions of solidarity itself. Ideologies introduce and offer the categories on which questions like who should get what and why can be based.

In summary, the literature discussed suggests an understanding of solidarity as necessarily multidimensional and multifaceted and rooted in complex social arrangements. It shows that solidarity has many shapes and forms irreducible to specific actions or attitudes. The empirical literature, however, mainly focuses on separate dimensions of solidarity, on single attitudes and actions classified as either solidary or not. The multidimensional character of solidarity is largely left unexplored. This is also the case for the subjective or ideological foundation of solidarity. If considered at all, only selected ideologies have been considered in the empirical literature. How different ideologies taken together may steer solidarity attitudes and actions has not yet been analysed.

Research Question and Data

Based on the discussion of the literature, two main research questions instruct the empirical study: How are different multidimensional nonbinary types of solidarity distributed among the (survey) population and what are their ideological foundations?

The empirical analysis is based on a telephone survey conducted between July and September 2017 in Austria. The survey's target population was economically active and aged 18-65 years, regardless of citizenship. People in training, retirement, maternity leave, or for other reasons were not working for a long period of time, were deliberately excluded; however, unemployment was included. The contact data were randomly selected from public registries and from a contact database created and maintained by the polling institute to compensate for missing entries in the public registry. The random phone number sample, however, was accompanied by a quota selection based on age, gender, and region, copying a distribution provided by the federal statistics institute. The survey was conducted in German, hence there is an unintended bias due to language skills. The realised sample size is 1,004 interviewees. For the analysis, unweighted data were used as the main research questions primarily concern correlation rather than distribution.¹

With data collection ending with September 2017, the survey covers the time shortly before the general election of 2017, resulting in a conservative-right wing coalition government formed by the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the Freedom Party Austria (FPÖ) that lasted for two years. The short timespan before election day allowed for gathering the opinions and attitudes

¹ The survey data are available via the GESIS data archive.

that may have led to the final election decision. Hence, a certain overlap between the survey and the respective part of the electoral population is assumed.

Operationalising and Measuring Multidimensional Solidarity

The research question poses two challenges regarding the operationalisation of the solidarity items. First, it should not reduce solidarity to binary types (solidarity vs. non-solidarity) and second, solidarity should not be reduced to one aspect e.g. welfare state support, but should rather combine the varying elements. To address the latter challenge, we consider four different dimensions of solidarity, which will be described here in more detail.

a) Institutional Solidarity in the Form of Welfare State Support

Due to the generally high approval rate of the welfare state in Austria, as Grausgruber (2019) recently analysed, the operationalisation does not focus on the rejection or acceptance of the welfare state but on the way welfare support is tied to certain terms and conditions. The Austrian welfare state incorporates (at least) two ways for claiming welfare support – either based on previous contributions (mainly insurance e.g., unemployment, retirement) or demand-based (e.g., basic income, free education). These form different types of solidarity, namely solidarity that must be earned versus solidarity granted if needed. The first fits the notion of an exclusive and the latter of a *universal* solidarity. A rejection of solidarity opposes both possibilities, being neither in favour of nor opposed to contribution-based welfare support.

b) Labour-Market Favouritism Due to Citizenship

Positions on the regulation of the Austrian labour market for non-Austrian (or more prominently non-EU) citizens express different solidarity positions by the different actors involved. Restricted access for non-citizens or favouring Austrian/European workers when hiring or firing may aim to strengthen the rights, opportunities, and privileges of Austrian workers by excluding migrants from workers' solidarity. Following Dörre (2018) and Flecker et.al. (2018),

this forms a kind of *exclusive solidarity* that has been strongly favoured by right-wing parties since the 90s.

Unrestricted access to the labour market, however, does not necessarily equal universal solidarity. Demands for unrestricted access to the labour market can also stem from the desire for better access to (anticipated cheaper) labour forces (see e.g. Hödl et al., 2000, p. 32ff). Solidarity is not aimed for here. On the contrary, it may even intend to weaken workers' solidarity on the national level.

However, better access to the labour market can nevertheless also stand for inclusive or *universal* solidarity - an inclusion of migrant workers into the historically hard-won workers' solidarity in Austria, not just for the migrants' sake but with mutual benefits.

c) Support for Socially Vulnerable Groups (Long-Term Unemployed and Refugees)

In 2017, the support granted for refugees was and still is limited to satisfying fundamental needs. Demanding more support for refugees can be seen as *universal* solidarity. On the other hand, demanding less support strengthens *exclusive* solidarity. Maintaining the given level of support more strongly fits another type that was also identified in the qualitative interviews conducted in framework of the project *Solidarity in Times of Crisis* (SOCRIS). This type refers to fleeing as a reward-worthy accomplishment, thus making it achievement-oriented and less based on solidarity. The kind and level of support for refugees given at the time of the survey represents this kind of support – enough to survive on but not enough to thrive on.

Regarding long-term unemployment, notions of *universal* and (primarily nationality-oriented) *exclusive* solidarity share similar orientations towards more support (at least if not racially charged see e.g. Gilens, 1995). Demanding less support, on the other hand, more strongly associates with a lack or *rejection* of solidarity.

d) Global Solidarity

Solidarity beyond the nation state is translated here into a demand for regular payments and support by countries profiting from global social inequality even at the cost of individual expenses. Approval is seen as a kind of *universal* and rejection as *exclusive* solidarity, e.g. nation or origin-bound entitlement, as well as a *lack of solidarity*.

Table 1 displays the dimensions and the questionnaire items.

Dimension	Questions
Institutional solidarity in the form of contribution-based welfare state support	Only those who pay taxes and contributions should get social benefits. *
Labour market favouritism due to citizenship	When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to Austrians over immigrants. *
Support for socially vulnerable groups or lack thereof	To what extent would you say the state should help the groups listed below more to improve their situation, where 3 means that government should give more help, 2 means the same level of help and 1 means government should give less help? Included refugees and long-term unemployed
Global redistribution	People in rich countries should pay an additional tax to help people in poor countries. *

***Answers: 1 totally disagree, 2 disagree, 3 neither nor, 4 agree, 5 totally agree.**

Table 1 Overview - Dimension and Questions of the solidarity variables used to construct the three types of solidarity.

For the next step, approval and rejection of these items are used to construct different types of solidarity based on the literature. The function of solidarity as described by Stjernø (2005) was considered to differentiate between an *exclusive* (strengthening certain groups or communities) and a *universal* solidarity (improving society) in general. *Exclusivity* and *inclusivity* are also features of solidarity in their own right as the literature on the political far-right prominently points out (Dörre, 2018; Flecker et al., 2018). Solidarity may additionally be oriented *transnationally*, as described by Beckert et al. (2004) and Nowicka et al. (2019), further strengthening its *universal* characteristics. Orientation towards *individualism*, on the other hand, points toward a general *lack of solidarity* (Stjernø, 2005).

This allows for constructing three types of solidarity – universal, exclusive, and a lack of solidarity. The three types are constructed via combinations of answers. For example, agreeing that welfare support should be exclusively tied to preceding contributions is used as an indicator of exclusive solidarity. Disagreeing is seen as indicating universal solidarity. The middle category, neither agreeing nor disagreeing, is seen as a lack of solidarity. This admittedly bold interpretation implies that the middle category neither agrees that welfare should be exclusively tied to previous contributions nor that it should be granted if needed, but rather, that welfare support is rejected in general.

Respondents agreeing to this question received one point for exclusive solidarity, respondents disagreeing received one point for universal, and neither-nor received one point for lack of solidarity. This was done for all five questions. Demanding more support for refugees was used as an indicator of universal solidarity. Respondents demanding more support hence got one point for universal solidarity and so forth. As a last step, the assigned points were added up, leading to three separate types of solidarity ranging from zero to five points each: zero for all who completely rejected and five for all who completely agreed upon each type of solidarity, and many variations in between. Hence, the three types are constructed based on theoretical considerations and not outcomes of statistical analyses, e.g. cluster analyses. Table 2 illustrates the combinations of rejections and approvals of the different dimensions and allocations to the three types of solidarity.

Dimension		Universal	Exclusive	Lack of Solidarity
		Response categories		
Contribution-based state support	welfare	Disagree (collectivist)	Agree (collectivist)	Neither agree nor disagree (individualist)
Labour market favouritism		Disagree (no group orientation)	Agree (group orientation)	Disagree (no group orientation)
Support for socially vulnerable groups		(inclusive, improve society)	(exclusive)	(individualist)
	Refugees	More	Less	The same
	Long-term unemployed	More	More	Less
Global redistribution		Agree (transnational)	Disagree (national)	Disagree (national)

Table 2 Construction of the three types of solidarity. The answers have been combined: totally disagree and disagree have been added up to disagree, totally agree and agree to agree. The range of the three solidarity variables is zero to five.

The three types of solidarity in their most distinct forms can be described as:

- **universal solidarity** advocates for more support for all considered socially vulnerable (inclusive, improve society). Does not favour workers due to nationality (no-group orientation) and does not tie social benefits to preceding contributions (collective, inclusive). It also demands global redistribution (transnational).
- **exclusive solidarity** strongly differentiates between who should get what support. It favours Austrian workers (group-orientation), demands more support for long-term unemployed but less support for refugees (exclusive). It also ties social benefits to preceding contributions (collective, exclusive) and rejects support for poorer countries (non-transnational).
- **lack of solidarity** demands less support for long-term unemployed (individualism) but favours keeping support for refugees at the level given in 2017 (not-exclusive, individualism – seeing asylum as a creditable accomplishment, see point c). It does not favour workers due to nationality (no-group orientation). It neither rejects nor prefers tying social benefits to contributions (individualism) and refuses transnational redistribution (national).

This construction of the types of solidarity comes with some features to be noted. There are overlaps in the dimensions between the three types e.g. exclusive and universal solidarity agree for more support for the long-term unemployed. Except for cases with zero or five points, they rather represent tendencies toward a certain type of solidarity. Moreover, in the most distinct form when reaching full (or zero) points, they could be seen as different ideal-types of solidarity.

Independent Variables and Hypothesis

In the empirical analysis, the different types of solidarity are explained with reference to socioeconomic characteristics and ideology variables. The ideology variables and the hypothesis informing the analysis will be explained in more detail here. Five different ideologies are addressed in the analysis. A strong focus on performance, or success ideology, is represented by ideas equating hard work with success. This is similar to the ‘success ideology’ concept by Kluegel and Miyano (1995). Social Dominance Orientation, or the desire for a strong social stratification (Stewart & Pratto, 2015), authoritarian views (Kimmelmeier, 2015) expressed in favour of strong leaders and discipline, nationalism addressed via exaggeratedly positive view of one’s own nation, and racism in the form of degradation of and disdain for supposed ‘others,’ are constructed using two to three intercorrelated variables (see Table 8 in the appendix).

The influence of the ideology variable will be analysed by multiple linear regressions models (Allison, 1999; Miles & Shevlin, 2001). To address the impact of ideology in contrast to other possible influences, several models have been calculated. The first model includes the socioeconomic background (education level and incomeⁱ) and subjective assessment of the financial situation of the household. The second includes political alienation and perceived

social position of one's own class or profession. The third contains the ideology variables. A fourth model incorporates concern for the living conditions of people in different parts of the world. These are stand-in variables for *sense of belonging*, which, for some authors, plays an important role as a precondition for solidarity (see e.g. Bayertz, 1998).

As argued before, solidarity is seen as embedded in different ideologies more or less compatible with the different principles of solidarity. Therefore, different connections between the type of solidarities and ideologies are assumed. These form the hypotheses underlying the following analysis.

- A strong focus on performance and accomplishments may foster opinions contrary to universal solidarity.
- We expect exclusive and non-solidary stances to positively connect to the success ideology, as it is used as a demarcation line for legitimising or delegitimising access to social resources.
 - Success ideology is further seen as the main motivator for lack of solidarity.
- Authoritarian, nationalist, and racist ideologies may support exclusive and hinder universal solidarity.
- These ideologies, however, may also hinder the lack of solidarity as these ideologies build upon the belief of cohesive social groups with entitled access to certain resources by birth, contradicting performance-based ideologies.
- Social dominance orientation is expected to suppress universal and support exclusive and lack of solidarity.

Based on the literature, we also expect the ideology variables to contribute more to the goodness of fit of the regression model compared to the socioeconomic variables. Table 3 illustrates the hypothesised relations between the different types of solidarity and the various ideologies.

	Solidarity		
	Universal	Exclusive	Lack of
Focus on Performance	-	+	+
Social Dominance Orientation	-	+	+
Authoritarianism	-	+	-
Nationalism	-	+	-
Racism	-	+	-

Table 3 Hypothesis: Ideology and types of solidarity

Importance of the Different Types of Solidarity

Table 4 shows the distribution of the items used for composing the three types of solidarity. Nearly half of the survey population prefer contribution-based welfare support and labour market favouritism (agree and strongly agree taken together). Both are expressions of exclusive solidarity. Global redistribution is rejected by just over a third of the survey population, which is attributed to exclusive and a lack of solidarity. Expressions of universal solidarity, on the other hand, are overall less pronounced. Within the three topics of *contribution-based welfare support*, *labour market favouritism*, and *global redistribution*, around a third can be assigned towards universal solidarity. The numbers attributed to lack of solidarity varied between 22% for neither agreeing nor rejecting contribution-based welfare support and 36,2% for disagreeing to global solidarity and labour market favouritism. For all three variables, it is noticeable that the margins are less pronounced than the centre. Strong stances on these three subjects are rather uncommon within the survey population.

This is also the case for the two questions on support for socially vulnerable groups. Around 48% were in favour of keeping the support at the level in effect in 2017. Fewer argued for more

support for both groups than for less support and this is more distinct for refugees than for long-term unemployed.

Name	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Neither agree, nor disagree	Agree	Strongly agree	N
Contribution-based welfare state support	6.3%	23.7%	22%	29.7%	18.3%	973
Labour market favouritism	8.6%	23.5%	22.5%	30.8%	14.6%	979
Global redistribution	8%	26.8%	19%	21.5%	14.7%	1004
Support for socially vulnerable groups						
	Less	The same	More	N		
Long term unemployed	28.3%	47.3%	24.3%	1004		
Refugees	30.5%	48%	20.9%	1004		

Table 4 Distribution of solidarity variables, row percent

Table 5 showcases the three types of solidarity as operationalised. 3% of the survey population can be classified as having internalised a full universal solidarity attitude. 6.1% answered four and 11.4% three of the five questions corresponding to this dimension. 25.5% gave no responses that could be assigned as representing universal solidarity in this study. Regarding exclusive solidarity, fewer, 0.5%, answered all of the questions for this dimension. However, 10.9% answered four and 16.8% answered three questions accordingly. 18.2% answered none of the questions classified as exclusive in the described sense. Hence slightly more of the interviewees tend toward exclusive than toward universal solidarity, with 6.3% taking two and 17.5% claiming three of the items attributed to universal solidarity together versus 11.4% and 28.2% for exclusive solidarity. On the other hand, fewer are completely in opposition to exclusive than universal solidarity. A clear lack of solidarity as constructed here is less common within the survey population. 0.4% could be classified as completely falling into this category. 3% answered four of the five and 15% three of the five questions accordingly. 18.4% of the survey population can be seen rather tending toward a lack of solidarity. Due to the novelty of this approach, there are no comparative statistics to rate this distribution.

	Forms of Solidarity (in %)		
	Universal	Exclusive	Lack of
0 not at all	25.5	18.2	13.6
1	32.7	26.2	34.7
2	21.4	27.4	33.3
3	11.4	16.8	15
4	6.1	10.9	3
5 completely	3	.5	.4
Sum	100%	100%	100%
N	1004	1004	1004

Table 5 Distribution within the survey population – universal solidarity, exclusive solidarity, and lack of solidarity

The three types of solidarity show different correlations with each other (see Table 6). Universal and exclusive solidarity can be seen as rather strong antipodes ($r = -.43$). They point in different directions but do not simply form two endpoints on a straight line. Universal and exclusive solidarity are also both in opposition to a lack of solidarity, although less pronounced than opposition among themselves. Both show a negative connection to lack of solidarity ($r = -.18$ for universal and $-.12$ for exclusive solidarity). Due to these different correlations, we assume that all three form different types of solidarity. They are neither antipodes nor less pronounced versions of each other.

	Exclusive	Lack of solidarity
Universal	-.43*	-.18*
Exclusive		-.12*

Table 6 Correlation between the different types of solidarity and the variable used for constructing the solidarity variable - Pearson correlation coefficient. * = $p < .05$

What Influences the Different Types of Solidarity?

Starting with universal solidarity, we first address the question of whether sociodemographic and socioeconomic data can be used to explain its approval or rejection. For the socioeconomic variables, neither income nor the evaluation of the household income show significant influence on the universal solidarity variable as constructed (see Table 9 in Appendix). Formal education is significant only in the first two models and in the direction leading to a more distinct universal solidarity. When including ideologies however, the coefficient is reduced to being insignificant

on the five percent level ($\beta = .03$ in model 4). Of the socioeconomic variables, only the expected development of the household income is classified as significant in all four models ($\beta = .07$ in the fourth model). A more positive view of the future financial situation of the household may in small part support the tendency towards a clearer universal solidarity attitude. Including political alienation and assessment of the position of class/profession leads to a slight improvement in the model (from $R^2 = .02$ to $R^2 = .09$). A strong feeling of political alienation negatively impacts the formation of universal solidarity within the survey population, while the feeling or appreciation of one's own class/profession slightly fosters it. However, the coefficient for both is strongly reduced when ideologies are considered. The inclusion of variables for focus on performance, social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, nationalism, and racism reduces the impact of the variables on political alienation from $\beta = -.21$ to $-.07$ and the assessment of the social position of one's own class/profession from $\beta = .09$ to $.04$. In the fourth model, both are no longer calculated as significant.

The noticeably high drop of the coefficient for political alienation suggests that alienation is strongly tied to ideologies and especially to focus on performance, social dominance orientation, and racism. All three show a negative effect on universal solidarity, with racism as the strongest influence. Racist ideologies ($\beta = -.33$ in model 4) and to a lesser extent, also focus on performance ($\beta = -.15$), hinder a fully developed sense for universal solidarity. The influence of social dominance orientation is reduced to statistical insignificance ($\beta = -.07$) when introducing the variables on the feelings of concern for the living conditions of the people in different parts of the world. Nationalism and authoritarianism are not recognised as significant at all.

Hence, within the survey population, two to three of the assumed relations between ideology and universal solidarity could be confirmed. Universal solidarity is strongly defined by rejecting an ideology agonistically separating between a 'we' and the 'other' and that success is already mainly tied to effort and performance. It is also in small part influenced by not striving for social segregation. Furthermore, compared to the previously added variables, the inclusion of the ideology variables substantially increases the goodness of fit of the regression model ($R^2 = .31$). Of the variables for sense of responsibility, concern for the living conditions of people outside of Europe shows a significant positive effect ($\beta = .17$) and very slightly decreases the effect of the ideology variables.

Is this also the case for exclusive solidarity? The tendency towards a fully developed exclusive solidarity within the survey population is significantly and directly influenced by income and education even when including all further variables (see Table 10 in Appendix). Higher income is connected to more distinct exclusive solidarity attitudes ($\beta = .09$ for model four), although weakly. Higher formal education, on the other hand, reduces tendencies toward exclusive solidarity. The influence of formal education is more pronounced within the first model ($\beta = -.20$) and successively limited with the addition of further variables ($\beta = -.06$ model 4).

Similar to the regression models on universal solidarity, political alienation starts with a high coefficient when introduced ($\beta = .24$) and declines as ideology variables are added ($\beta = .07$). However, it remains significant and supports tendencies towards exclusive solidarity even when all the other variables are included. Two of the ideology variables are calculated as having a significant effect. Racialising ideologies show the overall strongest influence on exclusive solidarity ($\beta = .30$), but also a pronounced social dominance orientation ($\beta = .13$) increases tendencies toward full exclusive solidarity opinions. Both point towards the assumed direction. The influence of focus on performance is very weak and insignificant on the .05 level.

Authoritarianism and nationalism show no effect at all. The inclusion of the ideology variables strongly increases the goodness of fit of the regression model (from $R^2 = .12$ for the second to $R^2 = .33$ for the fourth model). Concern for the living conditions of people outside of Europe is negatively (beta=-.22) related and for the fellow countrymen positively connected to exclusive solidarity (beta=.12) and its addition also slightly reduces the effect of the ideology variables.

For the type labelled as lack of solidarity, the regression analysis showed the most inconclusive outcome (see Table 11 in the appendix). Even considering all independent variables, the overall goodness of fit is exceptionally low ($R^2 = .05$ for model four). However, some interesting effects can nevertheless be observed. Income is marked as significant throughout all models. Higher income is positively connected to the tendencies towards a lack of solidarity (beta = .11). Formal education is calculated as significant only after including the ideology variables. This produces a rather unique pattern compared to universal and exclusive solidarity and may be explained by the alignment of the ideology variables. While the coefficient for focus on performance (beta = .08) is positive, it is negative for nationalism and authoritarianism (both -.09). Formal education, however, shows a synchronous influence on all three of these items (not shown here). For lack of solidarity, the inclusion of the ideology variables did not improve the overall model as much as for the other solidarity forms ($R^2 = .02$ first, .05 fourth model) leaving the regression model rather underexplained. For an overview of the influence of the different ideologies see Table 7.

	Solidarity		
	Universal	Exclusive	Lack of
Focus on Performance	-	n.s.	+
Social Dominance Orientation	-	+	n.s.
Authoritarianism	n.s.	n.s.	(-)
Nationalism	n.s.	n.s.	(-)
Racism	-	+	n.s.

Table 7 Influence of ideologies on the three types of solidarity. n.s. = not significant. () = very weak.

Discussion

Universal, exclusive, and lack of solidarity, as constructed here, combine different dimensions of solidarity (regarding socially vulnerable groups, conditionality of institutionalised solidarity, strengthening of certain groups, and across borders/on a global scale). Each dimension is important in its own right. Combined, however, they allow for addressing solidarity as a multidimensional phenomenon expressed in three types of solidarity. However, in their clearest form, these types are rather rare among the interviewees. Rather, the survey population shows tendencies towards the three options of solidarity instead of clear and distinct positions, whereby a lack of solidarity is the least pursued form. This underlines the discussion within the literature, which sees solidarity as rather fluid, flexible, and alternating (see e.g. Altreiter et al., 2019; Börner, 2018). In its concrete form, it is hard to pinpoint certain aggregations of solidarity attitudes. Solidarity in one respect, e.g. with socially vulnerable groups, does not automatically lead to solidarity in another e.g. on a global scale. The combinations are manifold within the survey population, which must be considered. Our analysis therefore switches from concepts of *solidarity* and *non-solidarity* to possible tendencies towards different types of solidarity. These tendencies are differently fostered or hindered by socioeconomic and political conditions, but especially by given ideologies.

Due to the positive impact of higher income on exclusive and lack of solidarity, both can be attributed as measures to preserve rather than to improve one's position and social status within the survey population. This counters arguments about exclusive solidarity as means mainly for alleged 'losers of modernisation' as is also criticised by Hofmann (2016).

For exclusive solidarity, the significant ideology and 'concern' variables stress notions that distinguish strongly between a favoured 'we' versus the 'other,' further cemented by approval

of social stratification. A racialising ideology combined with a Social Dominance Orientation form the ideological basis for exclusive solidarity, which is in line with other studies (Gilens, 1995; Harell et al., 2016). In contrast to Denz (2003) and Maggini (2018), the influence of authoritarianism could not be reproduced. Also, the use of performance principles as legitimation for exclusion is much less and insignificantly pronounced. This stands in opposition to arguments that exclusive solidarity is mainly based on the notion of previous achievements earned. It counters the argument that the preference for exclusive solidarity as constructed here is derivative of a performance orientation or success ideology, with e.g. the basic assumption that people born in Austria earned their privileges through hard work as brought forward especially in the policy arena (see e.g. Faist, 1995; Friedrich, 2012 for more on this). The ideological basis for exclusive solidarity within the survey population is based on constructions of belongings, notions of worth due to alleged origin and birth, i.e. status principles, which, even in contemporary societies, function as legitimation for discrimination and maintaining social segregation (e.g. Hall, 2016; Hund, 2010).

For rejecting solidarity in general, performance orientation is of primary significance and can be seen as the main ideological foundation. There are, however, also hints that it may go hand in hand with a rejection of nationalism and authoritarianism but less with anti-racism. This supports our assumption that non-solidarity has to be distinguished from exclusive and universal solidarity. Equalising the rejection of (universal) solidarity with non-solidarity may cloak the possible different effects of ideologies on attitudes towards solidarity.

The ideological foundation for universal solidarity does not completely stand in opposition to both other types of solidarity, but to selected aspects of each. A racist ideology is the main contrasting factor between universal and exclusive solidarity. In line with this, a sense of global community also distinguishes these two types of solidarity. The main differentiating ideological

aspect compared to lack of solidarity is performance orientation. Within the survey population, universal solidarity is ideologically defined by anti-racism and a rejection of a performance ideology, but also, although rather weakly, of ideologies endorsing social stratification.

In general, the assumption that solidarity is driven and formed by ideologies rather than social positions could be confirmed for exclusive and universal solidarity. Within both regression models, the contribution of ideology to the goodness of fit is much higher than the socioeconomic and demographic data. This, however, is not the case for lack of solidarity. There, none of the included variables offered much explanation, leaving the goodness of fit at a very low level.

Conclusion

This paper makes several contributions to the literature on solidarity. First, while the theoretical literature by and large stresses the multidimensional character of solidarity, the quantitative empirical research so far has focused on single dimensions alone. By combining several dimensions into three types of solidarity, the paper offers a unique approach on how to connect the theoretical literature with quantitative studies. With this, it aligns the empirical more closely to the theoretical analysis. Second, also following the literature, it does not reduce solidarity to a binary option but differentiates between a universal, exclusive, and lack of solidarity.

Third, by including different ideologies at the same time, it offers a more comprehensive analysis on how solidarity is linked to the perception of grouping, belonging, and deservingness. Here, ideologies are not delegated to an ancillary status or an afterthought. By not singling out one type of ideology, the paper also addresses how different ideologies together form a foundation for different types of solidarity.

However, there are also several limitations to be discussed. In the survey data, solidarity is solely based on attitudes and not on actions. Also, more than three forms of solidarity could be imagined and have been addressed in a previous publication (*reference anonymised*). However, the three types constructed here are, on the one hand, general but also on the other hand, specific enough so that they can be linked to the discussed theories of solidarity (especially Stjernø 2005). Focusing on three types also allowed for concentrating on and identifying the possible foundations of solidarity more strongly. A larger number of solidarity types would have further complicated the construction process and analysis. Further research should refine and maybe expand the types of solidarity analysed. Especially the lack of solidarity demands additional attention with the further challenge to differentiate between support based on charity, reward, or solidarity. Moreover, the concepts of exclusive and universal solidarity also demand constant adaptations and should not be seen as final.

Applying a multidimensional approach towards solidarity within empirical studies allows research to address topics not accessible otherwise. This is important, as solidarity remains a crucial social force shaping social, political, and economic processes and ideologies form a central source for the different types of solidarity. The latter also form a possible gateway into the very core of solidarity, making it accessible for promotion, but also vulnerable to manipulation with ever-shifting delimitations. Within the policy arena, exclusive solidarity can easily fall into notions of non-solidarity, for example by denouncing welfare support in general as allegedly mainly benefitting ‘foreigners’ or the ‘useless others’ (Friedrich, 2012). On the other hand, the absence of racist, authoritarian, and nationalist ideologies within lack of solidarity may also invite confusion with universal solidarity. The absence of exclusivist ideologies may imply a closeness between lack of solidarity and universal solidarity. However, lack of solidarity rather corresponds to what Kymlicka (2015, p. 7) in another context critically

labelled as ‘neoliberal multiculturalism’ denoting an ‘inclusion without solidarity.’ Here, rejecting or accepting the success ideology makes quite a difference in separating a lack of from universal solidarity - a difference which should not go unnoticed.

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Appendix

Dimensions	Items - Questions	N	Mean (standard deviation)	Pearson Correlation r Or Cronbach Alpha
Focus on performance	Only people who work hard enough will get ahead in their work.	994	3.52 (1.15)	
Social Dominance Orientation (0-12)		947	5.51 (2.62)	
	Some people are just inferior to others	973	3,13 (1.22)	Alpha = .61
	To get ahead in life, it is sometimes necessary to step on others	994	2.96 (1.22)	
	It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top while others are at the bottom.	980	2.41 (1.05)	
Authoritarianism (0-12)		935	4.82 (2.73)	
	Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.	989	3.29 (1.26)	Alpha = .69
	Most of our social problems would be solved if we could somehow get rid of anti-social people.	952	2.34 (1.06)	
	We need strong leaders who tell us what to do.	986	2.22 (1.15)	
Nationalism (0-8)		944	2.96 (1.87)	
	The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Austrians.	958	2.57 (1.16)	r = .35
	People should support their country even if the country is wrong.	983	2.38 (1.15)	
Racism (0-8)		943	3.60 (1.89)	
	Immigrants increase crime rates in Austria.	975	2.76 (1.21)	r = -.39
	Immigrants contribute to the welfare of this country.*	960	3.17 (1.05)	

Table 8 Overview - Ideology items and scales. Response categories of the items: 1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Neither agree, nor disagree, 4 Agree, 5 Strongly agree. The values of the ideology scales are given in the brackets from lowest (not at all) to highest (fully applicable). *this item has been recoded before used for the scale.

	Dependent Variable: Universal Solidarity (0-5)											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	sig
Constant	.29		.31	1.38		.00	3.11		.00	2.46		.00
Socioeconomic Situation												
Income (z-standardised)	-.04	-.03	.40	-.04	-.03	.47	-.01	-.01	.78	-.01	.00	.92
Assessment - household income (1-3)	.04	.02	.64	.04	.02	.59	-.01	-.00	.93	.02	0.01	.84
Education in Years	.06	.14	.00	.04	.10	.01	.01	.03	.41	.01	.03	.38
Household Finance Change												
Past (1-5)	-.02	-.01	.79	-.02	-.01	.74	.03	.02	.55	.02	.02	.67
Expected (1-5)	.11	.07	.04	.14	.09	.01	.12	.07	.02	.11	.07	.04
Political alienation (0-12)				-.11	-.21	.00	-.03	-.07	.05	-.03	-.06	.08
Class/profession												
Appreciation (1-5)				.10	.09	.01	.08	.07	.04	.07	.06	.07
Reward (1-5)				-.08	-.07	.05	-.05	-.04	.25	-.04	-.04	.26
Power (1-5)				-.04	-.03	.41	-.03	-.02	.52	-.03	-.03	.43
Ideologies												
Focus on performance (1-5)							-.18	-.16	.00	-.18	-.15	.00
SDO (0-12)							-.04	-.08	.03	-.03	-.07	.07
Authoritarianism (0-12)							.00	-.01	.86	.00	.00	.99
Nationalism (0-8)							-.04	-.06	.12	-.05	-.06	.10
Racism (0-8)							-.28	-.38	.00	-.24	-.33	.00
Concern for living conditions												
Fellow countrymen (1-5)										-.05	-.04	.37
European (1-5)										-.01	.00	.94
People living outside of Europe (1-5)										.21	.17	.00
R-Squared	.03			.09			.31			.33		
Corrected R-Square	.02			.08			.30			.32		
N	951			863			752			748		

Table 9 Universal solidarity: Multiple linear regression. Bold = significant. In brackets = range of answer categories or items.

	Dependent Variable: Exclusive Solidarity (6)											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	sig
Constant	3.41		.00	2.23		.00	.56		.13	.90		.02
Socioeconomic Situation												
Income (z-standardised)	.14	.11	.00	.15	.11	.00	.12	.09	.01	.11	.09	.01
Assessment - household income (1-3)	-.13	-.07	.07	-.07	-.04	.35	-.03	-.02	.65	-.06	-.03	.44
Education in Years	-.08	-.20	.00	-.06	-.16	.00	-.03	-.07	.04	-.03	-.06	.05
Household Finance Change												
Past (1-5)	-.10	-.07	.05	-.07	-.05	.22	-.03	-.02	.50	-.02	-.02	.62
Expected (1-5)	.01	.01	.87	.01	.00	.91	.04	.02	.49	.04	.03	.39
Political alienation (0-12)				.12	.24	.00	.04	.08	.02	.04	.08	.01
Class/profession												
Appreciation (1-5)				-.06	-.05	.13	-.05	-.04	.15	-.04	-.04	.24
Reward (1-5)				-.01	-.01	.83	-.04	-.04	.27	-.05	-.04	.19
Power (1-5)				-.02	-.02	.55	-.05	-.04	.20	-.03	-.02	.45
Ideologies												
Focus on performance (1-5)							.07	.06	.05	.06	.05	.09
SDO (0-12)							.09	.18	.00	.07	.15	.00
Authoritarianism (0-12)							.02	.04	.39	.02	.04	.30
Nationalism (0-8)							.02	.03	.45	.02	.02	.54
Racism (0-8)							.25	.37	.00	.21	.30	.00
Concern for living conditions												
Fellow countrymen (1-5)										.16	.12	.00
European (1-5)										.01	.01	.81
People living outside of Europe (1-5)										-.26	-.22	.00
R-Squared	.06			.12			.34			.37		
Corrected R-Square	.05			.11			.33			.36		
N	951			852			752			747		

Table 10 Exclusive solidarity: Multiple linear regression. Bold = significant. In brackets = range of answer categories or items.

	Dependent Variable: Lack of Solidarity (6)											
	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4		
	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	sig	B	Beta	Sig	B	Beta	sig
Constant	1.16		.00	1.27		.01	1.58			1.79		.00
Socioeconomic situation												
Income (z-standardised)	.08	.08	.03	.11	.10	.01	.12	.11	.01	.12	.11	.01
Assessment - household income (1-3)		.03			.01			.00			-.01	
Education in Years	.05		.45	.01		.89	-.01		.95	-.01		.85
	-.01	-.03	.37	-.02	-.05	.18	-.03	-.08	.04	-.03	-.08	.03
Household Finance Change												
Past (1-5)	.10	.09	.02	.12	.10	.01	.08	.06	.12	.08	.06	.12
Expected (1-5)	.05	.04	.28	.02	.02	.67	.02	.02	.64	.03	.02	.54
Political alienation (0-12)				.01	.01	.71	.01	.03	.45	.01	.03	.50
Class/profession												
Appreciation (1-5)				.03	.03	.43	.01	.01	.76	.01	.01	.74
Reward (1-5)				-.02	-.02	.62	-.01	-.01	.84	.00	.00	.95
Power (1-5)				.01	.01	.68	.01	.01	.73	.01	.01	.77
Ideologies/World images												
Focus on performance (1-5)							.07	.08	.04	.08	.08	.04
SDO (0-12)							.01	.03	.46	.01	.03	.48
Authoritarianism (0-12)							-.03	-.08	.09	-.03	-.09	.09
Nationalism (0-8)							-.05	-.09	.06	-.05	-.09	.06
Racism (0-8)							-.01	-.02	.59	-.02	-.04	.42
Concern for living conditions												
Fellow countrymen (1-5)										.00	.00	.94
European (1-5)										-.03	-.03	.56
People living outside of Europe (1-5)											-.02	.72
R-Squared	.02			.03			.05			.05		
Corrected R-Square	.02			.02			.03			.03		
N	951			863			752			748		

Table 11 Exclusive solidarity: Multiple linear regression. Bold = significant. In brackets = range of answer categories or items.

Endnotes

ⁱ Surveyed as household income but included as weighted by household size and z-standardised. Due to a high number of non-responses on the questions on income, this has been compensated for by applying multiple imputations. The missing values of income have been estimated based on age, gender, size of household, education, past and expected financial development of the household and assessment of the financial situation of the household. The imputation using SPSS is based on linear regressions with 20 imputations, 100 iterations and a tolerance value of 10E-12. Is used for the test for singularity (Wang & Johnson, 2019).