Towards a Sociological Critique of the De-politicization of Inflation – Exploring Inflation Rates Across Social Classes – Working Paper

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Bitte nicht verbreiten! Das paper (bzw. die Idee) ist auf dem Kongress der Österreichischen Gesellschaft für Soziologie entstanden und „work-in-progress“. Der Teil über Hegemonie war ursprünglich nicht inkludiert, und wurde für den Momentum Kongress angefügt. Das Paper wird (hoffentlich) bis zur Herbsttagung der Sektion Wirtschaftssoziologie (DGS) Anfang Dezember fertig werden. Verzeiht das unaufgeräumte Literaturverzeichnis. Wir freuen uns über euer Feedback und auf den Kongress!

Contents

1. **Introduction**
2. **Performativity and Economic Indicators as defensive hegemonic-strategy**
3. **Inflation in Economics and Sociology**
4. **The political history of Inflation**
5. **Single-Metric Inflation and the Ideology of unpolitical Money**
6. **Inflation rates across social classes (preliminary analysis)**

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1. Introduction

To economic sociologists, it has become received knowledge that the economic discipline not only describes but actively 'performs' the modern market economy. Thus, certain economic technologies, metaphors, and concepts enter our ordinary lifeworld and shape how we think about the economy at large. A case in point is inflation.

Over the past century, inflation has evolved into one of the most central concepts of economic policy, and the inflation rate has emerged – both within and beyond the realm of economics – into a 'quasi positive' and 'de-politicized' standard that reflects changes in prices along a single metric. Unlike markets, prices, and competition, inflation has received little attention from economic sociology, potentially due to emergence of 'new' economic sociology as a discipline only after the inflationary period of the 1970s in the West. Further, even if sociology has engaged with inflation, it often implicitly adopted the understanding of inflation as a uniform rise in prices from economic orthodoxy.

In the following, we make the case that inflation needs to be regarded as a complex socio-political construct pervaded by social class relationships. First, we sketch the history of the quantification of inflation, highlighting its politically contested role in performing various economic and social functions. Since the stagflation crisis of the 1970s and with the rise of central-bank capitalism, the 'single-metric' inflation rate has emerged as a key indicator for policy-making. Against this historical background, a 'quasi-positive' understanding of inflation has become dominant in orthodox economic theory and public discourse. This understanding dovetails with an 'ideology of unpolitical money' and is at odds with the political history of inflation. By depicting rising prices in a technocratic and politically neutral way, such a perspective obscures distributional effects and underappreciates class differences in the impact of inflation.

Second, we explore empirically how – throughout the last years – increasing prices have affected classes differently. To do so, we match inflation rates for ECOICOP-2013 categories at 2 structural levels from the HCIP to household consumption bundles from the HBS. Our analysis covers 28 European countries and three time points (2005, 2010, and 2015). In a first step, we examine differences in inflation rates for classes, split up by income quintiles and occupations (manual, non-manual, self-employed, unemployed).

Our research adds to an incipient sociological perspective on inflation by exploring if the exclusive focus on a 'quasi-positive' inflation rate conceals significant distributional effects. In as much as rising prices affect classes differently, a sociology of inflation must not rely on the conceptualization of inflation as brought forward by orthodox economic theory, but rather lay bare its performative role

and develop a more nuanced understanding of inflation as a complex socio-political phenomenon. In that, its mission is located at the intersection of the burgeoning field of the ‘sociology of money’ – that views money as a social relation – and a heterodox economics perspective – that zooms in on various drivers of inflationary dynamics.

2. Performativity and Economic Indicators as defensive hegemonic-strategy

In simply terms, sociological approaches to performativity study the processes in which the economic discipline and its concepts diffuse, become popular and eventually enter public discourse. Sociological studies exploring the performative effect of economic concepts have primarily focused on central economic institutions such as markets (Callon, 1998; Callon & Muniesa 2005) and prices (MacKenzie & Millo, 2003). As noted above in the introduction, within the field of (new) economic sociology, money in general and inflation in particular have been not the most prominent research topics. Especially in relation to performativity approaches, the relative dis-interest in money seems surprising, since the essential role which ideas on money play in economic discourse can hardly be denied, as noted by Jonathan Kirshner (2003: 655):

> „There is something special about the role of ideas in money – the power of ideas does more than just shape the possible. It defines the feasible. Ideas about money can profoundly shape policy in ways divorced from the economic logic or merits of those ideas”.

Even more strongly suggesting the performative role of ideas about money and, by extension, inflation, is the fact that policy makers seem painfully aware of the effect that their monetary convictions have on the general public:

> “The Committee was using communication - mere words - as its primary monetary policy tool […]. Communication was an independent and effective tool for influencing the economy”
>
> - Yellen, 2013

Modern central banks count on communication (although primarily addressing specific market actors in contrast to the general public) as an essential policy tool. In general, the performative power of economic indicators such as GDP (cite this performativity paper on GDP) can be tied into an understanding of hegemony as put forward by Antonia Gramsci. More precisely, we argue that the de-politicization and the employment of inflation rates as a quasi-positive, technical term in discourse may be understood as a “defensive-hegemonic strategy” (Nonhoff, 2019). The core idea of the concept of hegemony in Gramsci's

work is his observation that power (more precisely, *rule*) in (bourgeois) societies does not solely depend upon brute force but is always based upon a combination of coercion and consent. Moreover, the voluntary consent of parts of society to the government must be organized politically (Becker et al., 2017, p. 7). In contrast to orthodox Marxism, Gramsci understands classes as pluralistic combination of different interests. Crucial for him is the question of how a class can manage to transcend its “material” affiliation and construct a political project which cannot be confined in simple terms of class conflicts. The fight for hegemony can best be understood as a dialectical process between materialist structures and (semiotic) discourses (Preston & Silke, 2011, p. 10). Consequently, defensive-hegemonic strategies are about the "production of consent" rather than coercion (Thomas, 2009). Since the actual power of coercion is limited in (modern) democracies, it can be argued that hegemonic projects must put efforts into the production of consent in discourse. Performative metrics like GDP or de-politicized, what we call “quasi-positive” inflation-rates play an essential role in the production of consent for hegemonic projects in general and specific policies in particular. At the same time, however, it is important to emphasize that the discursive framing of inflation rates as ‘neutral’ indicators has very real consequences. Simultaneously, defensive-hegemonic strategies on a discursive level are not sufficient for a hegemonic project to maintain hegemony. Put differently, discursively produced notions of ‘neutral money’ may justify raising prices, but neoliberal hegemony is also dependent upon coercion, i.e. the enforcement of higher prices (e.g. rents) by the state.

3. Inflation in Economics and Sociology

It has been argued that economic indicators like inflation-rates actively ‘perform’ the modern market economy, thereby playing a role in defending hegemonic projects such as neoliberalism[3]. This contribution is based on the argument that the de-politicization of inflation rates is at odds with its political and essentially contested history. Before developing this claim further, however, it seems adequate to briefly summarize the theory of inflation in economics as well as sociology.

[3] We follow Biebricher (2021) in viewing neoliberalism primarily as a political theory. While this might certainly be up to discussion, this is not the place to extensively dwell on the term neoliberalism. For an overview, see Mirowski & Plehwe, 2015; Crouch, 2011; Harvey, 2011.

In simplified terms, economic orthodoxy understands money in as a technically and politically neutral device, which spontaneously emerged as a social solution to the "double coincidence of wants" (Jevons, 1897). In contrast, for historical (Aglietta, 2018; Hudson, 2004; Graeber, 2014; Alary et al., 2020) as well as analytical (Ingham, 2004; Schumpeter, 1987) reasons, we build on so-called credit-theories of money. While this is not the place to extensively dwell on the fallacies of classical and neo-classical monetary theory, it can be boiled down to the categorical error of not differentiating between 'money' as an abstract concept (a social institution) and the 'money-stuff' (Keynes, 1930), specifically coinage. In contrast, a sociological understanding of money highlights the importance of authority, coercion and institutions for its genesis and phenomenology. Money is credit in that its value consists of their ability to redeem a (generalized type of) debt (Innes, 1913; 1914; Sahr, 2022). Money is a liability for the issuer and a credit for the user, and the power to create money is shared by the state (i.e. the government and central banks) and private banks (Ingham, 2004; Wray, 2004, Deutsche Bundesbank, 2016; Mcley et. al, 2014). From a sociological perspective, the argument that all money is credit implies that money is a set of social relations (Ingham, 1996; Simmel, 1907). Further, Aglietta & Orlean (1998) argue that money forms a collective belief, referencing the idea of money as a 'social faith' (Simiand, 1934), which play an important role as a medium of social cohesion. While this idea will not be further developed in this contribution, inflation as a socio-political phenomenon threatens to impede the (methodical and hierarchical) trust in the institution of money, and consequently social cohesion.

Before leaving the realm of abstractions, two additions are important: Modern money must be understood as a collective, social entity (the "money grid", Mehrling, 2017). It is thereby subject to mechanisms of power and coercion, a fact which classical and neoclassical monetary theory cannot comprehend. Moreover, the contemporary financial and monetary system is hierarchical in nature (Ingham, 2004; Mehrling; 2012, 2013; Pistor, 2013), with 'sovereign money' (a liability of the state) on top, followed by different forms of 'near-money' (Ingham, 2004).

From a sociologically informed perspective, money resembles a public infrastructure (Sahr, 2022). Consequently, from a normative perspective, the question of who controls (the value of) money becomes essential. Orthodox approaches to inflation are rooted on the misguided understanding of money as a neutral, technical device. The neutrality of money (and inflation) goes back to David Hume's "classical dichotomy" (Patinkin & Steiger, 1989), and has been endlessly reproduced by the likes of Mill, Pigou, Modigliani and Friedman. In economic orthodoxy, inflation is generally being defined as either (1) a continuous increase in the *average* price level, or (2) an increase in the *total* amount of money in relation

to the total amount of goods (Friedman, 1968; Papademons & Modigliani, 1990; cf. Nitzan & Bichler, 2009: 369 for a good overview; add primary sources). Put differently, orthodox economic theory usually views inflation as an *aggregated* phenomenon.

In relation to the neoliberal hegemonic project, the monetarist view of inflation still plays an important role. Based on the notion of neutral money, in monetarism, „inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon" (Friedman, 1968: 98). The monetarist understanding of inflation builds on the quantity theory of money (originally developed by Fisher, 1911)4, with the 'monetarist' version developed by Friedman (1976 [1992]) and Friedman & Schwartz (1982). In simplified terms, the basic idea is that "too much money is chasing too few goods" (Coppola, 2021, p. 331), and that the money supply determines the inflation rate. With relation to the introductory considerations on the nature of money above, the monetarist view of inflation is flawed since (1) the money supply cannot be exogenously controlled by authorities (e.g. Wray, 2000) and (2), the monetarist notion of inflation as a uniform increase in prices is empirically wrong (section 6; Fix, 2021; Nitzan & Bichler, 2009; Weber & Wasner, 2023).

In contrast to monetarism, New-Keynesian[5] approaches to inflation strongly focus on the role of aggregate demand (demand-pull). In its more sophisticated, dynamic understanding, the rational is that demand rises faster than production capacities. This leads to an 'overheating' economy (Lavoie, 2022), for which both expansionary fiscal and monetary policy can be blamed (Machlup, 2020). While at least partially acknowledging the relevance of fiscal policy, New-Keynesian approaches share with monetarism that inflation is being understood as an aggregate phenomenon and can be reduced to a single, technical inflation rate. Consequently, it is at odds with a sociologically informed understanding of money and inflation. In general, it can be argued that in orthodox economic theory, inflation is being discussed in relation to a heterogeneity in *causes*, but homogeneity with reference to reducing a complex phenomenon to an aggregate macro-variable.

Finally, recent post-Keynesian approaches (Weber & Wasner, 2023; Weber et al., 2022) conceptualize inflation as a dis-aggregated phenomenon. Zooming in on sector-specific price rises and integrating a theory of price-setting (building on Kaleckian mark-up pricing) into their analysis, such approaches represent an important source of inspiration for a sociology of inflation, which is yet to be fully developed. At the same time, even heterodox, disaggregated approaches like Weber & Wasner (2023, e.g p. 32)

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[4] The QTM is not a *theory* in a strict sense, since it merely describes tautological relationship (e.g. Nitzan & Bichler, 2009, 30ff; Hung & Thompson, 2016).

[5] Resulting from the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis, "neoliberal dilution of Keynesianism" (Konings, 2022) from a critical perspective.

fallback on employing the official inflation-rate in their (academic as well as political) argument. As we intend to show, the employment of inflation rates in academic and public discourse is at odds with their political (and statistical) history.

As briefly indicated in the introduction, inflation as a research topic has been largely neglected in economic sociology, with some notable exceptions. Sociological approaches to inflation have largely focused on collective power (Goldthorpe, 1978; Rothorn, 1977; Crouch, 1987). While providing the important insight of understanding inflation as “a redistributional struggle fought through rising prices” (Nitzan & Bichler, 2009: 369), the mentioned also conceptualize inflation in aggregated terms, maintaining their focus on single-metric inflation rates.

4. The Political history of inflation

The construction of price-indices has always been politically contested (Stapleford, 2009). The early history of the quantification and measurement of inflation can be subdivided in three historical phases. Starting from the early 18th century, dedicated individuals started to develop basic concepts and methods. From the late 19th century onwards, statistical agencies of the state started to track price-developments on a larger scale. We will begin our closer historical analysis in the early 20th century, when inflation rates slowly began to play a political role.

In the following, we will sketch the political debates on the measurement of inflation throughout the 20th century. Further, we will briefly connect political disputes to respective statistical debates on the construction of price-indices.

4.1 The early quantification of inflation

At the turn of the 20th century, the US Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) came into being. The agency has been founded against the historical background of rising costs of living, an increasingly organized workforce and labor struggles increasing in number and intensity in the U.S. (Stapleford, 2009: ch. 1). One explicit goal of the BLS was to develop a ‘fair measure’ for wage increases to contain class conflict (Davis, 1986). Before that, the U.S. wholesale price index (today’s producer price index) was used as a measure of increases in the cost of living (Hayes, 2011), but was increasingly criticized for not adequately depicting the rising costs of living.

Between 1900 and 1920, the cost-of-living crisis emerged as a central topic in political debate, with the effect of the BLS’s attempts to construct price-indices becoming more and more politicized. Its efforts culminated in the first official ‘Cost-of-Living’ – Index (COL), published by the US Department of Labour in

1919. However, the establishment of the index did not settle the political contestation about wages between increasingly powerful unions and the BLS. Unions argued that the newly established index should account for more factors than just prices which altered costs of living (travel costs, childcare costs, changes in the quality of goods…), while BLS economists argued for the practicality of simply measuring price-changes. Brief efforts of unions to compute their own indices ended in frustration, as the BLS rejected more sophisticated indices on 'scientific grounds' (Stapleford, 2009).

Roughly at the same time, similar debates took place in the U.K. Efforts by the royal statistical society to provide better statistics on prices (starting from 1885 onwards) have been challenged by political elites by justification of additional government expenditure. Further, it was argued that the inquiries of the Labour Department on wages and household expenditure would intrude into what was a private matter between employers and their workers. Despite of political resistance, the board of trade used data from household budget survey (1904) to construct a first index of consumer prices, which should reflect rising costs-of-living and was quickly referenced in the debates on how much wages should rise (Ralph et al., 2020, chapter 2). Between the wars, more formal links between wages and the cost-of-living index were established. In what came to be known as the 'sliding-scales'-debate, UK governments throughout the 1920s and 1930s repeatedly argued for delinking wages and the COL-index, citing inflationary dynamics. Unions rejected such proposals on the grounds that this link was now firmly established in workers' minds. Governments shortly before and during WWII resorted to artificially suppressing the index by introducing price controls and subsidies exclusively for items which were included in the index, which led to increasing disparities between "official" figures and the experience of consumers (Searle, 2015, p. 156ff).

The political debates sketched above were accompanied by more technical, statistical discussions on the construction of price indices. Most famously, Frisch (1936) differentiated between the functional, but complex approach of constructing a COL-Index and the more pragmatic approach of comparing the prices of specific baskets of goods at different points of time (‚constant-goods'-index; COG). Conceptionally, the COL-Index is based on the neo-classical idea of maintaining their 'standard of living' at a constant level of utility (O'Neill, 2017; Staehle, 1935). As has been surfaced again and again in various political debates, it is statistically difficult to construct a 'true' COL-Index. At the same time, the baskets of goods- approach runs into several statistical problems, such as which goods to include, how to weigh them, how and if to differentiate between (sub-)populations, the declining quality of goods, non-constant preferences, the "law-of-one-price" (which disallows for, say, different kinds of bread within a basket). Especially the problem of changing quality as well as the "law-of-one-price" turned out to be highly relevant in political terms. The plethora of problems coming with the task of constructing an index which adequately depicts

rising prices led early statisticians to conclude that compiling a 'true' cost-of-living index is near impossible (Konüs, 1939; O'Neill, 2017: 279).

4.2 post- WWII – The rise of the CPI

While sharply rising prices during the War would force open political division, after the second World War the heated political debates about if COG-indices are suited to measure costs of living began to slowly settle down. In the U.S, the COG-index became dominant in the form of the newly established CPI. In addition, the CPI became an important macro-economic indicator for policy purposes, such as indexing social security payments, defining the poverty line or including it in decisions on Keynesian fiscal policies (Stapleford, 2009, chapters 8-9; Hayes, 2011). In the U.K., the pressure exerted by Unions during the war led to the establishment of a newly constructed retail price index in the early 1950, which exists alongside the CPI until this day. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, however, the political (and methodological) debates on the index have boiled down, until the introduction of the European HICP in 1996. Due to differences in construction (for instance, the RPI includes owner-occupied housing while the British CPI does not), political debates on which index to use are ongoing (Ralph et al, 2020, chapter 2).

Between the 1950s and the early 1990s, price-indices in general and the CPI in particular significantly gained in importance as a macro-economic indicator (Hayes, 2011). Moreover, the CPI started to be used in collective bargaining processes in most western capitalist economies (US, UK, DE). Politically, this has been made possible by diminishing pressure by unions and a less pronounced class conflict in the period of 'embedded liberalism' (Ruggie, 1982), which was characterized by the Keynesian goal of full employment and rising real wages.

4.3 Central Bank Capitalism

The rise of the CPI as a de-politicized and quasi-positive indicator is closely tied to the rise of inflation management and what we call central-bank capitalism.

Until the late 1980s, international central banking has been characterized by institutional isomorphism. Monetary policy by central banks has been highly dependent upon specific coalitions of national elites (Marcussen, 2009). For instance, post-War elites in Germany have been relatively homogeneous (with aligning interests of industrial as well as financial elites), whereas post-war Britan has been characterized by conflicts of interest between the City of London and industrial elites (cite). From the early 1990s onwards, central banks have been undergone a process of institutional convergence. Price stability emerged as the central *Handlungsmaxime* (Weinert, 2002), and most central banks became formally and

legally independent. Further, central banking was ‘internationalized’ and ‘europeanized’ (cite). The 1990s have witnessed the ‘scientization’ of central banking (Marcussen, 2009). In what Mirowski (1991) views as an epistemic rupture, the ‘art of central banking’ became the ‘science of central banking’. Politicians have been replaced with economists, and a relatively homogenous ‘knowledge community’ emerged as the dominant in-group in the FED and the ECB (Marcussen, 2009; Gregory, 2007), with a methodological focus on mathematical modelling. Importantly, however, the cultural and legal institutionalization of price-stability as uncontested consensus of monetary policy must be understood as the outcome of political struggles. For instance, Polillo & Guillén (2005) convincingly argue that the formal ‘independence’ of central banks emerged as a result of neoliberal efforts. While the focus on stabilizing the value of money played a role in central banking from the 1970s onwards, it was only in the 1990s that inflation targeting became dominant vice versa alternative goal variables such as growth and unemployment (Weinert, 2002, add sources).

In the context of the scientization of central banking, the inflation rate finally emerged as the de-politicized, quasi-neutral economic indicator which dominates the discourse up to this day. Two further aspects are of importance. While being theoretically anti-pluralist and politically anti-democratic (Grabel, 2000), it is often argued that the success of monetary policy hinges on the ‘credibility’ and ‘transparency’ of ‘rule-based’ central banking (Bowman et al., 2013). However, modern central banks are trying to be credible and transparent vis-à-vis specific economic actors, and not the general public. From the 1990s onwards, central banks started to device highly ritualized and regularized procedures around the formation and release of policy decisions (Bowman et al., 2013: 464) to better anticipate and control the reaction of market participants (Blinder, 2004). Thus, with Streeck (2017), it can be argued that they address ‘market society’ (*Marktvolk*) and not civil society (*Staatsvolk*). Additionally, central banks tend to subsidize research on monetary issues which are in line with the institutional status quo (White, 2005). In general, the scientization of central banks led to the ‘crowding-out’ of alternative monetary theory. After the financial crisis (GFC), central banks lost some credibility, and the ‘knowledge community’ of central banking must live with a state of fundamental uncertainty and a ‘consensus of dissatisfaction’ (Bowman et al., 2013). At the same time, however, central banks have become more ‘central’ than ever to the global, hierarchically organized monetary and financial system, creating an unprecedented amount of sovereign money (e.g. via APPs). Importantly, the process of money creation is not ‘neutral’ in any meaningful sense (van Kloster & Fontan, 2020). Moreover, in the years after the GFC, the FED and the ECB underwent regulatory changes to include more and more types of ‘shadow money’ into their regulatory framework, providing public backstops for what is essentially private money creation (Wullweber, 2018). Most

essentially for the argument underlying this paper, inflation targeting has never been questioned as central policy goal.

Against the historical background of central bank capitalism, measuring inflation has also undergone a process of harmonization and standardization. Most prominently, the European Union has introduced the harmonized index of consumer prices (HICP) in 1996. The statistical institutes of Canada, Australia, Europe and Japan have all settled on using a COG-index based on baskets of consumer goods (O'Neill, 2017, chapter 12). By the end of the 20th century, leading international institutions acknowledged that, for the statistical problems mentioned in brevity above, it is hardly impossible to construct a 'true' COL-Index (ILO et al, 2004). However, in public discourse, CPI-indices are mostly employed in arguments *as if* they would be measuring actual changes in the cost of living (Pollak, 1988). The U.S is a notable and important exemption. It is the only major economy where the inflation measure is officially labelled as a COL-Index (O'Neill, 2017: 282). This has mainly been a consequence of the highly influential 'Boskin-report', which stated that the official CPI-measurement was overstating changes in cost of living by 1.1%, and recommended switching to a 'real' COL-Index (Boskin et al., 1996). In other words, the report argued to measure the change in prices to achieve a fixed standard of living rather than the price change of a fixed basket of goods and services. It has been heavily discussed and criticized by national statistics agencies around the world (Gordon, 2000). Hoover & Dowell (2001: 138) argue that concluding that the CPI overstates inflation by a specific amount implies that a 'true' measurement exists, which is questionable from a statistical point of view. Importantly, Ralph et al. (2020) view the Boskin-Report as at least partially driven by interests within the US Treasury and the budgetary considerations.

5. Single-metric Inflation & the Ideology of unpolitical money

While there is the danger to get caught up in the technical details of inflation measurement, the above should have made it clear to the reader that the construction of price indices is not only a question of statistical finesse and mathematical sophistication, but usually heavily implicated in political considerations. In the U.K., as briefly mentioned above, either using the HICP or the RPI for specific macro-economic decisions is a matter of continued debate (Ralph et al., 2020, chapter 5). The Peronist government of Christina Kirchner in Argentina tried to directly influence the measurement of inflation for political gain by manipulating the construction of the CPI (Daniel & Lanata Briones, 2019).

A technical, de-politicized understanding of inflation rates as a neutral economic indicator is fundamentally at odds with the political history of inflation measurement. Consequently, we argue that the focus on

‚single-metric' – inflation must be considered as an integral part of an "ideology of unpolitical money" (Sahr, 2022). Building on the heterodox understanding of money put forward above, which rejects its technical and political neutrality as well as on the political history of inflation, we argue that a sociology must reject a mechanic and de-politicized understanding of inflation. Reducing a complex, socio-economic phenomenon to a single-metric obscures distributional effects and the mechanisms of power of which money is subjected to. In contrast, inflation (or better, rising prices) is a redistributive phenomenon with winners & losers. To uncover the distributional effects of inflation necessitates careful disaggregated empirical analysis.

6. Empirical analysis (preliminary results)

Goal: Analysis of inflation rates for income-quintiles in 27 European countries over 3 periods (2003-2007; 2008-2012; 2013-2018) by matching inflation rates for 12 ECOICOP-2013 categories (HCIP) to Household Consumption Bundles (HBS).

data source: freely available at eurostat, already used for similar purpose (u.a., Gürer & Weichenrieder 2018)

HBS -> Household Budget Survey, HCB relatively stable, HCB only available for 2005, 2010, 2015

→ computation of price-rises in a 5-year intervall around those years.

→ using 5-year intervalls may also reduce substitution effect?



Fig. 1: Price Increases between 2003-2018; 12 COICOP Categories

West =“BE","DK","ES","FR","PT","UK“, "NO","SE","FI","DE","AT","IE")



Fig. 2: Inflation rates for different income-quintiles (5 is the highest)

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