

Half a Century of Little Change within the Austrian Legislative Elite? A Prosopographical Study of ÖVP and SPÖ Members of Parliament (1945-2019)

Abstract: What occupational and political experience does it take to enter the Austrian *Nationalrat*? To answer this question, this article uses data visualizations to examine all members of parliament between 1945 and 2019 who were either members of the Social Democratic Party Austria or Austria's People Party (N=1,158). As this article finds, intra-party selection proves stable over time. Party members with strong roots in the local party or local executives (e.g., Mayor) either directly entered the *Nationalrat* or rose through the party machine. Lateral entries by functionaries of "social partnership" organizations can also be observed but become less frequent over time. Significant change becomes visible only with regard to the professional background as "career politicians" start to outnumber blue-collar workers. Professionalization of legislative elites is thus accompanied by a strong gatekeeping activity of political parties that stick to established recruitment practices.

Keywords: political elites, legislative recruitment, prosopography, data visualization

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Priv.-Doz. Dr. Philipp Korom

FWF-Projektleiter, Projekttitel: Nationale und lokale politische Eliten
in Österreich (P 31967)

Universität Graz/School of Governance, TUM München

Mail: philipp.korom@gmail.com

Homepage: <https://philippkorom.com>

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A Prosopographical Study of ÖVP and SPÖ Members of Parliament

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Introduction

A long line of research has shown that political careers are shaped by the interplay of personal ambition and given institutional opportunities that are beyond the control of individual politicians (Borchert 2011). It can be fairly assumed that winning one of the 183 prestigious and sought-after seats in the Austrian parliament—the National Council (*Nationalrat*, hereafter: NR)—is part of the career plan of many who strive for political power, not least because the national parliament is, in most cases, the final career plateau from which there is nowhere to move up professionally. As a recent study on post-parliamentary career trajectories in the Netherlands reveals, very few politicians can use the parliament as a springboard for advancement to lucrative and attractive job positions in public and private sectors (Claessen, Bailer, and Turner-Zwinkels 2021). There is also anecdotal evidence that the NR in Austria overwhelmingly attracts those who look to advance to the very top *within* politics.

The Member of Parliament (MP) office is appealing for various reasons. First, financial compensation is comparatively high, as a member of the Federal Council (*Bundesrat*)—the other Chamber of the Austrian Parliament—receives only 50 percent of the public salary of a NR member (Stelzer 2011: 75). Second, while job security is not guaranteed, members of the NR have an extremely good chance of being renominated and thus reelected for legislative office (Fischer 1974). Third, the Austrian constitution allows for a powerful legislature. Despite a directly elected president with considerable formal powers, the supremacy of parliament is key to the Austrian system of government. Passing ordinary legislation, for example, requires a quorum of one third of the MPs and a majority of the votes cast (50% +1). Such a legislature vested with real authority can be expected to attract more politicians than what is often called “rubber-stamp parliaments.” Moreover, MPs in Austria can take up quite different roles such as that of a policy advocate or constituency member (Müller et al. 2001; Meyer and Wagner 2020), and sitting on different legislative committees allows them to specialize in particular policy areas. The versatility of the job ensures that legislative careers are taken up by individuals with

very different career orientations and personal motives. Finally, and regardless of what the very core of being a representative means to the individual MP, the legislative mandate always serves the realization of the highest ideals of democracy, namely ensuring transparent governance and public participation. The potential for the office to help democracy work surely has a strong pull for those interested in serving the public good.

But what about the structure of opportunities that shape the ability of politicians to transition into the NR? Previous research has tackled this question but either considered short time spans (Müller et al. 2001), selectively studied points in time (Lichem 1966), or concentrated on decades before the Second Republic (Fornleitner et al. 1974; Matis and Stiefel 1982). This article introduces a new biographical dataset on all elected members of the NR between legislative period V (starting in 1945) and the legislative period XXVI (ending in 2019) who were either affiliated with Austria's People Party (ÖVP) or with the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ). Altogether, the database encompasses 1,158 individuals and contains information on all career trajectories within politics, which allows us to detect continuity and change in political careers. As "political careers do not proceed chaotically" (Schlesinger 1966: 118) but are found to be rather rigorously patterned, *collective* career patterns provide insights into the (changing) importance of different factors that facilitate careers, such as connections to intra-party groups or prior participation in politics through public offices at different levels of the federal state.

The main aim of this study is to investigate whether career structures and institutionalized pathways that constrain, in a non-deterministic way, politicians striving for upward mobility have changed during the last half century in Austria. The focus is on two parties only as the "grand coalition" government of ÖVP and SPÖ were the hallmark of post-war Austria, with both parties continuously dominating the NR as well, which enables us to investigate elite change *within* parties based on a large enough number of cases.

Both major parties have been partly in flux since 1945. On the one hand, the SPÖ, which had the highest ratio of members to voters of any democratic party in Europe during the Kreisky years (1970-83) with over 700,000 members, has lost over two thirds of its members since 1990 (Wineroither and Kitschelt 2017). The occupational profile of the party has changed radically as well. Traditionally, the

majority of party members consisted of blue-collar workers, which is not the case anymore. On the other hand, the lasting partnership of the SPÖ with organized labor has continued. While the ÖVP even rebranded itself in 2017 as “List Kurz – the New People’s Party” and replaced a previously highly factionalized and federalized decision-making power structure into a centralized one, the ÖVP has persistently been an indirect party with the bulk of its members still being recruited by its three main Leagues.

Given this background, one can expect to observe *some* change in the structure of opportunities for political careerists in Austria. To investigate whether and how the requisites for successful candidates for the national parliament have undergone transformation, this article will apply a prosopographical method by studying the political careers of parliamentarians in order to identify some kind of commonality (Verboven, Carlier, and Dumolyn 2007) and detect change in standard careers through data visualization. While this case study does not attempt any generalization of its findings, one can think of Austria’s (formerly) grand parties ÖVP and SPÖ as “critical cases” (Flyvbjerg 2006: 230). That is, if we observe alternative career trajectories increasingly substituting the established ones, we can expect dynamism in the career system of other traditional European parties as well.

Analytical Framework and Research Question

Careers can be understood in structural terms as “successions of related jobs, arranged in a hierarchy of prestige through which persons move in an ordered (more-or-less predictable) sequence” (Wilensky 1961: 523). Careers in politics are distinct from those in other industries such as business, as they are accompanied by a higher risk of coming to an abrupt end, especially if political positions are up for electoral grabs. Furthermore, entry into professional politics is far less dependent on formal degrees or certificates and career paths are not clearly regulated, which implies that there are multiple career paths to the top (Jahr and Edinger 2015). So far, scholars have studied political careers through different theoretical lenses and an integrative analytical framework is lacking (Vercesi 2018). This study aims at developing a holistic framework of analysis by considering entry points for political career with the help of social background analysis *and* by utilization of longitudinal career data that allows us to analyze political careers as chains of linked career moves. Such an approach recognizes the fact that the individual is the “architect” of his or own career but also departs from the assumption that career decisions are strongly shaped by institutional constraints set by the internal rules of party organizations and the larger political system.

Professional Background

That legislators share professional profiles is an often-made observation that is explained in various ways. In one line of argument, main occupations prior to politics stand in for professional experiences gained prior to legislative service, which are “tapped” into by political parties. Cairney (2007), for example, distinguishes between “brokerage” and “instrumental” occupations, the former being conducive to running for political office (e.g., lawyer, “professional”) and the latter being politics-facilitating as direct links to political networks are formed and skills in communication are frequently developed (e.g., interest group representative, trade union official, journalist). In a second line of reasoning, occupations serve as a rough proxy for social class. The unequal descriptive representation of class among legislators has long been recognized (Matthews 1954). What continues to be of interest, however, is *which* privileged groups tend to have sufficient time and financial resources to run for office.

Scarce evidence for Austria suggests that the representativeness of parliamentarians in the *Nationalrat* increased between the introduction of universal suffrage for women (1919) and the early 1960s, which is indicated, inter alia, by a growing number of members of parliament (hereafter: MPs) with a middle-class or working-class background (Gerlich 1974). In the early 1970s, a trend reversal set in as middle-class MPs started to grow disproportionately, which can be explained through an emerging preference for civil servants (*Beamte*). However, as Pelinka (1979) has pointed out, the rise of the *Beamtenparlament* did not imply that civil service recruitment pipelines substituted the monitoring functions of parties but rather that running for political office became popular among bureaucrats as the public service law allowed special leaves from their work without affecting claims to old-age pensions. The middle-class bias can be further explained through the many MPs whose focus of work is not in the *Nationalrat* but rather in the many corporatist institutions of Austria, such as Chambers or labor unions (Schefbeck 2006).

How the professional background of MPs has changed since the 1970s is largely unknown; all existing databases are plagued by methodological problems as the information provided by the MPs has never been uniform. Some indicated the learned profession, others the current occupations, and still others a former job that is popular with voters (Müller et al. 2001, 59–60). Departing from this state of knowledge, this study aims to furnish consistent information on the occupation's background since the founding of the Second Republic in 1945, which allows us to answer the following research question:

Research Question 1: How has the professional background of MPs changed over time (1945-2019)?

Public Office Careers in a Multi-Level System

Borchert and Stolz (2011) differentiate three career patterns in regionalized and federal systems: unidirectional, alternative, and integrated. Unidirectional patterns follow the organization of the state from the local to regional and national levels; alternative career paths develop mostly in one of the three levels if highly attractive offices have cognitive, legal, or political boundaries between levels of government or types of institutions; integrated careers that criss-cross all levels develop if political arenas are not sealed off from each other. Seen from a functional perspective, the cumulation of offices

across levels of the federal state may help to resolve territorial conflicts, as party politicians with office experiences at different levels can act as potential mediators between territorial units (Detterbeck 2011). At the individual level, career moves from one political level to another often represent a step up or a demotion.

Single-country studies reveal a great variety of level hopping across Europe. In Belgium, it is quite normal for a regional MP to be a candidate for a federal election and vice versa (Vanlangenakker, Maddens, and Put 2010). Swiss federalism is known to give importance to the subnational (communal and cantonal) levels; national MPs commonly exercise, in parallel with their federal mandate, other public offices at the local or regional level (Di Capua et al. 2020). In Germany, again, “career jumps” from the state to federal level are the exception rather than the rule while career moves in the opposite direction are rare (Jahr 2015). The given evidence for Austria suggests that while all kinds of linkages between party activities and public mandates exist (Detterbeck 2011), state legislators tend to stay in their political arena. In general, the frequency of inter-level movements can inform us about whether or not there are opportunity structures in place that force individuals to remain in their initial positions.

Research Question 2: Is there a significant degree of mobility between state legislatures and the national legislature?

Party Careers

Election to Austrian legislative bodies is conducted on the basis of the electoral list system, i.e. voters are offered a choice between competing party slates, not between candidates. Chances of being elected highly depend on the candidate’s initial position on the list, as very few candidates have succeeded in gaining sufficient votes to move to the top of the party list due to the voters’ preference (Harfst, Bol, and Laslier 2021). As the compilation of candidate lists is in the hands of political parties, aspirants to political office have been dependent on the party machine for nomination and election.

Regarding the inner-party recruitment process, it is crucial to know whether nominations are either determined mainly by the national party leadership or devolved to regional or district bodies. Like in most other European countries (Norris 2006), the process in Austria is *decentralized*, albeit national leaders can exercise a veto. Shell (1962) observed prolonged bargaining processes between the Party

Executive and District organizations for the SPÖ, in which both players have a significant say. Since the 1960s, the role of individual SPÖ party members have remained minor compared to that of the executive organs in the national, state, and district party organizations, which essentially reach agreements with each other (Bille 2001). Within the ÖVP, the recruitment also amounts, more or less, to the ratification of a subnational decision by the national organization. In a three-step procedure, local party leaders present their proposals to the state party, while state and national party organizations again make use of their right to nominate candidates (5-10%) for a election district. Finally, all decisions are made known to the national party, which can object to the list's order of preference (Stirnemann 1989, 408). In both parties, the ranking of candidates is, as a rule, not affected by binding (public or inner-party) primaries, which essentially strengthens the role of party organizations at the middle and lower levels (Nick 1989).

The candidate selection is decentralized in another way as party auxiliary associations, which are in essence “party/interest-group hybrids” (Kurt R. Luther 1992: 52), have an important voice in determining candidates. Within the SPÖ, NR mandates have been reserved for party members working full-time in leading positions of the Austrian Labor Unions (*Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund*, ÖGB) or the Chamber of Labour (*Kammer für Arbeiter und Angestellte*, AK). In a similar vein, the Business Chamber (*Wirtschaftskammer Österreichs*, WKÖ) and the Chamber of Agriculture (*Landwirtschaftskammer Österreichs*, LKÖ) have been a plentiful reservoir for ÖVP staffers in parliaments (Köppl and Wippersberg 2014: 33). Chambers that are bodies with legally compulsory membership established by public law and represent the interests of specific socioeconomic groups as well as the ÖGB—a federation of industry unions—are the backbone of the Austrian “social partnership,” which is essentially an institutionalized network of cooperation between employers and employees.

Moreover, members of the ÖVP are *de facto* almost always members of one the party’s three main Leagues: the Farmers’ League (ÖBB), the Business League (ÖWB), and the Workers’ and Employees’ League (ÖAAB). “The Leagues are economically and financially independent, and have their own legal existence and statutes. This means that the Leagues exist both as independent associations (*Vereine*), which decide over their statuses, leadership, and finances, and as constituent

units of the ÖVP” (Müller and Steininger 1994: 12). Within the ÖVP, Leagues have an important nomination right when it comes to the selection of parliamentary candidates.

Given decentralized nomination processes and the involvement of many intra-party groups as well as research insights for other countries (Binderkrantz et al. 2020; Ohmura et al. 2018; Turner-Zwinkels and Mills 2020), one can expect to find various distinctive career pathways leading to the NR. The heuristic tool most often applied in the literature to identify these pathways is typification. Typologies are essentially based on the selection of dimensions of comparison that compose together a multidimensional attributed space within which each individual can be positioned; “an empirical typology pinpoints specific locations within this space where cases cluster. The ultimate test of an empirical typology is the degree to which it helps [...] social scientists comprehend the diversity that exists within a general class of phenomena” (Ragin 1987: 149). In order to typologize the diverse careers of MPs, I will combine multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) with agglomerative hierarchical clustering (AHC) with the goal to answer the following two research questions:

Research Questions 3: Which types of career pathways leading to a legislative office can we reasonably distinguish on the basis of comprehensive career information?

Research Questions 4: Which types of career pathways increase or decrease numerically over time (1945-2019)?

Data, Variables, and Method

Data and Variables

To answer these research questions, I will draw on a self-created database with information on 1,522 members of the NR between 1945 and 2019—a time span that covers eleven legislative episodes—who were listed candidates of either the ÖVP or the SPÖ. The main source of information is the online *Who is Who* by the Parliamentary Administration,¹ which was cross-checked with other reliable biographical sources such as carefully edited biographical dictionaries on members of state parliaments (*Landtage*) or the rich online database on members of the Vienna State Parliament and City Council (e.g., Voithofer 2007).² The file generated on political careers contains a total of 11,416 observations, thus an average of approximately ten career stints per person.

The raw information was coded into nominal categories, which allows for the description of MPs in terms of the following variables:

Political jobs. Political career trajectories are identified by distinguishing between executive and legislative public positions that require elections, positions in parties as well its youth organizations, positions in the party's auxiliary organizations, and positions in Chambers and labor unions (see Table 1). In the case of the ÖVP, the party's three main three Leagues are treated separately from other party auxiliary organizations due to their importance. Within some categories, national jobs are further differentiated from jobs on the Land and regional level in order to give due attention to the multi-level politics in Austria. Positions in "social partnership" organizations are treated as political due to the close dovetailing between the long-standing government parties SPÖ and ÖVP, on the one hand, and Chambers and labor unions, on the other.

¹ <https://www.parlament.gv.at/WWER/>

² <https://www.wien.gv.at/infodat/sukri>

Table 1. Political Career Positions Considered

Type of career position	Geographical level/ other specification	Abbreviation	Example
Chamber position	Economic Chamber	EcoChamber	President of the Vorarlberg Economic Chamber
	Chamber of Labour	ChamberLabour	Federal President of the Chamber of Labor
	Chamber of Agriculture	ChamberAgric	Councillor of the Chamber of Agriculture of Lower Austria
Executive public position	Federal Level	FederalGov	Federal Minister
	Land Level	RegionalGov	Regional Government Minister
	Regional Level	Mayor	Vice-Mayor
League position		Municipal Council	Member of the Municipal Council
	Ö. Bauernbund	ÖBB	Secretary-General of the Austrian Farmers' League
	Ö. Wirtschaftsbund	ÖWB	President of the Business League
Legislative public position	Ö. Arbeitnehmerbund	ÖABB	Federal Chairman of the Workers' and Employees' League
	Land level	StateParl	Member of the State Parliament
	Regional Level	CityDistrCouncil	Member of the City/District Council
Party auxiliary position	All levels	AuxAssoc.	Secretary General of the Tenants Association Austria
Party position	Federal level	PartyNational	Member of the federal party executive committee
	Land level	PartyLand	Member of the party's regional executive
	Regional Level	PartyRegional	Local party chairman
Trade Union position	All three levels	TradeUnion	Vice-president of the Austrian Trade Union Federation
Youth party position	All three levels	YouthParty	Federal chairman of the youth party

Professional jobs. In line with previous research (Codato, Costa, and Massimo 2014), I considered the occupation prior to the political jobs held by MPs listed in Table 2. Many parliamentarians have spent virtually all of their adult life in public affairs. Others have had many different occupations; a very small number has pursued several occupations at once. Under such circumstances, any classification is difficult. I decided to consider jobs held for more than a year and immediately before the launching of a political career.

Jobs were coded using a national version of the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO-08) created by Statistics Austria (ILO 2012). 160 different job codes were assigned to 9 categories: (1) craftsmen, production and related workers, (2) journalists and other writers, (3) legal profession, (4) managers and businessmen, (5) other, (6) primary sector, agriculture, (7) professions

other than law (including military), (8) teachers and professors, (9) technicians, clerks, and service workers. The remaining (mostly vague) job titles *not* contained in ISCO were differentiated into two broad meta-categories: “public sector jobs” and “private sector jobs.” MPs who have never practiced any effective occupation outside of politics were categorized as “career politicians.”

Rural vs. urban electoral environment. Austria employs a three-tier proportional electoral system that allows candidacies at more than one level. For example, a place on the regional district party list may go hand in hand with an additional candidacy in the Land (state) party or the national party list. For all MPs *consistently* winning a “regional seat,” I coded the urban or rural character of their respective electoral district by using a measurement by the Austria’s Federal Statistic Office (“Statistik Austria”) indicating the proportion of urban areas within communities and cities in percentage points.³ Numbers were aggregated by electoral districts, which were categorized into three classes: urban (urbanity index >60%), mixed rural-urban (urbanity index >30%), and rural.

Analytical Method. Departing from the bulk of empirical studies on careers that apply sequence analysis (SA) to identify pathways to legislative power (e.g., Ohmura et al. 2018; Turner-Zwinkels and Mills 2020), I opted for another clustering approach that is based on multiple correspondence analysis (MCA), as it is impossible to collect data on Austria’s parliamentarians with the time granularity needed for SA. (The start and/or end date of a career stint is often not indicated in the available historical sources.) MCA is a multivariate graphical technique designed to explore relationships among sets of categorical (e.g., binary) variables in a multidimensional space. Both individuals (rows in the dataset) and variable categories (columns in the dataset) can be projected onto this space (Hjellbrekke 2019). The deviation of these row or column profiles from their respective average profile, which is represented by the centroid of the graphical data representation in the map, is used as a measure of the variance in the data. This measure of variance is called *inertia* in the context of MCA.

³ https://www.statistik.at/web_de/klassifikationen/regionale_gliederungen/stadt_land/index.html

Spatial proximity between two categories indicates that these categories are shared by a larger number of individuals. The more closely individuals are situated from each other, the more categories they share (and inversely, the more distant they are, the fewer categories they share). Most importantly, MCA is designed to reduce the dimensionality of categorical data sets that include more than two variables distributed among individuals. It also assumes that the variables comprising a data matrix together constitute a high-dimensional Euclidean space, which is collapsed by creating new, synthetic dimensions. Based on the so-called *eigenvalues*, or the contribution of each dimension to the total inertia, the researcher has to choose how many of the dimensions (axes) he or she wants to omit to reduce the multi-dimensional space. Besides the interpretability of each dimension (axis), a *cumulative rate of Benzécri's modified eigenvalues* of about 80% has established itself as a criterion for dimension selection (Le Roux and Rouanet 2010, 52). In the words of Jean-Paul Benzécri, the inventor of MCA, interpreting a dimension amounts “to finding out what is similar, on the one hand, between all elements figuring on the right of the origin and, on the other hand between all that is written on the left; and expressing with conciseness and precision, the contrast (or opposition) between the two extremes” (Benzécri 1992: 405). The interpretation must rely on categories in which the dimensions' *contributions* to the axis exceeds the average contribution.

I further extend MCA methodology by clustering individuals on the basis of their coordinates on the principal axes, i.e., their Euclidean distances from one another. The Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) starts with the “smallest partition,” which means that each MP initially represents a cluster. The process is continued by merging stepwise two clusters until all MPs are united into a single cluster. This creates a hierarchical relationship between all clusters, which can be visualized in a dendrogram. Ward's criterion (Husson, Lê, and Pagès 2017: 179–84) is applied to produce optimally homogenous clusters.

Results

Professional background (1945-2019)


The long-term perspective on the professional background of Austria's MPs reveals some clear-cut trends. Craft workers, or blue-collar workers as part of the industrial workforce—the once largest occupation group among SPÖ MPs—are clearly in decline since the 1950s (although workers are still an important component of the electorate). The same holds true with a less pronounced slope for MPs (mostly affiliated with the ÖVP) having previously worked in the primary sector, that is mostly independent farmers. Another pervasive trend is the rise of the career politician. The consistently high percentage of MPs with public sector jobs that also include officials of interest groups (e.g., chambers) hints at an “informal insider-outsider differential” (Best 2007: 104): Those who are available (in terms of their time, budget, and job security) and willing to engage in party politics at various geographical levels stand a greater chance of being nominated and elected for public office.

The “U-shape” curve depicting the proportion of public sector employees with its peak around the 1970s is worth closer attention as well. One has to be aware, of course, that the category is broad and has many internal distinctions: Even if all of its members are paid by public authorities, an Austrian Railway employee is in a completely different social position than that of, for example, a higher civil servant working for a Land government. Moreover, the important subgroup of teachers and professors was singled out and is treated separately in Figure 1. Nevertheless, the trend reversal is clear and in line with findings for Europe (Cotta and Tavares de Almeida 2000). The high-percentage shares in the 1960s and 1970 coincided with a general growth of the state sector and thus an increased number of people working within the various local and central branches of public services.⁴ The general decline in MPs with public sector backgrounds goes hand in hand with periods of several political reforms that slimmed down the state sector. While public sector employees remain important, it is clear that political representation increasingly moved not only into the hands of career politicians but also into the hands

⁴ In Austria, the public sector was significantly extended in the 1950s by government investment programs in infrastructure and by the extension of the social security system (Neck and Schneider 1988). In a period of economic growth, the financing of large public expenditures did not pose major difficulties. The economic situation changed drastically, however, with the first oil-price shock in 1973 and the ensuing period of slow economic growth as well as a financial crisis in the state-owned steel producer *Voest-Alpine* in 1995, which incurred major losses through speculations in the oil market.

of businessmen/managers, private sector employees (e.g., entrepreneurs), and individuals who have previously worked in professions other than law, especially in the case of the ÖVP.

Figure 1. Professions of MPs Before Entering Politics (1945-2019)




Political Career Positions (1945-2019)

A political career can be decomposed into its smallest components, which are career positions at a certain life stage. Figure 2 uses a color scheme to display the relative frequencies of various positions by party and legislation. Any interpretation of the figure needs to take into consideration that the general availability of different career positions varies immensely. If we see, for example, that local politics background is much more dominant than membership in regional government, we *cannot* conclude that the first is important while the second is not since there are comparatively much fewer positions available at the Land level.

For both parties we can equally observe a high frequency of party positions at different geographic levels, which suggests the consistent prevalence of long-winded intra-party careers (often dubbed as *Ochsentour* in the Austrian context). The growing importance of membership in party youth organizations is also noticeable. Further, legislative positions at the level of the nine federal states (German: *Länder*) and executive positions at the local levels (*Bürgermeister*, *Gemeinderat*) are frequent career steps as well. More generally, one can conclude that while there is significant mobility between state legislatures and the national legislature, legislative experience at the Land level is by no means a precondition for becoming a member of the NR.

Marked inter-party differences exist as well. As expected, membership in one of the main party's constituent Leagues (ÖBB, ÖWB, ÖABB) appears almost a precondition for becoming an ÖVP-MP. Interestingly, ÖABB membership is by far the most frequent. Over time, membership in the Chamber of Agriculture decreases while the percentage of ÖVP-MPs affiliated with the Economic Chamber continues to hover at around 20 percent. Within the SPÖ, the number of trade unionists among MPs plummets from nearly 50 percent at the end of the 1970s to 20 percent in 2017, and the share of SPÖ-MPs working in City Councils or District Councils (including district representatives in Vienna) grows markedly over time. In general, all of the career positions included in Figure 2 appear to be central to legislative careers.

Figure 2. Career Positions Listed in MPs' Resumés (Yes/No)



Note: Abbreviations are ÖBB = Farmers' League, ÖWB = Business League, ÖAAB = Workers' and Employees' League, EcoChamber = Business Chamber, ChamberAgric = Chamber of Agriculture, ChamberLabour = Chamber of Labour.

The Space of ÖVP-MPs (1945-2019)

To construct the space of all ÖVP members of the *Nationalrat*, MCA is performed on a dataset with 579 individuals and 17 variables comprising 36 categories. In Table 1A, the eigenvalues, the modified rates, and the cumulated modified rates of the first five axes are shown. As the first two axes jointly explain more than 80% of the variance, I decided to restrain the analysis to these axes only. The contributions of active variables on both axes can be seen in Table 2A in the Appendix. In the following Figure 3, the first axis corresponds to the horizontal axis, and the second axis to the vertical one. Only the top 20 contributing categories are displayed.

The first horizontal axis is labeled with nine categories with above-average contributions ($100/36 = 2.8\%$). On the left we find members of the Farmers' League (14.75%) and the Chamber of Agriculture (16.81%) as well as mayors (7.50%) and winner of a rural regional seat (5.24%). On the right we find members of the Economic League (6.02%) and the Economic Chamber (5.19%), members of the federal government (4.65%), and those who play active roles in the Land organizations (4.40%) or national party organization (3.53%). Most of these categories contribute as well to the second vertical axis (see Table A2), which especially distinguishes between parliamentarians with jobs in the Land and national party organization and others with membership in the Economic Chamber and the Economic League.

While the meaning of both axes partly overlaps, it is only the first horizontal axis that visualizes an important divide between regional candidates who consistently run for election in small rural electoral districts and are often experienced mayors and all other candidates. These locally rooted candidates are often members of the Farmers' League and the Chamber of Agriculture. The second vertical axis captures much stronger differences between career politicians with rich experience in party politics and others who became politically socialized within the Economic League and the Economic Chamber and whose careers are not marked by a long rise to the top of the party.

It turns out that four clusters are optimal in accounting for the variance found in the space of ÖVP parliamentarians (see the dendrogram in Appendix A3). The positions of these clusters in factorial planes 1-2 are shown as well in Figure 3. As we can see, the four clusters are clearly spread out across the first two dimensions with a significant overlap between the clusters labeled "party localists" and

“party animals.”⁵ My interpretations of these clusters are based both on their positions in the space and their most significant categories.

To make Table 2 understandable and provide an interpretation of the first row: 89.1% with membership in the Chamber of Agriculture also belong to cluster 1; 79.7% of the individuals in cluster 1 have joined the Chamber of Agriculture; 19% of all ÖVP politicians studied are known to be members of the Chamber of Agriculture. These percentages determine the statistical significance (p-value) of the category that is provided with the v-test, which corresponds to the quantile of the normal distribution and is associated with the p-value (Lebart, Piron, and Morineau 2006).

Table 2. Characteristic Categories for Each ÖVP Cluster, Ranked By Test Value

Cluster 1: Rural Fraction					
Categories	Cla/Mod	Mod/Cla	Global	p-value	v-test
ChamberAgric: Yes	89.1 %	79.7 %	19.0 %	1.606699e-72	18.01
ÖBB: Yes	80.0 %	74.8 %	19.9 %	4.207749e-57	15.9
RegSeat: Rural	46.9 %	30.9 %	14.0 %	2.073373e-08	5.6
Mayor: Yes	37.5 %	46.3 %	26.5 %	4.742284e-08	5.5
Municipal Council: Yes	28.8 %	43.1 %	31.8 %	2.966301e-03	3.0
Cluster 2: Party Localists					
ÖAAB: Yes	77.0 %	49.1 %	24.0 %	1.124764e-27	10.9
PartyRegional: Yes	48.3 %	50.9 %	39.7 %	2.129503e-05	4.2
YouthParty: Yes	59.1 %	11.9 %	7.6 %	3.006401e-03	3.0
Cluster 3: Economic Fraction					
EcoChamber: Yes	89.7 %	86.1 %	20.2 %	2.658121e-82	19.2
ÖWB: Yes	90.8 %	64.8 %	15.0 %	7.000558e-56	15.7
CityDistrCouncil: Yes	38.6 %	13.9 %	7.6 %	5.760422e-03	2.8
RegSeat: Urban	35.7 %	16.4 %	9.7 %	7.853612e-03	2.7
Cluster 4: Party Animals					
FederalGov: Yes	83.1 %	59.5 %	14.3 %	1.483325e-43	13.8
PartyNational: Yes	55.8 %	75.0 %	26.9 %	3.892788e-35	12.4
RegionalGov: Yes	63.5 %	28.5 %	9.0 %	5.713695e-13	7.2
PartyLand: Yes	38.5 %	49.1 %	25.5 %	6.357802e-10	6.2


The strongest “unique characteristics” are membership in the Chamber of Agriculture (Cluster 1) or the Economic Chamber (Cluster 3), followed by having held positions in the Federal Government (Cluster 4) and membership in the Workers’ and Employees’ League (Cluster 2). Combinations of salient characteristics give each cluster a distinct profile. The MP closest to the center of Cluster 1 is Peter Mayer, the Deputy Chairman of the Farmer’s Leagues of Upper Austria. Other prototypical cluster

⁵ It should be emphasized that all labels such as “party animals” are short-hand terms for my interpretation of identified clusters and should thus not be essentialized. The term “party animals” was first introduced to the literature on legislative careers by Ohmura et al. (2018).


members are: the Mayor of the municipality Altenberg bei Linz *Michael Hammer* (Cluster 2), the Vice Secretary-General of Austria's Economic League *Carmen Jeitler-Cincelli* (Cluster 3) and the former Federal Minister of Education *Elisabeth Gehrler* (Cluster 4).

Figure 3. The Space of ÖVP-MPs

A ÖVP: categories



B ÖVP: individuals



The Space of SPÖ-MPs (1945-2019)

The space of all SPÖ members of the *Nationalrat* MCA is based on a dataset including 579 individuals and 15 variables with 32 corresponding categories. The first horizontal axis in Figure 4 reflects 12.5% of the total inertia, and the second vertical axis 11.1% of the total inertia. For the interpretation of both axes, I will again only refer to those categories with contributions to the inertia that are above average (see Table A3). The first axis is above all determined by the following four binary variables whose categories correlate negatively and are located at opposite ends of the axis: Mayor, Municipal Council, Federal Government, and National Party. We find Mayors (13.03%) and Members of the Municipal Council (10.11%) on the left side, while MPs who made it into the Federal Government (14.14%) or with political jobs in national party organizations are located on the right side (7.77%). In addition, winners of rural regional seats (5.93%) are located on the left, and those of urban regional seats (3.42%) on the right.

The second vertical axis receives the highest contributions from the variables Trade Union, Chamber of Labour, Land party, party regional, youth party, and national party. At the bottom of the figure we find members of the Trade Union (12.02%) and the Chamber of Labour (10.27%), and at the top are members of the Land party (10.60%), the youth party (7.81%), the regional party (5.30%), and the national party organization (4.75%).

Thus, the interpretation of the first axis does not diverge much from the one in the space of ÖVP, as it distinguishes between mayors and others with careers in local politics who won their mandate through votes in a rural electoral district on the left and all others on the right. The second axis visualizes a clear cleavage between MPs with party careers and especially strong ties with the Land Party at the upper corner and unionists as well as members of the Chamber of Labour whose careers are not marked by intra-party ascensions at the bottom.


AHC reveals four distinct clusters that emerge significantly with a certain combination of characteristics (see Figure A2). Table 3 indicates that all clusters are characterized by a combination of five to seven categories except cluster 3, which can be mainly explained by the loose involvement of representatives of collective labor interests in the SPÖ party network.

Table 3. Characteristic Categories for Each SPÖ Cluster, Ranked by Test Value

Cluster 1: Mayors					
Categories	Cla/Mod	Mod/Cla	Global	p-value	v-test
Mayor: Yes	85.6	69.3	22.8	2.516514e-59	16.2
Municipal Council: Yes	48.7	71.2	41.1	4.217515e-20	9.2
RegSeat: Rural	75.0	20.2	7.6	2.439964e-11	6.7
RegSeat: Urban-Rural	54.9	17.2	8.8	2.883817e-05	4.2
Party Regional: Yes	34.1	68.7	56.6	2.268829e-04	3.7
CityDistrCouncil: Yes	36.5	23.3	18.0	3.997389e-02	2.0
Cluster 2: Party Localists					
AuxAssoc: Yes	51.8	59.2	33.3	1.019738e-16	8.3
RegSeat: Urban	59.2	24.9	12.3	2.022948e-08	5.6
PartyRegional: Yes	37.8	73.4	56.6	1.302489e-07	5.3
YouthParty: Yes	46.7	34.3	21.4	2.622249e-06	4.7
PartyNational: Yes	37.4	43.8	34.2	2.057388e-03	3.1
Cluster 3: Organized Labour Representatives					
TradeUnion: Yes	68.3	85.9	35.4	7.093109e-58	16.0
ChamberLabour: Yes	88.1	63.8	20.4	1.091745e-55	15.7
Cluster 4: Party Animals					
RegionalGov: Yes	73.8	57.1	11.2	9.524821e-33	11.9
FederalGov: Yes	58.2	63.1	15.7	1.076026e-28	8.8
PartyNational: Yes	32.8	77.4	34.2	1.817754e-18	8.8
YouthParty: Yes	33.1	48.8	21.4	1.161288e-09	6.1
StateParl: Yes	26.1	50.0	27.8	3.007010e-06	4.7
PartyLand: Yes	21.5	63.1	42.7	5.125431e-05	4.0
Federal Council: Yes	22.2	26.2	17.1	2.260993e-02	2.3

All clusters are visualized in the right panel of Figure 4. At the center of Cluster 1, one can find the mayor of the market town Altmünster *Elisabeth Feichtinger*. The most representative MP for Cluster 2 is the former Member of the Vienna City Council *Brundhilde Fuchs*; for Cluster 3 it is the unionist and Chamber of Labour representative *Franz Riepl*; and for Cluster 4 it is the former Vienna Land party leader and federal president *Franz Jonas*.

Figure 4. The Space of SPÖ-MPs




Time Trends and Socio-Demographics

Examining the prevalence of different types of MPs over time reveals that none of the identified clusters drops below the value of nine percent between 1945 and 2019 (see Figure 5), and thus a time-boundedness is not given. What one can observe, however, is a certain variability in prevalence over time. The ÖVP recruited disproportionately many MPs of the rural party fraction in the post-war period, which may be explained through a higher inter-penetration with the subsystem of farmers' interests in the past. Since the 1990s the rural fraction is represented significantly less and MPs assigned to the economic fraction have become more numerous. Over time party localists have become more important than party animals as well, which suggests that politicians can capitalize today more on their rootedness in regions than on national party positions. Turning to the SPÖ, we can observe a stark decline in unionists over time, who represented more than 40% of all MPs in the 1970s and accounted only for about 10% of all MPs between 2017 and 2019. Mayors remain well represented throughout time while party localists gradually emerge as the dominant type among SPÖ-MPs.


To investigate whether the different types of members of parliaments are marked by different sociodemographic patterns, Figure 6 shows concentration ellipses around categories pertaining to the variables gender, age when becoming an MP for the first time, and education. These ellipses include 80% of the individuals of a category and indicate the location and distribution of MPs marked by a given category. The results for the ÖVP suggest that some types of MPs are characterized by a distinct combination of sociodemographics. The rural fraction located on the left is overwhelmingly male, has lower education levels, and is above the age of 40, while party animals located in the upper right corner of the plane are often younger than 40 years and hold a Ph.D. (see Appendix). Completing the traditional *Ochsentour* through the party, thus, makes it likely to enter parliament at an earlier stage in life. The proportion of women does not diverge among the clusters of party animals, party localists, and the economic fraction. All other differences in sociodemographics between clusters are marginal as well.

Figure 5. Types of Members of Parliament Over Time (1945-2019)




Within the SPÖ, men and women are once again unequally distributed across all clusters. Unionists in the bottom part of the space have a lower proportion of women than the remaining sample, and party localists in the upper part of the space have a higher proportion of women. The youngest and best educated are found in the upper-right quadrant, which is mostly populated by party animals. Mayors on the left side of the plane are the oldest and rarely have a higher education degree.

Figure 6. The Space of ÖVP and SPÖ Members of Parliament (Cloud of Individuals): Gender, Education, and Age



The occupational background differs as well between types of parliamentarians. Career politicians are in both parties positioned in the upper right quadrant while “craftsmen, production and related workers” (short: workers) predominantly concentrate in the lower half of the graphs (see Figure 7) implying that within the ÖVP workers are often affiliated with the Economic Chamber while within the SPÖ they either tend to be members of trade unions and/or the Chamber of Labour or work in local politics. Public Sector Employees can be found through out the visualized social spaces but within the ÖVP they tend to belong to the cluster named “party animals”. As expected, the many ÖVP parliamentarians who used to work previously in the primary sector almost entirely overlap with the cluster of individuals that were labelled “rural fraction”.

Figure 7. The Space of ÖVP and SPÖ Members of Parliament (Cloud of Individuals): Occupations



Conclusions

This study has used information on public offices and party positions to investigate which pathways lead to legislative power in Austria. Using prosopographical tools, this study has shown that careers of parliamentarians do not necessarily follow a hierarchical pattern from the local to the regional (state) to the national (federal) level, and that the informal career system within each of Austria's (former) grand party allows for substantial diversity. While local politics such as becoming a member of a local council (*Gemeinderat*) or holding offices in regional parties is the “eye of the needle” through which the bulk of all MPs pass, experiences in regional politics can either serve as a direct or indirect stepping stone to the *Nationalrat*. Mayors and party localists spent most of the time throughout their careers in regional politics, while party animals became active in the *Länder* party and national party organizations and form close local ties with the party leadership. Moreover, lateral entries into legislative careers are possible as well, which is demonstrated by parliamentarians who are first and foremost socialized within the Chamber of Labour, the Economic Chamber, or the Trade Union.

One of the study's main findings is that intra-party recruitment systems put in place after World War II have until today served continuously as a template used by different party leaders to secure the cooperations of others. Substantial change such as the emergence of a novel career type cannot be observed. Career changers (*Seiteneinsteiger*) remain, for example, the exception to the rule. There are, however, certain internal dynamics of change that manifest itself in varying rates of prevalence in the types of parliamentarians. Within the SPÖ, the interorganizational mobility between collective labor organizations and the parliament has significantly decreased. While the party-union link is far from becoming a historical relic, it is also clear that the bonds of loyalty between both organizations have weakened (Tsarouhas 2012). In a similar vein, the organizational penetration of the ÖVP through the Chamber of Agriculture—a Catholic-conservative player in Austria's corporatism—has diminished. While this “social partnership” organization is, like all others, not questioned fundamentally, its influence has diminished (Bussjäger and Jöhler 2021). Consequently, politicians can no longer easily change from chamber to party functions and back again, and while double functions (*Personalunion*) remain common, they are by no means a guarantee for success anymore.

The declining relevance of trade unions, the Chamber of Labour, and the Chamber of Agriculture can also be explained by the changing backgrounds of the members of parliament. In the postwar period, craftsmen, production and related workers, and farmers comprised the largest occupational groups from which SPÖ and ÖVP parliamentarians entered politics. Starting in the 1970s, public sector employees started to dominate the *Nationalrat*, which has been increasingly replaced by career politicians, managers, businessmen, and private sector employees within the last decades.

The little change observed within the Austrian legislative elite was thus not driven by leadership change or the establishment of new recruitment channels, but rather by external factors such as the shifting representation of occupational groups in parliament and the decline of the Austrian “social partnership.” Thus, the long-term perspective adopted in this article reveals little paradigmatic change. While there is little doubt that parties such as the ÖVP and SPÖ have adapted during the past half century to the challenges posed by a transformed environment, this study has shown that both parties held on to the same recruitment networks throughout time.

Limitations

Despite its contributions, this article, like most analyses developing a *longue durée* perspective on elites, builds on data with clear limitations. The major limitation is the partially missing information on the duration of career stints, which makes it impossible to know how exactly careers unfolded over time. It is likely that data with a higher granularity would have allowed for the construction of a larger number of clusters due to variations in the ordering and duration of career stints. Detecting, for example, different varieties of the *Ochsentour* through the party may add valuable insights. The main insight of this contribution, however, can be expected to remain unaltered: The opportunity structures for making it into the Austrian parliament have not substantially changed between 1945 and 2019.

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Appendix

Table A1. MCA Conducted for All ÖVP Members of Parliament: Eigenvalues, Modified Rates, and Cumulated Modified Rates for Axes 1-5

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Eigenvalue	0.14	0.11	0.10	0.08	0.07
Modified rate	68.82	20.45	8.22	2.41	0.10
Cumulated modified rate	68.82	89.27	97.49	99.9	100

Table A2. Multiple Correspondence Analyses Conducted for All ÖVP Members of Parliament – Contributions of Active Variables

Variable	Category	Axis 1	Axis 2	N
Party National	Party National: No	1.30	3.26	423
	Party National: Yes	3.53	8.85	156
	Total	4.83	12.11	579
Party Land	Party Land: Yes	1.51	2.35	431
	Party Land: No	4.40	6.83	148
	Total	5.91	9.18	579
Party Regional	Party Regional: No	0.01	0.04	349
	Party Regional: Yes	0.01	0.06	230
	Total	0.02	0.10	579
Youth Party	Youth Party: No	0.07	0.02	535
	Youth Party: Yes	0.81	0.22	44
	Total	0.88	0.24	579
Federal Government	Federal Gov.: No	0.78	1.68	496
	Federal Gov.: Yes	4.65	10.05	83
	Total	5.43	11.73	579
Regional Government	Regional Gov.: No	0.17	0.81	527
	Regional Gov.: Yes	1.67	8.16	52
	Total	1.84	8.97	579
State Parliament	State Parl.: No	0.01	1.19	456
	State Parl.: Yes	0.04	4.42	123
	Total	0.05	5.61	579
Federal Council	Federal Council: No	0.00	0.00	480
	Federal Council: Yes	0.02	0.00	99
	Total	0.02	0.00	579
Mayor	Mayor: No	2.67	0.19	431
	Mayor: Yes	7.50	0.53	148
	Total	10.17	0.72	579
Municipal Council	Municipal C.: No	1.10	0.25	395
	Municipal C.: Yes	2.36	0.53	184
	Total	3.46	0.78	579
City/District Council	City/District C.: No	0.10	0.07	535
	City/District C.: Yes	1.19	0.84	44
	Total	1.29	0.91	579
Chamber of Agric.	ChamberAgric: No	3.94	0.55	469
	ChamberAgric: Yes	16.81	2.33	110
	Total	20.75	2.88	579
Economic Chamber	EcoChamber: No	1.31	3.81	462
	EcoChamber: Yes	5.19	15.03	117
	Total	6.5	18.84	579
ÖABB	ÖABB: No	0.72	1.33	440
	ÖABB: Yes	2.29	4.19	139
	Total	3.01	5.52	579
ÖBB	ÖBB: No	3.66	0.69	464
	ÖBB: Yes	14.75	2.78	115
	Total	18.41	3.47	579
ÖWB	ÖWB: No	1.06	2.39	492
	ÖWB: Yes	6.02	13.51	87
	Total	7.08	15.9	579
Regional Seat	RegSeat: No	0.85	0.84	392
	RegSeat: Rural	5.24	0.17	81
	RegSeat: Urban	2.48	0.71	56
	RegSeat: Urban-Rural	1.79	1.34	50
	Total	10.36	3.06	579

Legend: Variables with a contribution above average ($100/17 = 5.9\%$) are in **bold**; categories with a contribution above average ($100/36 = 2.8\%$) are in *italics*.

Figure A1. Dendrogram for the Heirarchical Representation of ÖVP Parliamentarians




Table A3. Composition of ÖVP Clusters

	CL 1: Rural Fraction (%)	CL 2: Party Localists (%)	CL 3: Economic Fraction (%)	CL 4: Party Animals (%)	All MPs (%)
Gender					
Men	114 (0.93)	181 (0.83)	103 (0.84)	97 (0.84)	495 (0.85)
Women	9 (0.07)	37 (0.17)	19 (0.16)	19 (0.16)	84 (0.15)
Age					
20-39	28 (0.23)	58 (0.27)	26 (0.21)	36 (0.31)	148 (0.26)
39+	95 (0.77)	160 (0.74)	96 (0.79)	80 (0.69)	431 (0.74)
Education					
ISCED 1-5	100 (0.81)	140 (0.64)	72 (0.59)	28 (0.24)	340 (0.59)
ISCED 6	11 (0.09)	35 (0.16)	22 (0.18)	20 (0.17)	88 (0.15)
ISCED 7	12 (0.10)	43 (0.20)	28 (0.23)	68 (0.59)	151 (0.26)

Table A4. MCA Conducted for All SPÖ Members of Parliament: Eigenvalues, Modified Rates, and Cumulated Modified Rates for Axes 1-5

	Axis 1	Axis 2	Axis 3	Axis 4	Axis 5
Eigenvalue	0.14	0.13	0.10	0.08	0.08
Modified rate	51.24	35.19	10.55	1.84	1.02
Cumulated modified rate	51.24	86.43	96.98	98.82	99.84

Table A5. Multiple Correspondence Analyses Conducted for All SPÖ Members of Parliament – Contributions of Active Variables

Variable	Category	Axis 1	Axis 2	N
Party National	Party National: No	<i>4.04</i>	2.47	198
	Party National: Yes	<i>7.77</i>	4.75	381
	Total	11,81	7,22	579
Party Land	Party Land: No	0.21	7.89	332
	Party Land: Yes	0.28	10.60	247
	Total	0.49	18,49	579
Party Regional	Party Regional: No	<i>4.04</i>	6.93	251
	Party Regional: Yes	3.09	5.30	328
	Total	7,13	12,23	579
Youth Party	Youth Party: No	1.45	2.13	455
	Youth Party: Yes	<i>5.31</i>	7.81	124
	Total	6.76	9,94	579
Federal Government	Federal Gov.: No	2.64	0.19	488
	Federal Gov.: Yes	<i>14.14</i>	1.01	91
	Total	16,78	1.20	579
Regional Government	Regional Gov.: No	<i>0.48</i>	0.69	514
	Regional Gov.: Yes	3.79	5.46	65
	Total	4,27	6,15	579
State Parliament	State Parl.: No	0.28	0.36	418
	State Parl.: Yes	<i>0.74</i>	0.94	161
	Total	1,02	1,30	579
Federal Council	Federal Council: No	0.32	0.03	480
	Federal Council: Yes	1.55	0.14	99
	Total	1,87	0,17	579
Mayor	Mayor: No	<i>3.85</i>	0.07	447
	Mayor: Yes	<i>13.03</i>	0.23	132
	Total	16,88	0,30	579
Municipal Council	Municipal C.: No	<i>7.06</i>	1.50	341
	Municipal C.: Yes	<i>10.11</i>	2.15	238
	Total	17,17	3,65	579
City/District Council	City/District C.: No	0.56	0.41	475
	City/District C.: Yes	2.55	1.86	104
	Total	3,11	2,27	579
Chamber of Labour	ChamberLabour: No	0.34	2.63	461
	ChamberLabour: Yes	1.31	10.27	118
	Total	1,65	12,90	579
Trade Union	TradeUnion: No	0.02	6.59	374
	TradeUnion: Yes	0.04	12.02	205
	Total	0,06	18,61	579
Auxiliary Association	AuxAssoc: No	<i>0.43</i>	1.67	386
	AuxAssoc: Yes	<i>0.87</i>	3.34	193
	Total	1,30	5,01	579
Regional Seat	RegSeat: No	0.05	0.14	413
	RegSeat: Rural	<i>5.93</i>	0.03	44
	RegSeat: Urban	<i>3.42</i>	0.34	71
	RegSeat: Urban-Rural	0.31	0.05	51
	Total	9,71	0,56	579

Legend: Variables with a contribution above average ($100/15 = 6.7\%$) are in **bold**; categories with a contribution above average ($100/32 = 3.1\%$) are in *italics*.

Figure A2. Dendrogram for the Heirarchical Representation of SPÖ Parliamentarians




Table A6. Composition of SPÖ Clusters

	CL 1: Mayors (%)	CL 1: Party Localists (%)	CL 3: Organized Labor Representatives (%)	CL 4: Party Animals (%)	All MPs (%)
Gender					
Men	133 (0.82)	114 (0.67)	138 (0.85)	65 (0.77)	450 (0.78)
Women	30 (0.18)	55 (0.32)	25 (0.15)	19 (0.23)	129 (0.22)
Age					
20-39	19 (0.12)	53 (0.31)	24 (0.15)	28 (0.33)	124 (0.21)
39+	144 (0.88)	116 (0.69)	139 (0.85)	56 (0.67)	455 (0.78)
Education					
ISCED 1-5	138 (0.85)	120 (0.71)	131 (0.80)	41 (0.49)	430 (0.74)
ISCED 6	12 (0.07)	22 (0.13)	10 (0.06)	16 (0.19)	60 (0.10)
ISCED 7	13 (0.08)	27 (0.16)	22 (0.13)	27 (0.32)	89 (0.15)