In-work poverty in the EU - A gendered Decomposition Analysis

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1 Introduction

In times of acutely high unemployment rates across the world, it may not seem like in-work poverty should be a prominent issue. However, in the very near future, policies to boost employment rates will be set in place. Such policies have in the past often increased employment but at the expense of job quality, which led to a rise in in-work poverty rates across Europe in the last decades (Fraser, Gutiérrez, and Peña-Casas, 2011). Thus, the recovery after the Covid-crisis and associated employment policies could very likely lead to a new surge of in-work poverty. Furthermore, the Covid-crisis seems to have contributed to widening gender inequality not only through more negative effects on female employment, but also through the pandemic-enforced retreat into the household and associated increases in care work, which were mostly borne by women (Alon et al., 2020). It is therefore of great relevance to analyse the phenomenon of in-work poverty from a gender perspective to help prevent a further increase in gender inequality after the Covid-crisis.

In-work poverty is generally defined as being in employment, but living in a household with an equivalised disposable household income below the at-risk-of-poverty line, which is mostly defined by 60% of median income (Gautié and Ponthieux, 2016). There has been extensive research on the explanatory factors and driving mechanisms of in-work poverty, where the labour market, household context, and social security have been found to be the most important areas to focus on. However, there has been less interest to analyse in-work poverty specifically from a gender perspective, with some notable exceptions (Filandri and Struffolino, 2019; Knittler and Heuberger, 2018; Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011; Ponthieux, 2018; Siegert, 2020). The definition of in-work poverty via household income makes individual analyses especially difficult and the household has often been criticised from a feminist perspective as a "black box", masking inequalities within (Mader and Schneebaum, 2013). To gain a better understanding of women's reality, studies focusing on gender differences introduced another indicator which approaches poverty measurement as if individuals were living alone, therefore ignoring the household-level altogether (Ponthieux, 2018). On the other hand, Knittler and Heuberger (2018) construct an indicator, which uses individual income as well, but adapts the poverty level to account for household factors. This approach can open the black box of the household without omitting the household level entirely from the analysis. In this paper, I will make use of this indicator, which has seen unjustifiably little attention. When analysed in combination with the European official in-work poverty indicator, it has the potential to disentangle the individual and the

household level and make inequalities and dependencies within the household visible (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018).

The paper will consist of four parts. First, a descriptive analysis of the prevalence of the two in-work poverty indicators (the European and the one following Knittler and Heuberger (2018)) by gender will be conducted. Thus, I can compare three groups of people: Those who are poor according to both indicators and those who are poor only due to one of the two indicators, respectively. This exercise enables me to shed light on dependencies within the household and the individual context of in-work poverty by gender. Second, I will analyse the life situation and well-being of these three groups of people with a special focus on those, who are working poor at the individual level, but lifted out of poverty via the household. Assessing their life situation is important to gauge the extent of the problem of leaving this group out of general in-work poverty analysis. In the third part regression models are estimated for the two indicators and every country separately by gender to identify differences in risk factors between men and women and between the indicators. This is also a first step towards the decomposition analysis that follows in the fourth part. Before the decomposition analysis, the fourth part briefly discusses gender differences in important characteristics to be able to set the decomposition results into context. Finally, the decomposition analysis tries to disentangle the effect of differences in risk factors and differences in characteristics for the gender gaps in in-work poverty for both indicators. To account for the vast institutional variety in Europe, the analysis will take a cross-country comparative approach, especially including the Eastern European countries, which have mostly been left out of in-work poverty research (Goerne, 2011).

To sum up, I make use of a relatively unknown indicator for in-work poverty (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018) to open the "black box" of the household, as well as decomposing gender differences to shed light on potential driving mechanisms. The broad cross-country European perspective makes it possible to account for the institutional context and has not yet been applied to the individual indicator (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018). The paper can thus contribute to a better understanding of the different realities of in-work poverty by gender, which is indispensable to ensure that a process of employment expansion after the Covid-crisis does not amplify gender inequality.

2 Related Literature

In the last decades, in-work poverty rates in Europe steadily increased or at least remained at a relatively high level due to a policy shift to activation policies and the workfare state (Fraser, Gutiérrez, and Peña-Casas, 2011; Spannagel et al., 2017). As these policies focused on increasing employment, they tolerated increasing levels of precariousness in the labour market, which led to higher in-work poverty rates (Lohmann and Andreß, 2008). At the same time, the economic crisis of 2008 and the associated financial pressure on national budgets led to a retrenchment of the welfare state and thus decreases of social benefit levels, which also resulted in higher in-work poverty rates (Hanzl-Weiß, Vidovic, and Sanoussi, 2010). This growing importance of in-work poverty as a political problem also led to increasing academic research on the topic.

The concept of in-work poverty combines two levels of analysis, which makes it's interpretation relatively complex. In-work poverty is on the one hand defined on the individual level through the employment status and on the other hand on the household level through the use of equivalised disposable household income as indicator for poverty (Lohmann and Crettaz, 2018).

Thus, the phenomenon inherently connects risk factors on the individual level, such as low wage, low work intensity and other forms of precariousness, with the household level and the corresponding dependency relationships (Goerne, 2011). The groups who are most at risk on an individual level are those who are atypically employed, migrants, lower educated and younger people, and those working in the service or agricultural sectors (Filandri and Struffolino, 2019). The relationship of in-work poverty to gender will be discussed in detail later on. On the household level, families with children and single-earner families have high in-work poverty rates, where single parents have the highest risk as they combine these two factors (Goerne, 2011).

Furthermore, the institutional setting influences in-work poverty risk in several ways. It shapes the labour market setting via wage bargaining regulations and other labour market policies and further influences household structures through family policies and other tax and transfer incentives (Marchal, Marx, and Verbist, 2018). Therefore, labour market risk factors and the household setting can have a very different impact on in-work poverty rates depending on the institutional context(Lohmann and Crettaz, 2018). Additionally, the welfare state influences household income directly via the tax and transfer system and associated redistribution mechanisms, which generally decrease in-work poverty (Lohmann and Crettaz, 2018). This leads to very different realities of in-work poverty depending on the type of the welfare state. While socio-democratic welfare states have very low levels of in-work poverty which are mostly driven by low wages and affect young single households, Southern European countries have high in-work poverty rates that are concentrated among older people in large households with low work intensities (Lohmann and Andreß, 2008). Liberal welfare states are characterised by high employment rates accompanied by low wages and relatively generous transfers for working people, which results in moderate in-work poverty rates (Lohmann and Andreß, 2008). In conservative welfare states employment rates are low and the moderate levels of in-work poverty are often related to strong household dependencies or concentrated in sectors that are not captured by the strict labour market regulations, also often called "outsiders" (Lohmann and Andreß, 2008). Finally, studies on in-work poverty in Eastern European countries remain scarce, but Goerne (2011) finds that in-work poverty rates in Poland are high due to large households with many dependents and a weak social safety net.

More specifically, this study relates to the literature examining in-work poverty in a gender context. However, the indicator has been criticised a lot for painting a distorted picture of the relationship between gender and in-work poverty (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011; Ponthieux, 2018). While the employment status is defined on an individual level, income and poverty is defined on the household level using the equivalised disposable household income. The definition of income and poverty status on the household level with the use of equivalence scales implicitly assumes total income pooling within the household and therefore obscures inequalities within the household (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011; Mader and Schneebaum, 2013). This assumption of full income pooling has been contested empirically for decades (Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Mader and Schneebaum, 2013). The aggregation of income on the household level also leads to the empirical phenomenon called "Gender Paradoxon", which refers to the surprisingly low in-work poverty rates among women, often lower than men's, while their individual disadvantaged position on the labour market is clearly established (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). Thus, individual in-work disadvantage of women is more often offset on the household level via the earnings of the partner than is the case for men (Ponthieux, 2018). While these women are excluded from the indicator, men with relatively good earnings, but with a partner who earns little or nothing are included in the indicator (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). To better capture these individual in-work poverty risks, several studies created individualized in-work

poverty indicators, which define poverty and income as if the person was living alone (Filandri and Struffolino, 2019; Ponthieux, 2018; Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). As a result, in-work poverty risks increase for men and for women, but much more so for the latter, which leads to striking gender gaps in individualized in-work poverty (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). Therefore, it seems that women's working poverty is more related to labour market factors than men's and is often offset due to (assumed) income pooling on the household level (Ponthieux, 2018). The effect of the new definition of in-work poverty depends strongly on the country-context and especially on the prevalence of the male-breadwinner model (Ponthieux, 2018). Further, a new paradoxon arises, as female employment rates on the macro-level on the one hand increase individual in-work poverty rates, but decrease conventional in-work poverty rates (Filandri and Struffolino, 2019). Thus, while dual-earnership often helps households escape poverty, it generates financial dependency for women (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011).

Even though individualized in-work poverty indicators can provide new insights into gender inequalities, they also suffer from limitations. While the assumption of full income pooling is arguably far from reality, the assumption of no income pooling at all for individualized indicators does not fare much better (Lohmann and Crettaz, 2018). Knittler and Heuberger (2018) thus propose to measure income at the individual level to be able to capture inequalities within the household, but to account for the household context by adjusting the poverty threshold following widely used equivalence scales. This indicator, in combination with the European in-work poverty indicator, makes it possible to analyse implicit dependency relationships within the household without totally ignoring economies of scale or children's needs on the household level. Knittler and Heuberger (2018) and Siegert (2020) apply this indicator to the Austrian sample of the EU-SILC and find increased in-work poverty risks especially for women, which is in line with the literature. I will use this indicator to analyse this phenomenon on a cross-country European perspective.

Eventually, the important question arises, what it means for those individuals, mostly women, to be lifted out of poverty by their partner's earnings and thus, to be financially dependent. Mader and Schneebaum (2013) show that economic power in the household influences bargaining power, meaning that in households where income differences are larger, important decisions are less often made together. Additionally, own labour income does not only influence current consumption possibilities, but also affects social security claims in most welfare states, most importantly pension income (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). Thus, the dependency relationship in such households extends beyond working age into old age as well. These considerations also become more and more important, as household structures become more unstable and divorce or separation rates increase steadily (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018). In general, this financial dependency relationship makes the individuals very vulnerable both to external and internal shocks (Peña-Casas and Ghailani, 2011). Van Damme, Kalmijn, and Uunk (2009) show that separation leads to very large income drops, increased poverty and welfare dependency, especially for women, who then have to increase their labour supply drastically. The same pattern emerges when analysing fatal health shocks, where especially widows suffer large income cuts and have to increase their labour supply to escape poverty, while this is not the case for widowers (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2015). Finally, economic dependency on the partner has been shown to be the primary reason, why women do not leave their abusive partner or return back to them (Kim and Gray, 2008). It is thus of vast importance to open the black box of the household and to include these dependency relationships in the analysis of in-work poverty, which will be done in this paper.

3 Data & Methodology

For the following analysis, the EU-SILC cross-sectional dataset for 2018 is used. I restrict the analysis to 14 countries[1], because they report consistent net individual earnings for all income components analysed, which is essential to construct the individual in-work poverty indicator in a comparable manner. The EU-SILC lends itself to this type of analysis, as it combines detailed individual information on labour market characteristics with several important variables on the household level. Additionally, it is the standard dataset used in the related literature on in-work poverty in Europe (Lohmann and Crettaz, 2018).

The first indicator to be analysed is the generally used in-work poverty indicator according to the official Eurostat definition (Eurostat, 2021). First, persons in employment are defined as everybody between 18 and 64 years old, whose main activity was employment, either self-employed or as employee, for more than 6 months of the previous calendar year. This is a very strict definition of being in employment, which many people do not fulfill, especially when compared to the U.S. definition (Siegert, 2020). Specifically, long-term unemployed or people in very precarious, unstable employment relations are excluded from the analysis (Ponthieux, 2018). However, this definition is used in this study to make the results comparable across other studies in Europe, which mainly use the same definition of in-employment, and to make gender-related mechanisms more noticeable. Further, this very selective group should be especially well protected from poverty via employment, which makes it even more interesting to analyse why/whether they are not. The second important part of the indicator is to define, who is poor. Therefore, the Eurostat-indicator uses equivalised disposable household income (using the OECD equivalence scale) and takes 60% of it's national median as the at-risk of poverty threshold (Eurostat, 2021). The income definition thus includes all income from work, capital and private transfers net of taxes and social contributions, but including all social and private transfers.

The second indicator is taken from Knittler and Heuberger (2018). The target population of people in employment is defined in the same way as the Eurostat-indicator to make them comparable (Eurostat, 2021). However, income is measured on the individual level including all income components that are included in the Eurostat-indicator. Income components, which are received on the household level, such as family benefits, are divided equally among all adults in the household (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018).[2] Eventually, the household context is incorporated via adjusting the poverty threshold. The starting point is 60% of median equivalised disposable income, which is then multiplied by the OECD equivalence weights and further divided by the number of adults in the household (Knittler and Heuberger, 2018). Thus, the poverty threshold can be referred to as the amount of money, a person needs to make to lift the household out of poverty if every adult contributes the same share to household income.

The analysis will be divided into four parts. First, the two indicators will be compared and their overlaps analysed on a country-level. More specifically, we can compare three groups of people: Those who are poor according to both indicators and those who are poor only due to one indicator. Second, EU-SILC has very suitable well-being and deprivation questions to paint

[1] Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Sweden, and Slovenia

[2] Naturally, assuming that household-level income components are shared equally is again not always capturing reality, as some noteworthy empirical papers have shown (Cesarini et al., 2017). However, these income components have to be included in the income definition to make the indicator comparable to the Eurostat definition and cannot be distributed in another way within the household with the data available.

a clearer picture of the life situation of people affected by in-work poverty according to these two indicators. The most interesting question here will be, how those who are lifted out of poverty due to the partner's income feel and whether that is different from non-poor people. This perspective can help to argue the importance of including this group in in-work poverty analysis. In the third part, I will estimate regression models for women and men separately by country using the two indicators as dependent variables. As the dependent variables are both binary, I will estimate linear probability models as well as logistic models and check for the robustness of the results to model specification. Both models will be weighted using the EU-SILC survey weights. Also, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported for the linear probability model. I will include all variables specified in table 1 as explanatory variables.

Table 1: Explanatory Variables

Variable	Type	Range or Levels	Missings
Demographics			
Age	continuous	from 18 to 81	None
Education	categorical	lower secondary, upper secondary, tertiary	93
Migration	binary	Yes or No	None
Urbanisation	categorical	urban intermediate thinly populated	Slovenia missing Estonia, Latvia w/o middle category
Household			
Family	categorical	single HH partner w/o kids single parent partner and kids	723
Employment			
Self-employment	binary	Yes or No	2
Part-time employment	binary	Yes or No	2
ISCO occupations	categorical	high-skill white collar low-skill white collar high-skill blue collar low-skill blue collar	4.291 (2.655 from Slovenia)
Temporary contract	binary	Yes or No	1.877 plus Sweden
experience	continuous	from 0 to 70	761 plus Sweden, Slovenia
Health			
Good health	binary	Yes or No	2.846 (1257 from Estonia) plus Sweden, Slovenia

Migration refers to migration background and takes the value of 1 if the country of birth is not the country of residence. Even though there are no missings, the variable is not used for the regression and decomposition analysis in Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland, because there are very little observations with migration background. The variable family is constructed from combining the variable *consensual union* with the variable *household type*, where the variable is set as missing if *household type* is *other*. The variables self-employment and part-time employment are constructed from four variables (PL073-PL076) and self-employed takes the value of 1 if the person has worked more months as self-employed than as employee (irrespective of full-time or part-time). The same applies respectively to part-time employment. The more straightforward variable *PL040-status in employment* is not used, because of the high number of missing values. However, for those observations where I have both variables, the assignment matches in almost all cases. The 2-digit ISCO groups are first combined to 1-digit groups and then grouped into 4 categories following Eurofound (2010). Good health is self-reported, where the variable takes value 1 if "very good" or "good" is reported.

In the fourth part, the gender differences in the two indicators will be decomposed. To be able to put these results into context, gender differences in the variables in table 1 will be analysed. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is widely used in the labour market literature to analyze gender differences in wages. However, the method is also very suitable to study gender differences in other outcomes, such as labour force participation or poverty rates (Yun, 2004). Specifically for this study, it provides a very straightforward descriptive method to study the underlying different mechanisms for men's and women's in-work poverty rates. It can deliver a very condensed picture of differences in characteristics and differences in coefficients, that lends itself perfectly to cross-country comparisons. In the analysis, I will refer to the explained part as differences in characteristics, and to the unexplained part as differences in risk factors, because this interpretation is much more suitable for this context. I will use two approaches to decompose the gender difference in the Eurostat and the individual indicator. First, the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition will be applied to linear probability models. More specifically, I use the two-fold decomposition and define the non-discriminatory parameters as the coefficients from pooled regression models, as proposed by Neumark (1988). Following Jann (2008b) I also include the group indicator (i.e. for gender) in these models to avoid spillovers of gender differences into the coefficients if this presumably important variable is omitted. The stata command *oaxaca* will be used for estimation (Jann, 2008a). However, as the indicators are binary in nature, the linear probability model has some limitations (Wooldridge, 2015). To account for this, the second approach uses a generalized decomposition method suitable for non-linear models and specifically logit models following Yun (2004). An estimation procedure for this approach is also implemented via the stata command *oaxaca* using the logit extension (Jann, 2008a). He proposes to evaluate the link function at the mean characteristics and use a Taylor expansion to linearize the characteristics and coefficients effects at these points. Using this approximation, he derives weights for each independent variable to capture it's contribution to the difference in the outcome mean (Yun, 2004). Therefore, the results of this generalized decomposition method can be directly compared to the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results, as the method essentially decomposes marginal effects at the mean and thus also leads to results in terms of probabilities. Nevertheless, the two approximation methods that have to be applied with non-linear models also result in additional approximation residuals and thus lead to more uncertainty (Yun, 2004). Specifically, it could be that the approximation is poor if most of the data lie in highly nonlinear regions of the model, or if differences in coefficients or means of the covariates are large (Jann, 2018). Therefore, it cannot be said a priori which of the two methods is more suitable for the data used. However, comparing the decomposition results with the separate regression models from part three and the gender differences in characteristics can help gauge the reliability of the decomposition estimates. Nevertheless, the decomposition results should only be seen as additional evidence, supporting the results from the previous parts, as both decomposition methods have it's limitations.

4 Results

4.1 Comparative Analysis

Figure 1 compares the shares of working people in the different countries, which are either poor due to one of the indicators or due to both.



Figure 1: In-work poverty according to combinations of the two indicators

It is interesting to see that there are stark cross-country differences. On the one hand, in countries, such as Austria, Ireland, Slovenia, and to a smaller extent Poland and Spain, the biggest share of working people is poor only due to the individual measure, followed by those who are poor due to both indicators. This means, that in these countries, many individually poor people are lifted out of poverty by other household members, but are thus also in a financially dependent position that is masked by the Eurostat indicator. On the other hand, there are countries where a substantial share is only poor due to the Eurostat indicator, such as Greece, Croatia. These people would not be poor individually, but their household incomes fall below the poverty line, because they have to additionally provide for other people in the household. Additionally, the two indicators overlap very much in countries like Estonia, Italy, Romania, and Sweden, where the biggest share is poor due to both of the indicators. This group is poor due to their individual income and cannot compensate for this in the household context. Eventually, in Bulgaria, Latvia, and Portugal, the shares are of very similar size. There thus seems to be an equal amount of people, who are poor because of the household context or get lifted out of poverty by other household members.



Figure 2: In-work poverty by gender according to the two indicators

In a next step, we can compare the in-work poverty rates by gender between the two indicators, as can be seen in figure 2. Again, the cross-country differences are striking. In most countries (Austria, Bulgaria, Estonia, Spain, Ireland, Latvia, Poland, Sweden, and Slovenia), there is no difference between the in-work poverty rates for men according to the two indicators. However, if the two indicators differ for men, the Eurostat in-work poverty rate is clearly higher (Greece, Croatia, Italy, Portugal, Romania). Thus, in these countries men are more often poor because of the household income than due to their individual income, i.e. because they have to additionally provide for other household members with their income. The situation for women is clearly the opposite. Even though in some countries their in-work poverty rates do not differ much between the two indicators (Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia), in all other countries women are clearly more often classified as in-work poor due to their individual income. The difference is most striking in those countries, that showed very high rates due to the individual in-work poverty indicator before, especially Austria.

Eventually, figure 3 shows how the shares of men and women in in-work poverty are divided between these three categories, analysed in figure 1. At first glance, it is interesting to see, that the levels of in-work poverty (when combining the two indicators) do not differ a lot between men and women in most countries, except for Austria. However, the nature of in-work poverty seems to be different by gender in most countries. On the one hand, most men, who are in-work poor, are so due to both indicators. Yet, in some countries (Greece, Spain, Croatia, Italy, Portugal) most men are poor only on a household level, but not due to their individual income, which was already indicated in the previous figure. There are also very low rates of men, who are only poor due to their individual income, but are lifted out of poverty by the household. On the other hand, the greatest share of women in in-work poverty is only poor according to



Figure 3: In-work poverty by gender according to combinations of the two indicators

individual income, but gets lifted out of poverty by the household (Austria, Greece, Spain, Croatia, Ireland, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia). Again, this phenomenon is most strikingly present in those countries that had high rates of individual in-work poverty in figure 1 and where women were more often in-work poor due to individual income in figure 2. Further, the share of women counting as in-work poor only according to the Eurostat indicator is very low in all countries.

This crude first analysis thus shows that in-work poverty seems to be of very different nature for men and for women. While men are often in-work poor, because they have to provide for other household members, women show very high rates of in-work poverty according to individual income, which then gets alleviated at the household level. Further, even if this phenomenon is more striking in some countries than in others, it seems to be relevant to some extent in all countries analysed here. Importantly, when only focusing on the Eurostat indicator and thus on household incomes, this latter group is omitted from the analysis and considered as "not poor". However, this is clearly a vulnerable group, as they do not earn enough to provide for themselves and are thus highly financially dependent on other household members, mostly their partner. The next section thus analyses the well-being situation of this group, which is normally not part of in-work poverty research, and compares it to other in-work poor groups and non-poor groups.

4.2 Well-being situation

The 2018 EU-Silc cross-sectional dataset includes a special module about well-being, which can be used to dig deeper into the actual living situation of the four groups analysed above, i.e. those who are not in in-work poverty according to neither indicator, those only due to one of

them, and those according to both indicators. However, as these well-being variables have a relatively big share of missing values, table 3 shows how these missings are distributed across the population. The table shows that more young people, people with upper secondary education, other household types with and without children, and those who are in-work poor due to only one of the two indicators are more likely to have missing values. This has to be kept in mind when interpreting the following results.[3]

Table 2: Well-being and the two indicators

	Not WP|A	WP ind.|B	WP EU|C	WP both|D
Overall satisfaction				
low	10.1	12.3 A	19.1 A B	21.7 A B C
medium	61.5 D	60.6 D	62.3 D	58.4
high	28.3 C D	27.2 C D	18.6	19.9
Satisfaction with household's financial situation				
low	22.5	29.5 A	46.3 A B	46.1 A B
medium	60.9 B C D	58.9 C D	46.3	45.1
high	16.6 B C D	11.7 C D	7.4	8.8 C
Satisfaction with job				
low	14.3	23.8 A	24.9 A	30.0 A B C
medium	60.4 B C D	54.8 D	56.3 D	51.1
high	25.3 B C D	21.4 C D	18.8	18.9
Perceived social exclusion				
low	91.2 D	92.7 A C D	90.4 D	88.0
medium	7.0 B	6.1	8.3 A B	10.0 A B C
high	1.8 B C	1.2	1.3	2.0 B C
Satisfaction with time use (leisure time)				
low	31.0	33.4 A	39.8 A B D	37.3 A B
medium	53.8 B C D	52.2 C D	49.1	49.0
high	15.1 C D	14.4 C	11.1	13.7 C

The table shows the relative frequencies of the answers to the well-being variables within the different combinations of in-work poverty indicators. The letters A to D indicate whether the share is significantly higher than in another column using pairwise z-tests (i.e. the letter A in column B indicates that this share is significantly higher in column B than in column A).

Table 2 shows a comparison of the answers to five relevant well-being variables between these four groups for all countries together. Using pairwise z-tests, the table also shows significant differences between the answers of the columns. For all 5 variables, it is clear that the group which does not count as in-work poor according to any of the two indicators responds most positively to these questions. They have highest overall satisfaction with their life, but also highest satisfaction with their household's financial situation, with their job and time use, and lowest perceived levels of social exclusion. Also, the group which is poor due to both in-work poverty indicators has the lowest satisfaction levels for all variables, closely followed by those who count as in-work poor due to the Eurostat indicator. The most interesting group in this study, the ones who are only poor due to the individual in-work poverty indicator, is in the middle of these. They fare worse than the non-poor group, but also clearly better than the other two in-work poor groups. The same pattern can be seen in table 4 in the appendix for additional variables. Even though, the life situation of those who count as in-work poor only

[3]Especially the results for Croatia (58% of the population have at least one missing value among the well-being variables), Sweden (54%), and Slovenia (64%) have to be taken with a grain of salt.

due to the individual indicator seems to be better than for those who count as in-work poor due to the Eurostat indicator, they still fare clearly worse in most well-being variables than the non-poor population. Additionally, there are many other problems arising from such financially dependent positions in the household, as discussed in the literature section, that cannot be accounted for by these well-being variables.

Eventually, figure 4 shows the distribution of answers to the overall satisfaction question by in-work poverty indicator and country. First of all, the cross-country differences in overall satisfaction are striking. While in Bulgaria, Croatia, Latvia, and Portugal a substantial part of the working population reports low overall satisfaction with their life, high overall satisfaction is reported a lot in countries like Austria, Ireland, Poland, and Sweden. However, the focus here is on the differences between the in-work poor groups. As described above, the non-poor group has the highest satisfaction levels, followed by only individual in-work poor, then only Eurostat in-work poor and those who are in-work poor due to both indicators. This pattern also holds for each country individually, except Ireland where the in-work poor according to the Eurostat indicator and also the individual one are most satisfied. The difference between satisfaction of non-poor and those who are poor according to the individual in-work poverty indicator is smallest in the countries, where the share of those who are poor only due to the individual indicator is largest, such as Austria, Spain, Ireland, Poland, and Slovenia. There are clear differences, however, in Bulgaria, Greece, Croatia, Latvia, and Romania.



Figure 4: Overall satisfaction by in-work poverty status

To sum up, the self-reported level of well-being seems to be lowest for the group, who counts as in-work poor according to both indicators, which mirrors these households' double

vulnerability. This group is closely followed by those who are in-work poor only due to the Eurostat indicator. The group, which only counts as in-work poor due to the individual indicator seems to have clearly higher well-being than the two former groups. However, they are still worse off than the non-poor group, which underlines the importance of not ignoring this group in in-work poverty research. Additionally, as already discussed above, the financially dependent position of those who only count as in-work poor due to the individual indicator, is associated with other factors which negatively affect well-being that are not captured by the variables used in this section.

4.3 Regression Analysis

This section will discuss the different regression results for the Eurostat and the individual in-work poverty indicator and differentiate them by gender and country. In the following, I will describe the results for the logistic regression models, as they are more appropriate for binary dependent variables. However, the results are very robust to model specification in most countries. All regression tables, logistic and linear probability models, can be found in the appendix in tables 5 to 12.

When looking at the regression results for in-work poverty according to the Eurostat definition, it is astonishing how different many of the coefficients are for men and women in nearly all countries. Only Sweden shows very similar risk factors for Men and Women. In Sweden, having a migrant background, living in a single household and being self-employed or working part-time strongly increase the risk for counting as in-work poor according to the Eurostat indicator. For the other countries, being self-employed, working part-time and mostly also having a migrant background are the most important risk factors for both men and women. Interestingly, having a migrant background is an important risk factor in most rich countries, such as Austria, Sweden, Greece, Italy, Spain, and for men also in Slovenia, but does not increase the risk of being in-work poor in most Eastern European countries, and Ireland and Portugal. Further, having upper secondary or tertiary education reduces the risk of being in-work poor a lot for men, but less so for women. This is also the case for having a job with a temporary contract. Also, occupational classifications matter in all countries, except Austria and Sweden, which are also the richest countries in the sample. However, there is no clear pattern of gender differences in their effect. Age, experience, and health do not have clear and rather small effects. Eventually, the most important distinction between men and women are the coefficients for the household-related coefficients, for which single households are used as a reference category. Single households are the primary risk group in Ireland, Sweden and Estonia, where having a partner and kids reduces in-work poverty risk compared to single households and only single mothers have a higher risk. In Latvia, Slovenia, and Poland, single households have the same risk of being in-work poor (all else equal) as households with partner and kids and again only single mothers (or single fathers in the case of Poland) have a higher risk. Additionally, while having a partner without children reduces the risk of being in-work poor for women in all countries except Croatia (where it is equal to single households), this is the case for men only in the six countries described above where single households are the primary risk group. Thus, moving in with the partner to share a household is nearly always reducing the in-work poverty risk for women, but not for men. Moreover, having a partner and kids in the household strongly increases the risk for being in-work poor for men in all countries except the six listed above, but this is not the case in any of the countries for women. Finally, being a single parent is a risk factor for women in 11 out of 14 countries, as opposed to only 3 out of 14 countries for men.

For the individual in-work poverty indicator, several coefficients are again very different for

men and women. However, being self-employed and working part-time are still very important risk factors for both. Also, having a migrant background, age, and experience have similar effects as for the Eurostat in-work poverty indicator. Having a temporary contract is additionally relevant in several countries, however in Bulgaria, Croatia, and Austria only for men. Interestingly, having higher education becomes more important for reducing the risk of being in individual in-work poverty, especially for women. Moreover, the four ISCO occupation categories have a lot of explanatory power for whether women are in-work poor according to the individual indicator, but are not so important for men. Eventually, the household variables are again the most interesting. As opposed to the Eurostat indicator, living with a partner or living with a partner and children reduces the risk of being individually in-work poor for men, but increases it for women in most countries. Living with a partner leads to lower in-work poverty risk for men in 11 out of 14 countries (in Spain, Croatia, and Slovenia the risk is not significantly different), while for women only in Sweden and Italy (in the other countries the coefficient is 0 or positive). This holds in an even stronger form for living with a partner and children. This household constellation increases women's in-work poverty risk according to the individual indicator in 8 out of 14 countries and is equal to that of single households in all other countries. On the other hand, it decreases the risk for men in 7 out of 14 countries and the coefficient is not significantly different from 0 in the rest. Being a single parent is now less of a risk than for the Eurostat indicator, but still more strongly for women.

The regression analysis thus shows that men and women have very different risk factors for being in in-work poverty and depending on the specific indicator used. Specifically, the household context seems to lift women out of the Eurostat in-work poverty, but increases the risk for individual in-work poverty (i.e. being financially dependent on other household members), while for men these relationships are reversed. This phenomenon is more pronounced in Austria, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Southern Europe than in Ireland, Sweden and the other Eastern European countries. The next section decomposes the difference in the in-work poverty rates for men and women in different characteristics and different risk factors.

4.4 Decomposition Analysis

First, to be able to set the results for the differences in characteristics into context, the gender differences in important characteristics are described in tables 13 and 14. The differences are very similar across countries. Women seem to have higher levels of education in all countries, except Austria, are less often self-employed, and more often employed in white-collar jobs. On the other hand, women have much higher part-time rates, especially in the Western European countries. Having a temporary contract is more widespread among women in most countries, except in Portugal, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania. Also, women have less work experience on average, except again in Estonia, Latvia, and Bulgaria. There are no strong differences in age, migration background, urbanisation, and health. It thus seems, that there is much stronger sorting for women into the labour market in most countries. However, they seem to be more often in precarious employment relationships. Additionally, it is important to look at the labour force participation rate, as in-work poverty is only defined as a proportion of those in-work. Across countries, the labour force participation rate of women is lower than that of men, but to a different extent. The gap is higher in Austria, Ireland, Greece, Italy, Spain, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. All those countries, where the importance of household factors and the gender difference in both indicators has already been identified in the previous parts.

As already explained in section 3, I used two approaches for the decomposition. However,

the approach following Yun (2004) seems to produce approximation errors. For the Eurostat indicator only Austria, Sweden, Greece, and Slovenia show robust results. The subsequent analysis is based on the results from the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition due to the following reasons. First, the results in the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in all countries are much more in line with the results from the previous section, and with what would be expected when looking at the different characteristics of men and women in the specific countries as shown in tables 13 and 14 in the appendix.[4] All changes in the results when moving from the Oaxaca-Blinder approach to the logistic approach cannot be tracked by the characteristics of men and women in these countries nor by the identified risk factors for men and women from the previous section. Also, the standard errors of the logit decompositions are surprisingly large and the estimates are also either very small or very large, which suggests errors in the approximation method. Indeed, Jann (2018) points out that there is no reason to expect the reweighting method of the logistic model of Yun (2004) to fit better than normal linear probability models. Additionally, the gender-specific regressions for the two indicators in each country in the previous section are remarkably robust to model specification, which indicates that the linear probability model is able to capture the data generating process similarly well as the logistic model. Eventually, as detailed decomposition methods are more reliable for linear models as they do not need any approximation method, the linear probability model seems to be the better choice. Overall, however, the estimates of the explained and unexplained part of the gender difference are robust to the approach in all countries for both indicators. The results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition for all countries and both indicators can be found in the appendix in tables 15 to 18.[5] Nevertheless, as already discussed in section 3, the use of a linear probability model for binary dependent variables is not optimal, and has to be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The decomposition should thus only be seen as additional evidence to the previous sections.

When looking at the overall decomposition results for the Eurostat indicator, it is interesting that, even though women have lower in-work poverty rates than men in all countries except Latvia, the mechanisms seem to differ. In Austria, women should have higher in-work poverty rates when looking at their characteristics, but different/less risk factors lead to their overall lower in-work poverty rate. The opposite is true for Latvia, which is also the only country where women have a higher in-work poverty rate. The contributions of different characteristics and risk factors are not significantly different from 0 for Ireland, Portugal, and Estonia, even though women have a significantly lower in-work poverty rate in Portugal. Both contributions are of equal size in Sweden, Spain, Croatia, Slovenia, and Romania. In Greece and Italy, different risk factors play a bigger role than differences in characteristics, while in Bulgaria and Poland this is reversed. In terms of differences in characteristics, working part-time is an important contribution in the Western European countries, where women would have much lower in-work poverty rates if they had as low part-time rates as men. This is less pronounced in the Eastern European countries, where part-time rates of women are also lower than in Western Europe (see characteristics tables 13 and 14). The second most important contribution in the Western European countries, which is also very relevant in the Eastern European countries except Bulgaria, is self-employment, where women would have higher in-work poverty rates if they would be as

[4] For example, the logit decomposition for the Eurostat in-work poverty indicator for Ireland tells us that women would have lower in-work poverty rates, if they had the same part-time rates as men. However, 35% of women and only 12% of men work part-time in Ireland, and working part-time has been identified as a risk factor for both men and women in the linear probability and the logistic model in the previous section. Thus, even though the rather large estimate, is not significantly different from 0, this result sheds doubt on the linear approximation.

[5] The results for the logistic decomposition approach are available upon request.

often self-employed as men. Also, women have higher educational levels in all countries except Austria, which contributes to them having lower in-work poverty rates in all countries except Austria, Sweden, Slovenia, and Romania. Further, the higher number of single mothers than single fathers increases women's in-work poverty rate in all countries except Slovenia and Romania. This is especially important in Italy, Portugal, Estonia, and Latvia, where this difference is particularly high. Eventually, women work more often in white-collar jobs in all countries in the sample, which mostly also leads to decreases in their in-work poverty rates (except in Austria, Ireland, Sweden, Spain, and Estonia). In terms of different risk factors, the most obvious result is, that having a partner and kids is a much lesser risk factor for women than for men. As I use the pooled coefficient as a baseline, the coefficient can be interpreted such that women would have much higher in-work poverty rates if having a partner and kids would be the same risk for them as for the pooled sample. This coefficient is not significant only in Sweden, Estonia, and Poland, which were already identified as those countries, where single households seem to be most at risk for men and women and big households are not the major risk factor. Also, the contribution of this differing risk factor is especially large in all other Western European countries and Croatia, where it is the main driver of the overall contribution of differences in risk factors. The same holds for living with a partner, but is less pronounced, especially in the Eastern European countries. On the other hand, being a single parent is a stronger risk factor for women than for men in all countries except Sweden, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Poland. This, thus, constitutes a double disadvantage, as women are also more likely to be single parents. Further, women are less rewarded for education in Ireland, Greece, and Bulgaria. The rest of the estimates does not show a clear cross-country pattern and can be seen in tables 15 and 16 in the appendix.

The picture is partly different for the individual indicator. Here, women have higher rates in all countries except Bulgaria, but the underlying mechanisms differ again between the countries. While in Austria, Italy, and Spain, differences in characteristics and risk factors both contribute equally to the higher individual in-work poverty rate of women, only differences in risk factors drive the gender difference in the individual in-work poverty rate in Ireland, Sweden, Greece, Portugal, Croatia. Eventually, in Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, and Poland, women should have lower individual in-work poverty rates than men according to their characteristics, but differences in risk factors lead to their overall higher rate. In Bulgaria, the only country where women have a lower rate, this is driven by differences in characteristics as well. In terms of differences in characteristics, it is obvious that the high part-time rate of women drives the characteristic part in the Western European countries. This is much less pronounced, but still important for the Eastern European countries, where the part-time rate of women is much lower than in the Western European countries. A counteracting factor is the lower self-employment rate of women, which yields to lower in-work poverty rates in all countries except Bulgaria. This effect is higher in those countries, where self-employment is more widespread. Also, women's higher educational level decreases their individual in-work poverty rate compared to men, especially in the Southern European countries and Ireland, Estonia, Latvia, and Poland. Moreover, women work more often in white-collar jobs, which also decreases their in-work poverty rate in Greece, Italy, Bulgaria, Romania, and Poland. These labour market characteristics, thus, have the same effects for both in-work poverty indicators. Eventually, women's lower work experience also explains their higher individual in-work poverty rates in Austria, the Southern European countries, and Croatia. However, in Estonia and Latvia, they have more work experience, which leads to lower in-work poverty rates. In terms of differences in risk factors, the most obvious result is that living with a partner and kids is a much stronger risk factor for women than for men (i.e. the opposite of what was the main result for the Eurostat in-work poverty indicator).

This is especially pronounced in the Western European countries except Italy, and Croatia, Slovenia, Estonia, and Poland. Living with a partner without kids is a stronger risk factor for women in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Estonia, and Poland, but lower in Austria. Interestingly, being self-employed is also a bigger risk factor for women in Austria, Greece, Portugal, Slovenia, Estonia, Romania, and Poland. On the other hand, living in a single household poses a lesser risk for women in all countries except Sweden, Portugal, Spain, and Bulgaria. Eventually, working in lower occupational positions is less penalized for women, especially in the Western European countries. In terms of risk factors, labour market characteristics thus play a bigger role for the individual indicator than for the Eurostat indicator. The rest of the estimates does again not show a clear cross-country pattern and can be seen in tables 17 and 18 in the appendix.

5 Conclusion

The results show that in-work poverty has very different manifestations for men and women. The generally used Eurostat in-work poverty indicator captures very well the in-work poverty reality of men, who are mostly in-work poor because they have to provide for other household members, like partners or children or both. Women's in-work poverty is, however, of a more individual nature. Women are often in precarious employment relationships, like part-time work or temporary contracts, and do not earn enough income to provide for themselves, but do not count as in-work poor according to Eurostat, because other household members provide for them. This makes them financially dependent on these other household members, mostly partners and this dependency relationship is masked by the household level analysis of the Eurostat indicator. Therefore, the individual in-work poverty indicator, following Knittler and Heuberger (2018), captures better these forms of in-work poverty, which are due to the own disadvantaged position on the labour market and thus more relevant for women. On the other hand, it does not capture men, who earn enough individually, but not enough to provide for the household. This gender difference seems to be prevalent to some extent in all countries, but especially in Austria, Ireland, the Southern European countries, Croatia, Slovenia and Poland. In these countries, women are thus mostly omitted form in-work poverty analysis when the Eurostat indicator is used. Interestingly, the Eastern European countries Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, and Romania do not show these stark gender differences in the type of in-work poverty, which can also be seen in the decomposition analysis. Furthermore, in Estonia and Latvia, men's and women's labour force participation is nearly equally high, and thus this lack of gender difference is presumably not driven by a stronger selection of women in the labour market. A brief analysis of several well-being variables from the EU-SILC well-being module shows that those, who are poor only due to the individual in-work poverty indicator (and thus omitted from general in-work poverty analysis), have better well-being than those who are in-work poor due to the Eurostat indicator or due to both. However, they also have clearly lower well-being levels than those who do not count as in-work poor due to any of the two indicators. This shows, that individual in-work poverty, even if it is offset on the household level, is a social problem and this disadvantaged group should not be omitted from in-work poverty analysis.

Furthermore, the analysis of separate regressions by gender, gender differences in characteristics, and a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition to combine these two mechanisms confirms these two different natures of in-work poverty. The regressions and the decomposition showed that it is mostly differences in risk factors, which drive gender differences in the two in-work poverty rates. These differences in risk factors are most pronounced for household composition variables. Whereas living with a partner and kids increases men's risk to be in-work poor due to

the Eurostat indicator much more than women's risk, it increases women's risk to be in-work poor due to the individual indicator much more than for men. The same holds for living with a partner without having children, but is less pronounced. This points to the importance of traditional gender roles in the family and the male breadwinner model, where men have to provide for the household and women retreat partly or fully from the labour market. Additionally, being a single parent increases women's risk to be in-work poor due to the Eurostat indicator much more than men's. This amounts to a double disadvantage, as women are also more often single parents than men. These patterns are most pronounced in the countries already identified before, where conservative gender roles are more prevalent, part-time rates for women are very high, and the male breadwinner model is the base for the welfare state (Austria, partly Ireland, the Southern European countries, Croatia, and Slovenia). Additionally, it is interesting that occupational sorting is much more important for men's individual in-work poverty than for women's. In terms of characteristics, it is interesting that women have better characteristics for the labour market in terms of education, and occupational categories, which is presumably due to the stronger selection into the labour force for women (i.e. only more advantaged women enter the labour market). However, women have higher part-time rates, less work experience and more temporary contracts, which all point to more precarious employment relationships. It is especially the high part-time rates which offset the advantages resulting from better education and occupations.

These results can also shed light on what has to be considered to avoid rising in-work poverty rates or gender inequalities in the realm of the recovery of the Corona crisis. This is especially important as policies to boost employment, such as stricter rules and sanctions for the unemployed or general liberalizations of the labour market, which are at the moment discussed in several European countries, have often led to strong increases in in-work poverty (Fraser, Gutiérrez, and Peña-Casas, 2011). Throughout all countries studied in this paper, working part-time or as self-employed or having a temporary contract are the most important risk factors for both indicators of in-work poverty and for both men and women. To prevent such precarious employment relationships would thus prevent rising in-work poverty rates or even decrease in-work poverty. Employment policies should thus also consider job quality and not only quantity as ultimate goal. This is especially relevant for women, as they are most affected by these forms of employment. An important point on the agenda of European welfare states should therefore additionally be to promote gender equality in the labour market, avoid structural disadvantages of women, and remove existing incentives that promote the male-breadwinner model. This is highly relevant for the Continental and Southern European countries. Households with two equally contributing earners are also much more resilient to labour market shocks, such as a pandemic, than households which depend on one sole or main income earner.

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Appendix

Table 3: Attrition Characteristics

	Not missing|A	Missing|B
Age groups		
young	22.8	31.0 A
middle	59.0 B	49.4
old	18.3	19.6 A
Gender		
Men	53.3	60.7 A
Women	46.7 B	39.3
Education		
lower secondary	22.0	22.2
upper secondary	42.6	50.8 A
tertiary	35.4 B	27.0
Status in Employment		
Self-employed w. employees	4.6	4.5
Self-employed w/o employees	12.8 B	12.3
Employee	81.6	81.9
Family worker	1.0	1.3 A
Houeshold Type		
Single hh	14.8 B	4.5
2 adults w/o children, under 65y	17.6 B	16.5
2 adults w/o children, over 65y	2.8	3.8 A
Other hh w/o children	15.4	23.7 A
Single parents	3.1 B	1.3
2 adults, 1 child	15.3 B	13.5
2 adults, 2 children	16.1 B	14.7
2 adults 3+ children	3.2	3.7 A
Other hh with children	10.9	17.5 A
Other	0.6	0.6
In-work poverty status		
Not WP	83.5 B	82.4
WP ind.	5.5	6.1 A
WP EU	4.4	5.1 A
WP both	6.6	6.4
Total	90.133	45.121

The table shows the relative frequencies of the characteristics within the group of having no missing values in all well-being variables versus the group where at least one value is missing. The letters A and B indicate whether the share is significantly higher than in the other column using pairwise z-tests (i.e. the letter A in column B indicates that this share is significantly higher in column B than in column A).

Table 4: Well-being and the two indicators (additional variables)

	Not WP|A	WP ind.|B	WP EU|C	WP both|D
Feeling happy				
All of the time	19.3 D	22.0 A C D	19.4 D	15.3
Most of the time	47.8 C D	47.9 C D	40.6	39.9
Some of the time	25.2 B	23.2	28.8 A B	31.5 A B C
A little of the time	6.2	5.9	9.7 A B	10.7 A B
None of the time	1.5 B	1.1	1.5	2.5 A B C
Satisfaction with relationships				
low	7.9 B	7.2	11.3 A B	14.7 A B C
medium	50.7	51.9	53.1 A	52.0 A
high	41.4 C D	41.0 C D	35.6 D	33.3
Feeling lonely				
All of the time	0.8	0.6	0.7	1.9 A B C
Most of the time	2.5	2.1	2.9 B	5.2 A B C
Some of the time	11.3 B	9.9	11.8 B	17.4 A B C
A little of the time	21.6 B C	18.9	19.5	23.5 A B C
None of the time	63.8 D	68.4 A C D	65.0 D	52.0
Feeling nervous				
All of the time	1.5	1.7	2.9 A B	2.3 A B
Most of the time	6.0	6.0	7.6 A B	8.2 A B
Some of the time	25.7	27.1 A	26.9	32.5 A B C
A little of the time	39.1 B C D	35.5 D	35.5 D	33.1
None of the time	27.8 D	29.8 A C D	27.2 D	24.0
Feeling down in the dumps				
All of the time	0.7	0.6	1.3 A B	1.2 A B
Most of the time	3.5	3.7	5.8 A B	6.4 A B
Some of the time	17.9	18.8	22.4 A B	27.6 A B C
A little of the time	34.8 B C D	32.2	32.3	32.7
None of the time	43.0 C D	44.7 A C D	38.1 D	31.9
Feeling calm and peaceful				
All of the time	16.4 D	16.8 D	16.3 D	14.1
Most of the time	51.5 B C D	49.7 C D	43.9	45.5
Some of the time	22.2	22.7	25.1 A B	27.9 A B C
A little of the time	8.0	8.5	11.9 A B D	9.8 A B
None of the time	1.9	2.3 A	2.7 A	2.8 A
Feeling downhearted or depressed				
All of the time	0.7	0.5	1.1 A B	1.1 A B
Most of the time	3.2	3.5	5.8 A B	6.8 A B C
Some of the time	16.2	18.1 A	20.8 A B	25.0 A B C
A little of the time	34.7 B C D	33.2	31.7	32.7
None of the time	45.2 C D	44.8 C D	40.7 D	34.4

The table shows the relative frequencies of the answers to the well-being variables within the different combinations of in-work poverty indicators. The letters A to D indicate whether the share is significantly higher than in another column using pairwise z-tests (i.e. the letter A in column B indicates that this share is significantly higher in column B than in column A).

	Austria		Ireland		Sweden		Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Demographics														
age	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00***	−0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00***	0.00	−0.00	0.00*	0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.03	−0.03	−0.05**	0.01	−0.03	−0.03	−0.06***	−0.02	−0.06***	−0.03*	−0.04**	−0.02	−0.07***	−0.04*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.03	−0.01	−0.04*	0.02	−0.05*	−0.02	−0.10***	−0.05***	−0.09***	−0.05***	−0.08***	−0.08***	−0.10***	−0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
migration	0.11***	0.08***	0.02	0.03	0.08***	0.06***	0.10***	0.06***	0.08***	0.10***	0.01	0.02	0.19***	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
intermediate area	−0.03	−0.01	−0.01	0.02	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
rural area	0.00	−0.00	0.01	0.03*	−0.01	0.04*	0.02	0.02*	−0.01	0.02	0.03*	0.01	0.02	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.02	−0.08***	−0.07***	−0.03*	−0.07***	−0.08***	0.03**	−0.03**	−0.01	−0.08***	0.00	−0.05***	0.00	−0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
single parent	−0.01	0.01	−0.08***	0.09**	−0.01	0.01	0.05*	0.07**	0.02	0.11***	0.07**	0.08***	0.00	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
partner w kids	0.05**	−0.06**	−0.03*	−0.02	−0.05**	−0.07***	0.09***	0.02	0.11***	−0.06***	0.04***	−0.02	0.09***	−0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Employment														
self-employment	0.11***	0.12***	0.10***	0.09*	0.18***	0.18***	0.15***	0.11***	0.13***	0.09***	0.20***	0.15***	0.16***	0.17***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
part-time	0.12***	0.06***	0.06*	0.04**	0.07**	0.05***	0.10***	0.08***	0.11***	0.05***	0.11*	0.12***	0.10**	0.08***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.02	0.03*	0.03	0.04**	−0.00	0.02	0.03**	0.02*	0.06***	0.03**	0.04**	0.03**	0.05**	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.03	0.08	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.05***	0.02	0.06***	0.07*	0.05***	0.03	0.05**	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
low-skill blue collar	0.03	0.02	0.05*	0.03*	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.04*	0.08***	0.09***	0.02	0.06***	0.08***	0.08***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
temporary contract	0.16***	0.01	0.05	0.01			0.06**	0.07***	0.09***	0.04**	0.06***	0.03*	0.09***	0.06***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
experience	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00			−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	0.00	−0.00*	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.00	−0.01	−0.05*	−0.09			−0.04*	−0.04**	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02*	−0.02*	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)			(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2851	2647	2137	1807	3128	3043	9285	6671	9837	7837	6578	6648	6844	5903

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 5: WP Eurostat, weighted logistic model average marginal effects

	Austria		Ireland		Sweden		Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Intercept	−0.03	0.05	−0.06	−0.06	0.11	0.18	0.19*	0.13	−0.00	−0.24**	−0.10	−0.03	−0.03	−0.17
	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.15)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.11)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.11)
Demographics														
age	0.01	0.00	0.01*	0.01	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.00	0.00	0.02***	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
age^2	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.04	−0.03	−0.07**	0.01	−0.04	−0.05	−0.08***	−0.03*	−0.07***	−0.02	−0.04**	−0.03	−0.08***	−0.05*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.05	−0.00	−0.06*	0.02	−0.07**	−0.04	−0.12***	−0.06**	−0.10***	−0.05***	−0.07***	−0.07***	−0.11***	−0.10***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
migration	0.12***	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.08***	0.06***	0.09***	0.08***	0.10***	0.13***	0.01	0.02	0.22***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)
intermediate area	−0.03	−0.02	−0.00	0.03	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
rural area	−0.00	−0.01	0.01	0.03*	−0.01	0.04*	0.02*	0.03*	−0.01	0.02	0.03**	0.01	0.02	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.02	−0.07***	−0.08***	−0.03*	−0.07***	−0.07***	0.03*	−0.04***	−0.00	−0.08***	0.00	−0.05***	0.01	−0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
single parent	−0.02	0.03	−0.05*	0.09**	−0.00	0.04	0.05	0.07**	0.02	0.11***	0.07**	0.09***	−0.01	0.09***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
partner w kids	0.05**	−0.06**	−0.05**	−0.02	−0.06**	−0.07***	0.10***	0.02	0.11***	−0.06***	0.06***	−0.01	0.10***	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment														
self-employment	0.10***	0.11**	0.09***	0.05	0.16***	0.16***	0.14***	0.09***	0.11***	0.07***	0.19***	0.14***	0.15***	0.14***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part-time	0.11**	0.06***	0.08*	0.04**	0.07**	0.05***	0.12***	0.11***	0.12***	0.06***	0.14**	0.15***	0.10**	0.08***
	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.02	0.03*	0.02	0.03*	−0.00	0.02	0.03**	0.01	0.05***	0.02*	0.03*	0.03*	0.04*	0.04***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.02	0.07	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.05***	0.04*	0.06***	0.06*	0.06***	0.03	0.04**	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
low-skill blue collar	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.04*	0.07***	0.10***	0.02	0.05**	0.07***	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
temporary contract	0.16***	0.01	0.05	0.02			0.03*	0.04**	0.10***	0.05**	0.05**	0.02	0.09***	0.07***
	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
experience	−0.01*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.01			−0.00	0.00	−0.01*	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.00	−0.01	−0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
experience^2	0.00*	0.00	0.00	0.00			−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.00	−0.02	−0.07*	−0.10			−0.04*	−0.06**	−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*	−0.03*	0.00	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2853	2647	2137	1807	3128	3043	9285	6671	9850	7845	6579	6648	6844	5903

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 6: WP Eurostat, weighted linear probability models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

	Croatia		Estonia		Latvia		Slovenia		Bulgaria		Romania		Poland	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Demographics														
age	0.00	0.00**	0.00*	0.00*	0.01***	0.00**	−0.00	0.00*	0.00**	0.00**	0.00	−0.00	0.00***	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.05**	−0.03	−0.03	0.00	−0.04	0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.13***	−0.04*	−0.11***	−0.06***	−0.04*	−0.05*
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.08***	−0.06**	−0.11***	−0.07*	−0.07**	−0.04	−0.06**	−0.02	−0.17***	−0.06**	−0.22***	−0.09**	−0.08***	−0.09***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
migration	0.01	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.03	−0.01	0.15***	0.02						
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
intermediate area	0.01	0.01							0.01	0.01	0.02	−0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)							(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
rural area	0.03**	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03*	0.01			0.06***	0.04**	0.11***	0.01	0.04***	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.01	−0.01	−0.13***	−0.07***	−0.04**	−0.03**	−0.02	−0.04*	−0.03	−0.03*	−0.01	−0.03**	−0.04***	−0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
single parent	−0.00	0.09***	−0.05	0.09**	0.03	0.06**	−0.04*	0.06*	0.02	0.06*	0.00	0.10**	0.06*	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
partner w kids	0.05***	0.02	−0.09***	−0.05**	0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.02	0.04**	0.02	0.06***	−0.00	−0.02	−0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment														
self-employment	0.07***	0.08**	0.10**	0.12***	0.12***	0.13***	0.18***	0.21***	0.02	0.01	0.24***	0.18***	0.18***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part-time	0.09*	0.03	0.03	0.07**	0.07*	0.09***	0.15**	0.09**	0.05	0.09**	0.06**	0.04*	0.05*	0.04**
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
low-skill white collar	0.02	0.03***	0.02	0.07***	0.01	0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.05***	0.13***	−0.01	0.02	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.05***	0.02	0.05*	0.06*	0.05**	0.07**	0.04*	0.02	0.05*	0.05**	0.15***	0.10***	0.07***	0.06***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
low-skill blue collar	0.07***	0.03*	0.02	0.05*	0.04*	0.10***	0.02	0.02	0.06**	0.10***	0.13***	0.07**	0.03*	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)
temporary contract	0.09***	−0.00	0.04	0.09	0.13	0.20	0.07**	0.02	0.03	−0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05***	0.05***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)
experience	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.01***	−0.00*			−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	0.00	−0.00**	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.02*	−0.01	0.04*	0.00	−0.02	−0.03**			0.02	−0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	3520	2953	2416	2955	2297	2598	4705	3578	3312	3045	4053	2949	6617	5905

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 7: WP Eurostat, weighted logistic model average marginal effects

	Croatia		Estonia		Latvia		Slovenia		Bulgaria		Romania		Poland	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Intercept	−0.07	−0.17	−0.25	0.13	−0.45**	−0.27*	−0.01	−0.16*	0.04	−0.24	0.15	0.17	−0.28**	−0.05
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.16)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Demographics														
age	0.01	0.01*	0.02*	−0.00	0.03**	0.02*	0.00	0.01*	0.01	0.02**	0.00	−0.00	0.02***	0.01*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
age^2	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*	0.00	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00*	−0.00	−0.00*	0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.08***	−0.04	−0.03	−0.00	−0.06*	0.00	−0.04	−0.02	−0.18***	−0.09**	−0.19***	−0.13***	−0.06**	−0.10**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
tertiary	−0.10***	−0.06**	−0.11***	−0.08*	−0.08**	−0.04	−0.06*	−0.03	−0.21***	−0.11***	−0.18***	−0.13***	−0.10***	−0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
migration	0.01	0.02	0.05	0.03	0.03	−0.01	0.15***	0.02						
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
intermediate area	0.01	0.01							0.00	0.01	−0.02	−0.02	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)							(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
rural area	0.03**	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.03*	0.01			0.07***	0.04**	0.09***	0.01	0.05***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.01	−0.02*	−0.13***	−0.07***	−0.04**	−0.04**	−0.02	−0.04**	−0.02	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.05***	−0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
single parent	0.01	0.09***	−0.05	0.10**	0.03	0.05*	−0.04	0.05*	0.02	0.06*	−0.01	0.10**	0.07*	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
partner w kids	0.05***	0.01	−0.10***	−0.06**	0.00	−0.03*	−0.01	−0.02	0.05**	0.02	0.06***	−0.00	−0.03*	−0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment														
self-employment	0.06***	0.08**	0.09***	0.12***	0.13***	0.14***	0.17***	0.21***	0.03	0.00	0.34***	0.28***	0.19***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)
part-time	0.15*	0.06*	0.05	0.09***	0.12**	0.12***	0.16**	0.11**	0.06	0.12**	0.12**	0.16***	0.09**	0.06***
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.02	0.03**	0.01	0.07***	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.04**	0.05**	−0.02*	0.01	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.05***	0.03	0.05*	0.06	0.06**	0.08**	0.03*	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.08***	0.09***	0.07***	0.11***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
low-skill blue collar	0.07***	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.04*	0.11***	0.01	0.01	0.05**	0.10***	0.06**	0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
temporary contract	0.08***	−0.00	0.04	0.12	0.18	0.29	0.07**	0.03	0.05	0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.03**	0.03**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.27)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)
experience	−0.00	−0.01*	−0.01	−0.00	−0.02**	−0.01			−0.01*	−0.01**	0.00	0.00	−0.01**	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
experience^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00			0.00	0.00*	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.03**	−0.01	0.04*	0.00	−0.02	−0.03*			0.03	−0.02	−0.04	−0.02	−0.02*	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	3520	2953	2417	2956	2297	2598	4705	3578	3312	3045	4053	2949	6636	5920

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 8: WP Eurostat, weighted linear probability models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

	Austria		Ireland		Sweden		Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Demographics														
age	0.00	0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.00***	−0.00	−0.00***	0.00*	0.00*	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.05	−0.03	−0.08**	0.05	−0.01	−0.05*	−0.02**	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03*	−0.01	−0.04**	−0.04*	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.04	−0.04	−0.10***	0.02	−0.04	−0.04	−0.02*	−0.05**	−0.03*	−0.08***	−0.03**	−0.05**	−0.06***	−0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
migration	0.06**	0.05*	0.03	0.01	0.05*	0.04*	0.03*	0.01	0.07***	0.13***	0.01	0.00	0.09***	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
intermediate area	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.00	0.01	−0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
rural area	0.03*	0.03	0.01	0.05*	−0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05***	0.01	0.02	0.03***	0.03**	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.03*	−0.02	−0.05***	0.07**	−0.05**	−0.04*	−0.03***	0.03**	−0.06***	−0.05***	−0.02*	0.02	−0.01	−0.04
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
single parent	−0.01	0.03	0.08	0.05	0.03	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.05*	0.09***	0.03*	0.01	0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
partner w kids	−0.02	0.09***	−0.04**	0.09***	−0.05***	−0.00	−0.03***	0.07***	−0.04***	−0.00	−0.01	0.02	−0.03	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Employment														
self-employment	0.12***	0.25***	0.14***	0.22***	0.22***	0.26***	0.12***	0.24***	0.12***	0.13***	0.33***	0.41***	0.27***	0.29***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
part-time	0.10***	0.19***	0.10***	0.17***	0.09***	0.09***	0.11***	0.23***	0.14***	0.12***	0.12***	0.28***	0.20***	0.24***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.01	0.13***	0.00	0.07**	0.02	0.05**	0.02**	0.02	0.02	0.04***	0.02	0.05***	0.02	0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.01	0.14**	0.04*	0.06	0.01	0.09	0.02**	0.07***	0.03**	0.11***	0.01	0.08***	0.02	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)
low-skill blue collar	−0.01	0.19***	0.03	0.14**	0.02	0.09**	0.02	0.05**	0.03*	0.12***	0.01	0.08***	0.04*	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
temporary contract	0.14**	0.02	0.02	0.05			0.04*	0.11***	0.06***	0.06***	0.06***	0.05***	0.12***	0.13***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
experience	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00*	0.00			−0.00	−0.00	−0.00***	−0.01***	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.04*	−0.00	−0.02	−0.06			−0.00	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2851	2647	2137	1807	3128	3043	9285	6671	9837	7837	6578	6648	6844	5903

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 9: WP individual, weighted logistic model average marginal effects

	Austria		Ireland		Sweden		Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Intercept	0.14	0.11	0.07	0.06	0.29***	0.59***	0.10	0.04	0.06	0.09	−0.17	0.14	0.40**	0.14
	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.20)	(0.09)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.08)	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.12)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Demographics														
age	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.01	−0.02***	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01*	−0.00	−0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
age^2	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00***	0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.06	−0.03	−0.09**	0.06	−0.01	−0.05	−0.02*	−0.04*	−0.01	−0.03	−0.01	−0.04**	−0.03*	−0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.06	−0.04	−0.11***	0.03	−0.04	−0.05	−0.01	−0.05**	−0.03*	−0.08***	−0.03*	−0.04*	−0.06***	−0.07***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
migration	0.06**	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.05*	0.06**	0.02	0.01	0.07***	0.15***	0.01	0.01	0.10***	0.07**
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
intermediate area	0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	−0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
rural area	0.03*	0.02	0.01	0.05*	−0.01	0.04	0.02**	0.06***	0.01	0.02	0.03***	0.03**	−0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.03*	−0.02	−0.06**	0.08**	−0.05***	−0.04	−0.03***	0.02*	−0.06***	−0.04***	−0.02	0.02	−0.01	−0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
single parent	−0.02	0.03	0.09	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.05*	0.01	0.00	0.06**	0.09**	0.04**	0.03	0.06*
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
partner w kids	−0.01	0.11***	−0.04*	0.09***	−0.05**	0.03	−0.03***	0.06***	−0.04***	0.01	−0.00	0.04**	−0.01	0.04*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Employment														
self-employment	0.10***	0.23***	0.11***	0.20***	0.18***	0.22***	0.10***	0.20***	0.10***	0.10***	0.29***	0.39***	0.23***	0.26***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
part-time	0.11***	0.18***	0.10**	0.18***	0.09***	0.09***	0.16***	0.30***	0.16***	0.13***	0.25***	0.36***	0.25***	0.25***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.00	0.12***	−0.01	0.06*	0.02	0.05**	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.03**	0.02	0.04**	0.02	0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.01	0.15**	0.04*	0.07	0.00	0.08	0.03**	0.14***	0.02	0.12***	0.02	0.09***	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.04)
low-skill blue collar	−0.01	0.19***	0.01	0.13**	0.01	0.09*	0.01	0.04	0.02*	0.13***	0.01	0.06***	0.04*	0.13***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
temporary contract	0.13**	0.02	0.02	0.05			−0.01	0.05***	0.06***	0.07***	0.04***	0.04*	0.11***	0.14***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
experience	−0.01	−0.01	−0.00	−0.00			0.00	−0.00	−0.01**	−0.01***	−0.01**	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
experience^2	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00			−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00*	0.00	−0.00	0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.04*	−0.01	−0.03	−0.06			−0.00	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.03	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)			(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Num. obs.	2853	2647	2137	1807	3128	3043	9285	6671	9850	7845	6579	6648	6844	5903

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 10: WP individual, weighted linear probability models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

	Croatia		Estonia		Latvia		Slovenia		Bulgaria		Romania		Poland	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Demographics														
age	0.00	−0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00**	0.00*	0.00	−0.00***	0.00**	0.00	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.01	−0.05*	−0.05	0.00	−0.01	−0.00	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.00	−0.06***	−0.02	−0.03*	−0.02
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.01	−0.06*	−0.13***	−0.07*	−0.06**	−0.06*	−0.03	−0.04	−0.01	−0.02	−0.06	0.01	−0.06**	−0.06**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
migration	0.00	0.02	0.09*	0.02	0.03	−0.00	0.07***	0.01						
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
intermediate area	0.01	0.01							0.02	−0.01	0.05	0.01	0.02	−0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)							(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
rural area	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.00			0.05***	0.02	0.10***	0.03	0.03*	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.01	0.03**	−0.14***	−0.03	−0.05***	−0.02	−0.03	0.03	−0.04*	−0.00	−0.04**	0.02	−0.07***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
single parent	−0.00	0.05***	0.02	0.06*	−0.05**	0.01	−0.00	0.03	0.03	0.05	−0.00	0.04	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
partner w kids	0.00	0.06***	−0.11***	0.01	−0.02	0.01	−0.05**	0.06***	−0.00	0.03*	−0.02	0.03**	−0.06***	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment														
self-employment	0.09***	0.06**	0.11***	0.21***	0.15***	0.21***	0.36***	0.59***	−0.01	0.00	0.27***	0.35***	0.31***	0.37***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)
part-time	0.09*	0.19***	0.09*	0.18***	0.14***	0.21***	0.22***	0.23***	0.13**	0.18***	0.05***	0.04**	0.16***	0.15***
	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.01*	0.04**	0.03	0.11***	0.01	0.06***	−0.02	0.02	0.07***	0.08***	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.02***	0.04*	0.04	0.06*	0.02	0.09**	0.02	−0.00	0.07***	0.08***	0.11***	0.18**	0.07***	0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.02)
low-skill blue collar	0.03**	0.04*	0.00	0.09***	−0.00	0.08***	0.01	0.03	0.06***	0.12***	0.07**	0.10	0.01	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.01)	(0.02)
temporary contract	0.04**	0.01	0.06	0.15	0.05	0.24	0.07***	0.08***	0.09*	0.02	0.09	0.00	0.05***	0.07***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.01)	(0.01)
experience	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00**	−0.00**	−0.00***			−0.00***	−0.00***	0.00	0.00	−0.00*	−0.00
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.01	−0.01	0.04*	0.01	−0.01	−0.00			0.01	0.01	−0.04**	−0.01	0.01	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	3520	2953	2416	2955	2297	2598	4705	3578	3312	3045	4053	2949	6617	5905

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 11: WP individual, weighted logistic model average marginal effects

	Croatia		Slovenia		Estonia		Latvia		Bulgaria		Romania		Poland	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
Intercept	−0.19**	0.00	−0.21**	0.22	−0.06	0.14	−0.37***	−0.23	−0.09	−0.16	0.14	0.17	−0.08	−0.21*
	(0.07)	(0.12)	(0.08)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.16)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.12)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.13)	(0.09)	(0.08)
Demographics														
age	0.01**	0.00	0.01***	−0.01	0.01	0.00	0.02***	0.02*	0.01	0.01	0.00	−0.01	0.01*	0.02***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
age^2	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00**	0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00**	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	−0.00	0.00	−0.00	−0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
upper secondary	−0.02	−0.05*	−0.01	−0.03	−0.05	−0.01	−0.02	−0.01	−0.03	−0.02	−0.13***	−0.05*	−0.05*	−0.05
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
tertiary	−0.02	−0.06*	−0.02	−0.04	−0.13***	−0.08*	−0.07**	−0.07	−0.03	−0.04	−0.10***	−0.03	−0.07**	−0.07**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
migration	−0.00	0.02	0.06**	0.01	0.06*	0.01	0.03	−0.00						
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)						
intermediate area	0.00	0.01							0.02	−0.00	−0.02*	−0.01	0.02*	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)							(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
rural area	0.01	0.01			0.01	0.01	−0.00	0.01	0.06***	0.03	0.04***	0.03*	0.04***	0.04***
	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Family														
partner w/o kids	−0.00	0.03**	−0.03	0.03*	−0.14***	−0.03	−0.04**	−0.02	−0.03	0.00	−0.04***	0.02	−0.07***	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
single parent	0.01	0.06**	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.07*	−0.05**	0.00	0.04	0.05	−0.00	0.04	−0.00	−0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
partner w kids	0.00	0.06***	−0.06***	0.06***	−0.11***	0.00	−0.02	−0.00	−0.00	0.04*	−0.03*	0.04**	−0.06***	0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Employment														
self-employment	0.07***	0.07**	0.36***	0.58***	0.10***	0.20***	0.17***	0.24***	−0.00	−0.00	0.40***	0.55***	0.31***	0.38***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.01)	(0.02)
part-time	0.24***	0.26***	0.26***	0.29***	0.11*	0.20***	0.22***	0.25***	0.16**	0.21***	0.17***	0.15***	0.21***	0.19***
	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)
low-skill white collar	0.02**	0.04**	−0.01	0.02	0.03	0.11***	0.01	0.05**	0.06***	0.07***	0.01	−0.01	0.02	0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
high-skill blue collar	0.03***	0.06*	0.02	−0.02	0.05	0.07*	0.02	0.11**	0.06***	0.07**	0.06***	0.15***	0.09***	0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
low-skill blue collar	0.02**	0.03*	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.08***	−0.00	0.07**	0.05**	0.11***	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.05**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
temporary contract	0.02*	0.00	0.07**	0.09***	0.06	0.19*	0.05	0.29	0.13*	0.06	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.05***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.32)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.01)	(0.01)
experience	−0.01*	−0.01			−0.01	−0.01	−0.01**	−0.01*	−0.01	−0.01**	−0.00	0.00	−0.01**	−0.01**
	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
experience^2	0.00*	0.00			0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00*	0.00	−0.00	0.00*	0.00**
	(0.00)	(0.00)			(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Health														
good health	−0.01	−0.00			0.03	0.01	−0.01	0.00	0.01	0.01	−0.05*	−0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)			(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Num. obs.	3520	2953	4705	3578	2417	2956	2297	2598	3312	3045	4053	2949	6636	5920

$^{***}p < 0.001$; $^{**}p < 0.01$; $^{*}p < 0.05$

Table 12: WP individual, weighted linear probability models with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors

Table 13: Gender differences in characteristics by country

	Austria		Ireland		Sweden		Greece		Italy		Portugal		Spain	
	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B
Age														
Weighted Mean	42.0	42.0	43.9 B	41.9	43.2	43.7	44.0 B	43.1	44.8	44.7	43.1	43.2	43.2	42.9
Education														
lower secondary	9.5	11.7 A	16.9 B	6.5	14.3 B	11.4	20.5 B	16.4	35.5 B	24.2	52.5 B	40.4	34.8 B	25.2
upper secondary	52.3	50.5	28.2	29.9	55.2 B	43.4	46.4 B	39.0	45.3	46.2	27.1	26.8	26.1 B	24.2
tertiary	38.2	37.8	54.9	63.7 A	30.4	45.3 A	33.2	44.6 A	19.2	29.6 A	20.4	32.7 A	39.1	50.6 A
Migration														
No	77.9	78.1	78.6	76.9	80.9	81.4	90.3	91.3 A	85.6 B	84.4	90.9	90.1	85.2	84.1
Yes	22.1	21.9	21.4	23.1	19.1	18.6	9.7 B	8.7	14.4	15.6 A	9.1	9.9	14.8	15.9
Urbanisation														
urban	30.5	31.8	38.3	40.5	42.4	43.3	40.4	43.3 A	33.0	35.2 A	44.2	46.4 A	49.6	55.2 A
intermediate area	30.8	30.3	20.8	22.8	39.2	38.6	31.2	31.9	41.7	41.2	30.1	30.3	25.0 B	23.1
rural area	38.7	38.0	40.9 B	36.7	18.4	18.1	28.4 B	24.8	25.3 B	23.6	25.7 B	23.3	25.5 B	21.7
Family														
single	28.7 B	24.1	22.2 B	18.3	28.3 B	20.2	27.4 B	24.3	33.4 B	31.3	22.0	20.8	27.1 B	23.1
partner w/o kids	27.2	31.9 A	24.6	24.5	28.7	33.7 A	22.6	26.8 A	20.7	21.8	25.2	24.6	24.0	25.4
single parent	4.8	8.2 A	8.2	14.8 A	6.2	8.3 A	3.2	6.4 A	3.6	12.1 A	5.5	12.7 A	4.4	10.3 A
partner w kids	39.3 B	35.8	45.0	42.5	36.8	37.9	46.8 B	42.5	42.3 B	34.8	47.3 B	42.0	44.5 B	41.1
Self-employment														
No	86.4	90.9 A	78.3	91.6 A	85.0	94.1 A	65.0	73.0 A	72.7	82.7 A	87.0	90.3 A	81.9	88.5 A
Yes	13.6 B	9.1	21.7 B	8.4	15.0 B	5.9	35.0 B	27.0	27.3 B	17.3	13.0 B	9.7	18.1 B	11.5
Part-time														
No	92.9 B	56.5	87.5 B	65.8	91.1 B	70.8	93.3 B	84.9	94.0 B	74.6	97.3 B	91.1	94.1 B	78.8
Yes	7.1	43.5 A	12.5	34.2 A	8.9	29.2 A	6.7	15.1 A	6.0	25.4 A	2.7	8.9 A	5.9	21.2 A
ISCO-Occupation														
high-skill white collar	49.0	47.5	39.9	45.0 A	48.1	54.9 A	27.6	37.4 A	35.4	43.6 A	35.4	37.5 A	31.0	35.9 A
low-skill white collar	13.9	34.5 A	17.7	43.5 A	15.6	36.1 A	28.7	41.2 A	21.2	37.1 A	19.6	35.9 A	23.0	43.0 A
high-skill blue collar	22.6 B	5.6	23.1 B	2.5	20.4 B	2.4	26.5 B	12.3	23.0 B	4.9	25.6 B	6.8	23.2 B	3.8
low-skill blue collar	14.5 B	12.4	19.3 B	9.0	16.0 B	6.6	17.2 B	9.1	20.4 B	14.4	19.4	19.7	22.8 B	17.3
Temporary contract														
No	94.8 B	93.6	95.5 B	94.1	91.7 B	86.5	90.0 B	85.7	88.6 B	86.2	84.6	84.8	80.8 B	77.7
Yes	5.2	6.4 A	4.5	5.9 A	8.3	13.5 A	10.0	14.3 A	11.4	13.8 A	15.4	15.2	19.2	22.3 A
Experience														
Weighted Mean	23.9 B	20.8	23.8 B	19.6	23.0	22.5	20.9 B	17.7	20.1 B	17.7	24.7 B	23.1	22.3 B	19.3
Good health														
No	17.2	17.0	8.3 B	6.4	16.3	18.0	6.9	7.5	11.7	12.6	31.6	39.7 A	12.0	14.0 A
Yes	82.8	83.0	91.7	93.6 A	83.7	82.0	93.1	92.5	88.3	87.4	68.4 B	60.3	88.0 B	86.0
Labour force participation														
2019	81.47	72.18	79.51	67.6	84.95	81.25	76.73	60.61	75.14	56.53	78.69	73.04	79.05	69.24

The table shows weighted summary statistics (either means or proportions) for the respective characteristics for men and women. The letters A and B indicate if the value is statistically significantly higher than the other column. This is tested using pairwise z-tests within the countries. The labour force participation rate is taken from organization (2021) and defined as the proportion of the male or female population respectively aged 15-64 that is economically active.

Table 14: Gender differences in characteristics by country

	Croatia		Slovenia		Estonia		Latvia		Bulgaria		Romania		Poland	
	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B	Men A	Women B
Age														
Weighted Mean	41.7	41.8	42.1	42.5 A	42.8	45.2 A	42.8	44.9 A	43.0	44.4 A	41.6	41.6	42.3	42.0
Education														
lower secondary	8.4	8.4	8.8	7.8	12.4 B	5.2	10.4 B	4.1	14.3 B	9.9	17.3	16.3	6.6 B	3.8
upper secondary	69.9 B	59.2	63.9 B	46.8	53.5 B	40.2	61.2 B	48.3	62.5 B	51.7	64.7 B	56.5	67.6 B	53.9
tertiary	21.7	32.4 A	27.3	45.4 A	34.1	54.6 A	28.4	47.6 A	23.2	38.4 A	18.0	27.3 A	25.9	42.3 A
Migration														
No	89.1	89.6	88.5	90.0 A	89.3	88.9	90.6 B	88.8	99.5	99.2	99.9	100.0	99.6	99.5
Yes	10.9	10.4	11.5 B	10.0	10.7	11.1	9.4	11.2 A	0.5	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.4	0.5
Urbanisation														
urban	29.4	32.4 A			69.6	71.0	64.1	66.6	49.6	52.6 A	28.1	37.1 A	34.4	39.4 A
intermediate area	32.5	34.5							24.2	25.0	26.4	25.7	23.2	23.3
rural area	38.1 B	33.1			30.4	29.0	35.9	33.4	26.2 B	22.4	45.5 B	37.2	42.4 B	37.3
Family														
single	26.9 B	20.8	25.5 B	13.8	25.9	26.8	27.3	29.0	28.4 B	21.3	25.3 B	17.0	20.6 B	17.6
partner w/o kids	19.1	21.8 A	19.6	23.8 A	29.1	30.4	27.5	26.2	23.0	28.1 A	23.3	27.0 A	27.2	28.9 A
single parent	6.7	9.3 A	4.7	8.7 A	4.1	10.0 A	5.4	13.6 A	5.2	9.1 A	6.5	9.0 A	4.8	7.9 A
partner w kids	47.3	48.1	50.1	53.8 A	40.9 B	32.7	39.7 B	31.2	43.4	41.6	44.8	47.0	47.5 B	45.6
Self-employment														
No	87.4	94.4 A	87.0	93.0 A	86.6	93.3 A	88.0	92.8 A	87.6	92.3 A	75.4	80.9 A	76.7	82.7 A
Yes	12.6 B	5.6	13.0 B	7.0	13.4 B	6.7	12.0 B	7.2	12.4 B	7.7	24.6 B	19.1	23.3 B	17.3
Part-time														
No	98.5 B	95.4	97.2 B	94.3	92.9 B	87.7	94.7 B	90.3	96.4 B	95.1	92.0	91.6	95.3 B	90.1
Yes	1.5	4.6 A	2.8	5.7 A	7.1	12.3 A	5.3	9.7 A	3.6	4.9 A	8.0	8.4	4.7	9.9 A
ISCO-Occupation														
high-skill white collar	34.1	42.0 A	25.6	29.9 A	40.8	54.3 A	36.4	49.1 A	25.8	36.4 A	21.6	32.8 A	29.7	43.4 A
low-skill white collar	18.6	38.5 A	17.0	37.8 A	9.6	26.3 A	11.5	30.0 A	17.9	38.3 A	12.1	29.6 A	12.4	29.4 A
high-skill blue collar	23.9 B	5.9	33.1 B	7.6	25.1 B	3.4	24.8 B	6.1	24.7 B	9.6	39.7 B	22.7	35.7 B	14.2
low-skill blue collar	23.4 B	13.6	24.3	24.7	24.4 B	16.0	27.3 B	14.9	31.6 B	15.7	26.5 B	14.9	22.2 B	13.0
Temporary contract														
No	87.2 B	84.4	89.5 B	87.3	98.2	98.6	99.4	99.8 A	96.1	96.7	98.9	99.1	81.8 B	80.4
Yes	12.8	15.6 A	10.5	12.7 A	1.8	1.4	0.6 B	0.2	3.9	3.3	1.1	0.9	18.2	19.6 A
Experience														
Weighted Mean	19.3 B	18.0	19.8 B	19.0	21.3	22.3 A	21.2	22.4 A	18.2	19.6 A	19.3 B	18.3	21.1 B	18.8
Good health														
No	17.6	19.7 A	20.1	24.4 A	35.1	34.5	35.6	42.2 A	13.6	16.2 A	10.2	12.7 A	23.1	23.1
Yes	82.4 B	80.3	79.9 B	75.6	64.9	65.5	64.4 B	57.8	86.4 B	83.8	89.8 B	87.3	76.9	76.9
Labour force participation 2019	72.01	61.96	77.92	72.17	81.99	75.8	80.23	75.36	77.74	68.87	78.2	59.13	78.12	63.51

The table shows weighted summary statistics (either means or proportions) for the respective characteristics for men and women. The letters A and B indicate if the value is statistically significantly higher than the other column. This is tested using pairwise z-tests within the countries. The labour force participation rate is taken from organization (2021) and defined as the proportion of the male or female population respectively aged 15-64 that is economically active.

Table 15: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Eurostat indicator

	Austria	Ireland	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain
Overall							
Men	0.081***	0.051***	0.070***	0.119***	0.135***	0.100***	0.135***
Women	0.071***	0.039***	0.061***	0.081***	0.107***	0.086***	0.118***
difference	0.010	0.012	0.008	0.038***	0.028***	0.015*	0.017+
characteristics	-0.022***	0.002	0.013*	0.010***	-0.002	0.006	-0.002
risk factors	0.032**	0.010	-0.005	0.027***	0.030***	0.009	0.019*
Characteristics							
age	-0.000	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.001
education	-0.001	0.004*	0.003	0.006***	0.009***	0.008***	0.011***
migration	0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.000	-0.002
urbanisation	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001**	0.000	0.001	0.000
single	0.000	0.001	0.002*	-0.001**	-0.001*	-0.000	-0.001*
single parent	-0.001+	-0.003*	-0.001+	-0.001**	-0.007***	-0.005***	-0.003***
partner	0.002*	-0.000	0.002**	0.001***	0.001	-0.000	0.001
partner with kids	0.000	-0.000	0.001	0.001**	0.001*	-0.000	0.001+
self-employed	0.005***	0.011***	0.014***	0.011***	0.010***	0.006***	0.010***
part-time	-0.023***	-0.011***	-0.012***	-0.009***	-0.011***	-0.008***	-0.012***
Isco	-0.000	-0.002	0.003	0.005**	0.010***	0.006*	0.005
temporary	-0.001	-0.000		-0.002***	-0.002**	0.000	-0.002**
experience	-0.002	-0.002		-0.004+	-0.012***	0.001	-0.010***
good health	0.000	0.002		-0.000	-0.000	-0.002**	0.000
Risk factors							
age	-0.052	-0.052	-0.019	0.049	-0.022	0.034	0.078
education	-0.005	-0.017+	0.000	-0.008*	-0.002	0.001	0.001
migration	0.007	-0.004	0.003	0.001	-0.005	-0.002	0.010+
urbanisation	0.001	0.002	0.007*	0.000	0.001	-0.001	-0.002
single	-0.007+	0.011**	0.001	-0.008**	-0.011**	-0.005*	-0.004
single parent	-0.004*	-0.009***	-0.002	-0.002+	-0.008***	-0.003+	-0.007***
partner	0.008+	0.002	0.001	0.008**	0.009***	0.008*	0.010*
partner with kids	0.027***	0.018**	0.007	0.019***	0.048***	0.015**	0.041***
self-employed	-0.002	0.004	-0.000	0.015**	0.009**	0.006+	0.001
part-time	0.004	0.004	0.002	0.001	0.005	-0.000	0.001
Isco	0.007	0.002	0.016	0.005	0.005	-0.002	-0.007
temporary	0.008*	0.001		-0.001	0.006+	0.004	0.005
experience	0.018	0.020		-0.039	-0.008	-0.022	-0.009
good health	0.013	0.035		0.011	0.005	-0.000	-0.003
Constant	0.007	-0.007	-0.021	-0.025	-0.001	-0.023	-0.096
Observations	5498	3944	6171	15956	17674	13266	12747

$^{+}$ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 16: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Eurostat indicator

	Croatia	Slovenia	Estonia	Latvia	Bulgaria	Romania	Poland
Overall							
Men	0.062***	0.081***	0.098***	0.073***	0.110***	0.182***	0.109***
Women	0.043***	0.045***	0.092***	0.083***	0.081***	0.116***	0.078***
difference	0.019**	0.035***	0.006	-0.010	0.029***	0.066***	0.031***
characteristics	0.009**	0.014**	0.012+	0.014**	0.027***	0.039***	0.035***
risk factors	0.009+	0.021**	-0.006	-0.024**	0.002	0.028**	-0.004
Characteristics							
age	-0.000	0.000	-0.011**	-0.015***	0.001	0.000	0.000
education	0.002**	0.001	0.017***	0.009***	0.012***	0.002	0.007***
migration	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000			
urbanisation	0.001*		0.000	0.001	0.003**	0.005**	0.002***
single	-0.001**	0.001	0.000	0.000	-0.001+	-0.001+	0.000+
single parent	-0.001*	-0.001	-0.006***	-0.004***	-0.001+	-0.001	-0.001**
partner	0.001*	0.001*	0.000	-0.000	0.002**	0.001*	0.001+
partner with kids	-0.000	0.000	-0.003**	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
self-employed	0.005***	0.011***	0.007***	0.008***	0.001	0.019***	0.010***
part-time	-0.003**	-0.004**	-0.003**	-0.005***	-0.002+	-0.000	-0.004***
Isco	0.009***	0.006+	0.005	0.015***	0.013***	0.015***	0.019***
temporary	-0.001*	-0.001*	0.000	0.001+			
experience	-0.003*		0.005*	0.008*			
good health	-0.000		-0.000	-0.002*			
Risk factors							
age	-0.017	-0.084*	0.043	0.218*	-0.025	0.050	0.042*
education	-0.009	-0.001	-0.007	-0.016	-0.018*	-0.011	0.008
migration	-0.000	0.016***	0.002	0.003			
urbanisation	0.000		0.001	-0.002	-0.003	0.006**	0.001
single	0.002	0.004	0.019**	0.001	-0.001	0.001	-0.001
single parent	-0.006***	-0.005***	-0.004*	-0.002	-0.002	-0.008**	0.002+
partner	0.004+	0.008*	0.001	-0.001	0.001	0.009*	-0.005
partner with kids	0.024***	0.013*	0.009	0.010+	0.011+	0.030***	-0.007
self-employed	-0.001	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	0.002	0.015+	0.007+
part-time	0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.000	-0.002	-0.003	0.003
Isco	-0.007+	-0.003	0.008	0.010+	0.002	-0.002	0.002
temporary	0.011***	0.005	-0.001	-0.000			
experience	0.006		0.017	-0.111*			
good health	-0.020		0.023	0.006			
Constant	0.020	0.070+	-0.110	-0.139*	0.038	-0.058	-0.057*
Observations	6473	8283	5371	4895	6357	7002	12522

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 17: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Individual indicator

	Austria	Ireland	Sweden	Greece	Italy	Portugal	Spain
Overall							
Men	0.071***	0.059***	0.072***	0.049***	0.086***	0.072***	0.123***
Women	0.193***	0.114***	0.089***	0.133***	0.150***	0.109***	0.179***
difference	-0.122***	-0.054***	-0.017*	-0.084***	-0.064***	-0.038***	-0.057***
characteristics	-0.075***	-0.006	0.005	-0.001	-0.022***	-0.005	-0.032***
risk factors	-0.047***	-0.048***	-0.022*	-0.083***	-0.042***	-0.033***	-0.025**
Characteristics							
age	0.001	-0.001	0.002	-0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
education	-0.002+	0.006*	0.003*	0.001*	0.006***	0.005***	0.008***
migration	0.000	-0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	-0.000	-0.001
urbanisation	0.000	0.001	0.000	0.002***	0.000	0.001*	0.000
single	-0.000	-0.001	0.001	-0.000+	0.000	-0.000	-0.000
single parent	-0.000	-0.001	-0.001+	-0.000	-0.004***	-0.002**	-0.002**
partner	0.001*	-0.000	0.002**	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
partner with kids	0.001*	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001**	-0.000	-0.000
self-employed	0.008***	0.019***	0.017***	0.013***	0.012***	0.012***	0.017***
part-time	-0.065***	-0.033***	-0.020***	-0.020***	-0.028***	-0.018***	-0.039***
Isco	-0.003	0.009	-0.000	0.008***	0.007***	0.002	0.001
temporary	-0.001	-0.000		-0.001*	-0.001**	0.000	-0.004**
experience	-0.015**	-0.005		-0.005**	-0.012***	-0.003*	-0.012***
good health	0.000	0.001		-0.000	-0.000	-0.001*	-0.000
Risk factors							
age	0.013	0.174	0.036	0.062	-0.034	0.087	-0.020
education	-0.006	-0.032*	0.008	0.004	-0.002	-0.003	0.003
migration	0.002	0.003	-0.001	0.000	-0.012***	0.000	0.006
urbanisation	0.000	-0.003	0.006+	0.003*	0.001	0.000	0.002
single	0.011*	0.010*	0.002	0.007*	0.010**	0.001	0.003
single parent	-0.000	0.008+	0.003	0.003**	-0.001	0.004*	-0.000
partner	0.011*	-0.020**	-0.001	-0.006*	0.002	-0.009**	0.008+
partner with kids	-0.029***	-0.033***	-0.016**	-0.029***	-0.006	-0.011*	-0.017**
self-employed	-0.014**	-0.012	-0.004	-0.034***	-0.000	-0.012**	-0.003
part-time	-0.007	-0.015+	0.001	-0.012***	0.007*	-0.003	0.001
Isco	0.046***	0.016	0.029*	0.013***	0.024***	0.012**	0.003
temporary	0.006+	-0.001		-0.008***	-0.002	-0.001	-0.006
experience	0.054	-0.071		0.000	0.049*	-0.011	0.021
good health	-0.026	0.027		0.009	0.001	0.003	-0.020
Constant	-0.109+	-0.101	-0.085*	-0.094*	-0.077+	-0.091+	-0.005
Observations	5498	3944	6171	15956	17674	13266	12747

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 18: Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition for Individual indicator

	Croatia	Slovenia	Estonia	Latvia	Bulgaria	Romania	Poland
Overall							
Men	0.021***	0.081***	0.105***	0.058***	0.106***	0.143***	0.113***
Women	0.054***	0.100***	0.124***	0.094***	0.093***	0.160***	0.151***
difference	-0.033***	-0.019*	-0.019+	-0.036***	0.013	-0.017	-0.038***
characteristics	-0.002	0.018***	0.016*	0.015**	0.015***	0.049***	0.050***
risk factors	-0.030***	-0.037***	-0.035**	-0.051***	-0.002	-0.066***	-0.088***
Characteristics							
age	-0.000	0.001+	-0.006+	-0.012***	0.003**	-0.000	-0.001
education	0.001	0.001	0.017***	0.012***	0.004+	-0.001	0.006***
migration	0.000	0.000	-0.000	-0.000			
urbanisation	0.000		0.000	0.000	0.002**	0.003***	0.002***
single	-0.001**	0.001	0.000	-0.000	-0.001	0.000	0.001*
single parent	-0.000	0.000	-0.005**	0.000	-0.001+	-0.000	0.000
partner	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.001*	0.000	0.000
partner with kids	-0.000	-0.000	-0.002*	0.001	0.000	-0.000	0.000
self-employed	0.005***	0.025***	0.010***	0.011***	-0.001	0.027***	0.022***
part-time	-0.008***	-0.010***	-0.007***	-0.011***	-0.003+	-0.000	-0.011***
Isco	0.003+	0.003	0.004	0.006+	0.010**	0.020***	0.031***
temporary	-0.000	-0.002*	0.001	0.000			
experience	-0.002*		0.005*	0.008*			
good health	-0.000		-0.000	-0.000			
Risk factors							
age	0.104+	0.123**	0.065	0.079	0.048	0.094**	0.081***
education	0.009	0.004	-0.011	-0.002	-0.006	-0.014*	0.002
migration	-0.002	0.006+	0.005	0.003			
urbanisation	-0.000		0.001	0.002	-0.006+	0.001	-0.003*
single	0.008***	0.009***	0.018*	0.008*	0.004	0.008**	0.009***
single parent	-0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.003*	0.000	-0.000	0.002+
partner	0.000	-0.003	-0.012*	0.001	-0.003	-0.004	-0.011***
partner with kids	-0.008*	-0.027***	-0.016*	0.002	-0.002	-0.011+	-0.024***
self-employed	-0.000	-0.020***	-0.010*	-0.007+	-0.001	-0.030**	-0.014**
part-time	-0.000	-0.001	-0.009+	-0.002	-0.001	0.001	0.001
Isco	0.004	-0.005	0.012	0.018*	0.003	-0.005**	0.011***
temporary	0.002	-0.003	-0.002	-0.000			
experience	-0.017		0.043	-0.015			
good health	-0.002		0.018	-0.006			
Constant	-0.126**	-0.120**	-0.138+	-0.127*	-0.036	-0.106**	-0.143***
Observations	6473	8283	5371	4895	6357	7002	12522

+ $p < 0.10$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$